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Abstract: 
The overwhelming majority of scientists have concluded that global warming is 
unequivocal. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) fifth report in 
2013 concluded that the challenge of climate disruption to human beings is even more 
imperative than the previous report claimed,
1
 and that anthropogenic greenhouse
gases (GHGs) emissions have extremely likely been the dominant causes of the 
observed global warming since the mid-20
th
 century.
2
Anthropogenic GHGs emissions have many implications, including more intensive, 
extreme meteorological events, spreading of diseases, and threatening human health 
and life. Climate change also causes injustice in human society because of the 
dislocation of the consequences from it in time and space for the affected people. As a 
response, a variety of policies and laws have been initiated from regions and nations. 
Among them, economic incentive instruments are employed to combat global 
warming, including a carbon emission trading system (ETS) and a carbon tax. 
Carbon emission trading as a market means has its advantages, such as political 
feasibility and certainty for environmental benefits. Its volatility of carbon price could 
be avoided by a proper design, for instance, a price containment mechanism. In 
contrast, a carbon tax is less politically feasible and also may have an effect on trade 
and market distortion, such as border and tariff adjustments (BATS). 
1Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [hereinafter ―IPCC‖], FIFTH ASSESSMENT REPORT, at 3, (2013) SPM 
WGI-12 AR5. 
2Supra at 12. 
3 
Allowing parties to buy CERs from CDM and Reduced Emissions from Deforestation 
and forest Degradation (REDD+) projects will be conducive to carbon emissions 
reduction.
3
The European Union Emission Trading System (EU ETS) is the largest and most 
successful market based system in the world. The lessons learned in its development, 
detailed in the body of this thesis, set invaluable examples from which other market 
based systems can greatly benefit. 
The Regional GHG Initiative (RGGI), the first mandated cap-and-trade program for 
GHGs, is another pioneer cap and trade program herein discussed in depth. It is a 
regional program of Northeastern U.S. states. RGGI is regarded as an effective and 
efficient system. It successfully decoupled economic growth and the reduction of 
carbon emissions. RGGI states surpassed other states in economic growth and the 
decline of carbon emissions simultaneously. 
RGGI‘s challenges and shortcomings are also documented. Thus RGGI encountered 
carbon leakages through importing electricity from non-RGGI states. The Cost 
Containment Reserve also needed improvement. When reserve allowances were sold, 
additional emissions tended to inflate the original cap. To avoid this scenario, some 
portion of allowances needed to be held back in the allowance reserve. 
3 U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change [hereinafter ―UNFCC‖], http://redd.unfccc.int/ (last visited 
Nov. 6, 2017). (This is so despite the fact that a small minority, less than 3%, express doubts about global warming 
and a few even deny climate change.) 
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Another pioneer U.S. cap and trade initiative, The Western Climate Action Initiative, 
is a unique multi-jurisdictional program among western U.S. states and Canadian 
provinces. In one element of it, California and Quebec have created the first 
international cap-and-trade system of sub-national jurisdictions. It is the most 
ambitious program in North America, but it encountered difficulties from the dramatic 
change in the political landscape accompanying the 2008 economic crisis and the 
change in U.S. administrations. 
The emission trading systems of a number of other nations that are experimenting 
with emission trading systems are also covered in depth, including the Korea 
Emission Trading System begun in South Korea in 2015 and the Tokyo Metropolitan 
Government cap-and-trade program which was the first mandatory ETS in Japan, 
begun in 2010. 
The China approaches to these issues and their prospects are a major focus of this 
study. China officially launched seven state pilot ETS programs starting in 2013 and 
plans to initiate a national ETS this year in 2017. The many accumulated experiences 
from the pilot programs include such findings as the importance of setting realistic 
targets balancing the needs for carbon reductions with those of economic growth and 
pollution control and the need for legislation specifying the actions to be taken, 
provisions for disclosure, allowance allocations, offsets, infrastructure building, 
monitoring reporting and verification, and adoption of a compliance mechanism. 
Deficiencies in the pilot programs are evaluated, such as those derived from lack of a 
national legal basis and unified rules for the carbon market, an excess of free 
allocation of allowances, a lack of liquidity of the market, lenient punishment for 
5 
non-compliance, and absence of a sound monitoring and regulatory mechanism. 
The requisites for sound market based programs are described, with particular 
emphasis on the need for a comprehensive legal basis on which programs can be built. 
The pluses and minuses of cap and trade market based programs versus carbon taxes 
are explored in depth, including the possibilities of combining the two systems. 
Various bottom up and top down approaches are explored and the key elements of 
success and failure. 
From the perspective of international cooperation under the Paris Agreement in the 
long run, it is concluded that it is necessary to identify a formula to link the domestic 
carbon markets to those in other jurisdictions. A multi-lateral club approach is 
suggested. The role of the judicial branch in carbon emission reduction is explored 
with several recent relevant cases described. 
Conclusions of the study seek to identify what alternative systems of carbon emission 
controls are being applied throughout the world, what lessons can be learned from 
them, and what are the important elements needed for successful programs. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
1.1The challenges of climate change and climate justice 
The overwhelming majority of scientists have concluded that the ―warming of the 
climate system is unequivocal.‖4 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) summarized that, ―many of the observed 
changes are unprecedented over decades to millennia.‖ 5  Since the 1950s, the 
atmosphere and the ocean have warmed, the amounts of snow and ice have 
diminished, the sea level has risen, and the concentrations of greenhouse gases have 
increased.
6
 
 
This trend has already been manifested in many aspects, including effects on the 
atmosphere, ocean, cryosphere, sea level, and carbon and other biogeochemical cycles. 
For instance, global mean surface temperature exhibits substantial multi-decadal 
warming. ―Each of the last three decades has been successively warmer at the Earth‘s 
surface than any preceding decade since 1850. In the Northern Hemisphere, 
1983-2012 was likely the warmest 30-year period of the last 1400 years.‖7 
 
Scientific evidence also shows that temperature has increased near the surface of the 
ocean (0-700m): on a global scale, the upper 75m has warmed by 0.11℃ per decade 
                                                             
4IPCC, supra note 1.  
5Id. 
6Id. 
7Id. 
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over the period 1971-2010.
8
 The cryosphere confirms the same challenge of global 
warming: ―Over the last two decades, the Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets have 
been losing mass, glaciers have continued to shrink almost worldwide, and Arctic sea 
ice and the Northern Hemisphere spring snow cover have continued to decrease in 
extent.‖9 
 
Meanwhile, the global mean sea level rose by 0.19m during the period of 1901-2010, 
with the most rapid mean rate of sea level rise since the mid-19
th
 century in 
comparison with the previous two millennia.
10
 ―CO2 concentrations have increased 
by 40% since pre-industrial times, primarily from fossil fuel emissions and secondly 
from net land use change emissions.‖11 In fact, 30% of the anthropogenic induced 
carbon emissions have been absorbed by the ocean, resulting in acidification,
12
 a 
disastrous effect to oceanic ecosystems. 
 
The IPCC Fifth Report drew the conclusion that ―equilibrium climate sensitivity is 
likely in the range 1.5℃ to 4.5℃, extremely unlikely less than 1℃, and very unlikely 
greater than 6℃. The lower temperature limit of the assessed likely range is thus less 
than the 2℃ indicated in the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report.‖13 This conclusion 
indicates that challenge of climate disruption to human society is more imperative 
than the IPCC Fourth Report claimed. Moreover, the ―evidence for human influence 
                                                             
8Supra note 1, at 4.  
9Supra note 1, at 5.  
10Supra note 1, at 6.  
11Supra note 1, at 7.  
12Id.   
13Supra note 1, at 11.  
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has grown since AR4‖,14 which states ―it is extremely likely that human influence has 
been the dominant cause of the observed warming since the mid-20
th
 century.‖15 
―Natural causes alone cannot explain all of these changes. Human activities contribute 
to climate change, primarily by releasing billions of tons of carbon dioxide (CO2) and 
other heat-trapping gases into the atmosphere every year.‖ 16  Human causes 
contributed to a global mean surface warming likely to be in the range of 0.5℃ to 1.3℃ 
during the period of 1951-2010, including the cooling effect of aerosols. These 
assessed contributions are consistent with the observed warming of approximately 0.6℃ 
to 0.7℃ over this period.17 
 
The Fifth Assessment Report further concluded that ―continued emissions of 
greenhouse gases will cause further warming and changes in all components of the 
climate system. Limiting climate change will require substantial and sustained 
reductions of greenhouse gas emissions.‖18 
 
Human influence on climate system has many implications. Human induced climate 
disruption is intensifying droughts, storms, floods, wildfires, heat waves, and diseases 
all across the globe.
19
 Since 1979, over ―9,000 Americans were reported to have died 
as direct result of heat-related illness such as heat stroke.‖20 And ―a total of about 
28,000 heat-related hospitalizations were recorded across 20 states‖ during the period 
                                                             
14Supra note 1, at 12.  
15Supra note 1, at 12.  
16JERRY M. MELILLO, TERESE RICHMOND & GARY W. YOHE, CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN THE UNITED STATES: 
THE THIRD NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT, (U.S. Global Change Research Program, 2014).   
17Supra note 1, at 12-13.  
18Supra note 1, at 14.  
19Friederike E.L. Otto, Climate Change: Attribution of Extreme Weather, 8 Nature Geoscience 81, 82 (2015).  
20U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Climate Change Indicators: Health and Society, 
https://www.epa.gov/climate-indicators/health-society (last visited Nov. 6, 2017).  
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of 2001-2010, according to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).
21
 
 
―Global warming is also contributing to species extinctions and ecosystem 
degradation on a scale that rivals the five great mass extinction events in the Earth‘s 
history.‖22 One expert claims that ―the best scientific minds in the world are warning 
of far more serious and irreversible consequences for humanity unless there is a 
concerted effort by government and the private sector to end the fossil fuel era in time 
to avoid utter catastrophe.‖23 
 
Climate change also incites injustice in human society, because of the dislocation of 
the results from climate disruption in time and space among people in different groups, 
different geographical locations and different generations; this is an intergenerational 
and an intra-generational problem. The limited carrying capacity and scarcity of the 
climate resources determine the uneven impacts on the world by climate change.  
 
Since the climate system itself has characteristics of liquidity and inseparability, the 
direct effect of climate change has reached every corner of the world, but the most 
vulnerable and poorest countries and peoples are the first and most severely affected, 
even if they are not related to the major manufacturers who cause the disruptions of 
climate change.
24
 Second, the biggest emitters of greenhouse gases are not those who 
are the most seriously affected by climate change.
25
 
                                                             
21Id. 
22Patrick Parenteau & Mingde Cao, Carbon Trading in China: Progress and Challenges, 46 Environmental Law 
Reporter 10194, 10194 (2016). See also, Gerarda Ceballos et al., Accelerated Modern Human-Induced Species 
Losses: Entering the Sixth Mass Extinction, 1 Sci. Advances, 19 (2015).  
23Supra note 22, at 10195.  
24
NICHOLAS STERN, THE STERN REVIEW ON THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE, EXEC. SUMMARY 1 (CAMBRIDGE 
UNIVERSITY PRESS 2007). 
25AGNES MICHELOT, ET AL., CLIMATE JUSTICE: CHALLENGES AND PERSPECTIVES 77-105 (Bruylant 2015). 
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Developed countries contribute most to climate change, but according to the Alliance 
of Small Island States (AOSIS), the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) suffer most 
from the impact of climate change. This is because the AOSIS and LDCs countries 
are located in climate sensitive and fragile areas, coupled with their low economic 
development status and weak capacity for addressing climate change.
26
 
 
Furthermore, since carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases generally have long 
lifecycles and are difficult to remove from the atmosphere, climate change has a long 
term accumulation; thus, one generation enjoys the benefits of industrialization, and 
future generations bear the adverse consequences of it. These characteristic of climate 
change raise the issue of climate injustice. Lord Nicholas Stern, a leading world 
economist of the London School of Economics, states that climate change has caused 
the ―greatest and most widest-ranging market failure ever seen.‖27 
 
Carbon dioxide emissions are a classic example of a market externality that can only 
be corrected by governmental policies. ―But those policies must be intelligent, 
well-designed, and cost-effective.‖28  Therefore, justice requires internalizing the 
social cost of carbon emissions; that means that ―those who have benefited the most 
from the industrial era, and who have the resources and technologies to make a 
difference, must take the lead‖ in paying for the social costs of the carbon pollution 
through regulatory and fiscal policies.
29
 
 
 
                                                             
26Id.  
27Supra note 24.  
28Supra note 22, at 10195. 
29Id.  
14 
 
1.2Policies and regulatory response to climate change challenges and climate 
injustice 
Climate change as a compelling threat to humanity has been widely recognized by 
national governments and international society. As a response, a host of policies and 
laws have been initiated. Among them, the traditional command and control method is 
still playing a critical role in combating global warming, such as with renewable 
portfolio standards, pollution standards, building codes and standards, appliance 
efficiency standards, and vehicle efficiency standards. Some experts have held that 
with such standards ―renewable energy and efficiency resources should play a major 
role from the energy aspects of sustainable development.‖30 
 
Meanwhile, a variety of economic instruments have also been employed as 
alternatives to cope with the issue, particularly cap-and-trade systems and carbon 
taxation. Critics of command and control mainly assert that for a fixed climate goal, 
an efficient cap-and-trade system should suffice, and that command and control 
measures increase overall compliance costs without producing additional 
environmental benefits.
31
 
 
Proponents of command and control, on the other hand, argue on the basis of welfare 
economics. They claim that multiple externalities exist in energy and climate policy, 
and they cannot be internalized by an isolated carbon market.
32
 Apart from climate 
change, serious and costly externalities arise from continued dependence on fossil 
                                                             
30ADRIAN J. BRADBROOK & RICHARD L. OTTINGER, EDS., ENERGY LAW AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 79-113 
(The World Conservation Union, 2003).  
31Larry Kreisler et al. eds., Envtl Pricing: Studying in Policy Choices and Interactions, Vol. XVI 51, (Edward 
Elgar Publishing 2015). 
32Id. 
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fuels, with life-threatening air, water and chemical pollution and the impacts of 
extraction of traditional energy resources.  
 
In addition to negative externalities, positive effects also come from the energy 
transformation process, such as from innovation in renewable energy and energy 
efficiency technologies. For the sake of internalizing externalities, command and 
control proponents often advocate that a policy mix of complementary instruments to 
adoption of standards, such as carbon pricing and feed-in-tariffs are justified.
33
 
Moreover, they assert that the cap size of carbon emission trading is often based on 
political acceptability rather than on environmental necessities or overall abatement 
costs. They conclude that ―hence, real-world cap-and-trade systems will probably 
never be cost efficient or sufficiently effective.‖ 34  Therefore, complementing a 
politically weakened cap and trade program with additional measures could be a more 
reasonable alternative.
35
 
 
From the dimension of sustainability established at Rio Summit in 1992 and the 2030 
Agenda for Sustainable Development
36
environmental effectiveness, economic 
efficiency and social justice should be included in energy and climate policies. One 
expert emphasizes the significance of evaluation of climate change related policies, 
for policymaking is strongly influenced by politics and that the choice of available 
policy options is limited by institutional dependencies and political factors.
37
 She 
                                                             
33Id. 
34Id. 
35Id. 
36 U.N. Dep. of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, Transforming Our World: 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, 
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2017). .  
37NATALIE STOINANOFF, LARRY KREISER ET AL., CARBON PRICING: DESIGN, EXPERIENCES AND ISSUES 177 (Edward 
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claims that an efficient and effective policy might still be defective if it dangerously 
compromises equity.
38
 
 
Unfortunately, there are not many examples of climate change methodology 
effectiveness evaluations in practice.
39
 She cited the Multi-Party Climate Change 
Committee established by the then first female Prime Minister of Australia, Julia 
Gillard as an example. The Committee was meant to design a climate change policy 
framework and specifically to establish a carbon price mechanism. Eleven policy 
principles, intended to lay a basis for the deliberations on a carbon price, were 
provided by the Committee, including environmental effectiveness, economic 
efficiency, budget neutrality, competitiveness of Australian industries, energy security, 
investment certainty, fairness, flexibility, administrative simplicity, clear 
accountabilities, and support of Australia‘s international objectives and obligations. 
The Committee specified that these principles would facilitate the development of the 
carbon pricing mechanism.
40
 
 
Parties to the 2015 Paris Climate Change Agreement committed to hold the increase 
in the global temperature to well below 2℃ above pre-industrial levels and pursue 
efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5℃ above pre-industrial levels.41 This 
would require a fuel transformation from fossil fuels to renewable energy as being 
indispensable for the de-carbonization of the energy supply.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Elgar Publishing 2015).  
38Id. 
39Id. 
40Id. 
41Paris Agreement, UNFCC, art. 2(1)(a), Dec. 12, 2015.  
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From the perspective of politics and economics, a rapid and complete internalization 
of externalities remains practically impossible. Market oriented approaches, e.g., 
carbon taxation or carbon emission trading have been regarded as cost-efficient. They 
have reduced compliance costs by up to 50 percent compared with 
command-and-control methods in various cases in practice.
42
 But a sudden 
conversion would be unacceptably disruptive of national economies. 
 
Regarding the aspect of social equity, the impact of the financial burden resulting 
from the energy transformation on poor households is significantly higher than that 
for rich ones.
43
 It has been observed that carbon emission trading with other 
instruments such as the German feed-in-tariff raised overall compliance costs and thus 
further increased covered industries‘ resistance to ambitious carbon pricing.44 In fact 
―several arguments support the view that an ambitious policy mix might be easier to 
implement than a single carbon pricing system.‖45  However some conservative 
commentators have asserted that subsidizing renewable energies by a feed-in-tariff 
mainly paid by households, although highly questionable from the dimension of 
equity, might weaken the opposition from industries.
46
 
 
Last, but not least, ―supporting renewable energy and thus fostering the renewable 
energy industry creates a new potent political player in the energy policy discourse 
                                                             
42A.D. ELLERMAN ET AL., MARKETS FOR CLEAN AIR (Cambridge University Press 2000).  
43Supra note 31, at 54.  
44Supra note 31, at 55.  
45E. Gawel et al., A public choice view on the climate and energy policy mix in the EU-How do the emissions 
trading system and support for renewable energies interact?, 64 Energy Policy 175, 175-182 (2014).  
46Supra note 31, at 56. 
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and weakens the relative influence of traditional fossil-fuel based utilities.
47
 Some 
experts found that the theoretical arguments on the necessity of a policy mix 
convincing, and the political process to provide more ambitious carbon pricing 
systems as insufficient.
48
 Nonetheless, they insist that cap-and-trade is the most 
promising carbon pricing option among market-based approaches due to its 
environmental advantages; and they imply that regressive effects of carbon pricing on 
equity would be bigger than other methods, therefore they should be remediated by 
compensating poor communities or households through revenues from taxes or 
auctions.
49
 The merits and demerits of cap-and-trade in comparison with carbon 
taxation will be further discussed below.  
 
1.3 What role the judicial branch may play in combat with climate change?  
The executive branch plays a major role in compliance and enforcement of climate 
law and policy. However, when the executive branch fails to enforce the laws and 
regulations to protect the climate, or it is regarded that it has overstepped its power, 
disputes arise. Judiciary intervention is finally required.  
 
What role the judicial branch may play in the climate change arena has been a heated 
debate in recent years. Among a group of cases related to climate change, Urgenda 
Foundation v. the State of the Netherlands
50
 and Asghar Leghari v. Federation of 
Pakistan
51
 are good examples.  
                                                             
47Id. 
48Supra note 31, at 63. 
49Id. 
50Urgenda Foundation v. the State of the Netherlands, C/09/456689/HA ZA 13-1396 (The Hague District Court, 
Netherlands 2015). 
51Ashgar Leghari v. Federation of Pakistan, etc., No:HCJD/C-121, W.P.No.25501/2015, 5 (The Lahore High Court, 
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On the 24th of June 2015, the Urgenda Foundation, partly on behalf of 886 Dutch 
concerned citizens, launched a suit against the government of the Netherlands in The 
Hague District Court (Civil Section), on the grounds that the Netherlands had 
breached the government required standard of due care by implementing a policy that 
would lead only to a reduction of CO2 emissions by 2020 of less than 25% compared 
with the baseline of 1990 level. The Urgenda Foundation is a citizens‘ platform 
established in 2008 that aims to stimulate and accelerate the transition to a more 
sustainable society. The court ordered the Netherlands to cut CO2 emissions by 25% 
by 2020 from the base of the 1990 level. This case has been regarded as 
unprecedented by commentators.
52
 
 
In 2012, Urgenda wrote a letter to the Dutch government stating that there was 
scientific proof that the European Union‘s commitment to reduce emissions by 20% 
on the basis of 1990 level was simply not enough to avoid dangerous climate change, 
and that the Dutch reduction goal derived from the European target was therefore  
inadequate.
53
 Urgenda urged the Netherlands to do more. The government‘s response 
to the letter was found by the Court to be unsatisfactory. Urgenda therefore requested 
the Court to rule that the State was liable for its role in causing dangerous global 
climate change in 2013. The claim asserted that the State would be acting unlawfully 
if it failed to reduce the annual greenhouse gas emissions in the Netherlands by 40%, 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Pakistan, 2015).  
52
K. J.de Graaf, The Urgenda Decision: Netherlands Liable for Role in Causing Dangerous Global Climate 
Change, J. ENVTL. L. (2015) 27(3): 517,518(2015). 
53Id. 
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in any case by at least 25%, compared with 1990 levels, by the end of 2020.
54
 
 
In its defense, the Netherlands argued that there was no legal duty under national or 
international law for the government to take measures to achieve the reduction targets 
claimed by Urgenda. Furthermore, it maintained that any court order to amend the 
State‘s climate change mitigation policy would violate the government‘s prerogative 
over environmental policies and interfere with the system of separation of powers.
55
 
One of the key elements of the court‘s decision is that it relies on the current climate 
of science and international climate policy, and that agreements to establish that the 
Dutch reduction target is below the standard deemed necessary for developed 
countries (25-40% by 2020) in order to prevent dangerous global climate change (2℃ 
target). Since the Dutch target is similar to the EU target, the court ruled that the EU 
target was (unlawfully) below the necessary standard as well.
56
 
 
Urgenda also alleged that the government was acting contrary to the statutory duty of 
article 21 of the Dutch Constitution. Article 21 imposes a duty of care on the State 
relating to the habitability of the country and the protection and improvement of the 
living environment.
57
 The court established several factors from international law and 
certain elements from Dutch case law on negligence in determining the scope of the 
duty of care owed by the State: (1) the nature and extent of climate change damage; (2) 
the foreseeability of such damage; (3) the chance that hazardous climate change will 
occur; (4) the nature of the acts or omissions of the State; (5) the onerousness of 
taking precautionary measures; and (6) the extent of the discretionary powers of the 
                                                             
54Id. 
55Id. 
56
Supra note 52, at 519. 
57Id. 
21 
 
State, with due regard to public law principles.
58
 
 
The court recognized that the Dutch government had broad discretionary powers with 
regard to its environmental policies, but that they were not unlimited. Hence, the court 
ruled that the Netherlands was in breach of its duty of care and therefore acting 
unlawfully towards Urgenda.
59
 Furthermore, the court concluded that, in light of the 
latest scientific knowledge, it would be more efficient to mitigate and more cost 
effective to take adequate action immediately than to postpone measures in order to 
prevent future hazardous climate change.
60
 
 
In addition, regarding the causation issue, the Netherlands government argued that it 
did not emit GHGs itself. But the court refuted all arguments against a causal link in 
few words, by referring to important case law of the Dutch Supreme Court on joint 
liability. That case law basically provides that when one actor‘s contribution to the 
damage is minor, that is no reason to reject liability.
61
 ―The fact that the amount of 
the Dutch emissions is small compared to other countries does not affect the 
obligation to take precautionary measures in view of the State‘s obligation to exercise 
care.‖62 
 
The Urgenda decision is controversial in several aspects. First, whether the court 
overstepped its powers by issuing the order; second, whether the court‘s assessment of 
                                                             
58Id. 
59Id. 
60Supra note 52, at 522.  
61Id.  
62Urgenda v, The Netherlands, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2015:7196 479 (The Hague District Court 2015) (original 
language:ECLI:RBDHA:2015:7155). 
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the scope of the State‘s unwritten duty to take due care was proper; finally, whether 
the Netherlands government should have lodged an appeal against the court‘s 
judgment.
63
 Critics hold that setting mitigation targets and finding efficient and 
effective instruments to achieve climate targets is generally considered a matter of 
policy. Therefore, the Dutch system of separation of powers between the legislator 
and the judiciary does not allow for the order given by the court;
64
 as a result, they 
assert that the court decision probably could not have survived if the government had 
lodged an appeal. One professor commented that, although the court‘s reasoning was 
questionable from a legal perspective, the judgment was nothing short of 
ground-breaking. This case seems to be the very first decision by any court in the 
world that ordered a state to limit GHG emissions for reasons other than statutory 
mandates.
65
 
 
In the case of Asghar Leghari v. Federation of Pakistan,
66
 a farmer challenged 
Pakistan‘s federal and provincial governments in Lahore High Court through public 
interest litigation in September 2015. Lambasting the inaction, delay and lack of 
seriousness on the part of the Federal Government and the Government of the Punjab 
to address the challenges associated with climate change, the judge said there had 
been ―no progress on the ground‖ despite a National Climate Change Policy adopted 
in 2012 and an implementation framework on the books.
67
 The plaintiff accused 
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government agencies of failing to develop the required resilience to climate change 
provided under the government‘s own framework for implementation of its National 
Climate Change Policy of 2013.
68
 
 
The judge ruled that the delay and lethargy of the State in implementing the State‘s 
Framework Act offended the fundamental rights of the citizens which needed to be 
safeguarded. The judge elucidated that fundamental rights like the right to life include 
the right to a healthy and clean environment and right to human dignity. The judge 
continued, ―environment and its protection have taken a center stage in the system of 
our constitutional rights.‖69 He asserted the existing environmental jurisprudence has 
to be fashioned to meet the needs of the urgent and overpowering need, i.e. for 
climate change mitigation, and stated a need to move to climate change justice from 
other matters of environmental justice.
70
 
 
Within one month of having heard the Ashgar Leghari‘s case, the judge summoned all 
of the country‘s main officials before him, and appointed a named Climate Change 
Commission to ensure implementation of Pakistan‘s climate change framework.71 
―The Leghari decision reveals the under-used power of the courts.‖72 ―The courts can 
bring remedies and will now increasingly be used to enforce political accountability 
and ensure climate justice.‖73 
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The Chief Executive of Globe International commented that the Leghari and Urgenda 
cases set a model for fast track adjudication of climate change-related issues that are 
too often dismissed as too complicated for the courts to handle.
74
 ―The Leghari case 
highlights a simple but fundamental truth--individuals can and do make a difference. 
The case was brought by one man and judged by one man. Each made history. The 
case now sets a new high water mark for climate adjudication.‖ 75  She added 
―bottom-up legal accountability through the courts could become a powerful 
enforcement mechanism.‖76 
 
In Massachusetts v. EPA the Court granted ―special solicitude‖ for standing in public 
interest cases championed by a state. The Court reasoned ―Massachusetts has a 
special position and interest here. It is a sovereign State, and not, as in Lujan, a private 
individual, and it actually owns a great deal of the territory alleged to be affected.‖77  
Furthermore, the Court stretched the bounds of causation and redressability. The 
harms associated with climate change are serious and well recognized; a strong 
consensus among scientists indicates that global warming will cause such serious 
consequences as the rise of sea levels, severe and irreversible changes to natural 
ecosystems, a significant reduction in winter snowfall, flooding and draughts, and 
destructive wildfires, all with direct and significant economic, environmental and 
human harm consequences. The ―EPA‘s failure to dispute the existence of a causal 
connection between man-made greenhouse gas emissions and global warming, its 
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refusal to regulate such emissions, at a minimum, ‗contribute‘ to Massachusetts‘ 
injuries.‖78 
 
Furthermore, the court held that the ―EPA has a duty to take steps to slow or reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions. A reduction in domestic emissions would slow the pace of 
global emissions increase, no matter what happens elsewhere.‖79 In addition, the 
―EPA‘s steadfast refusal to regulate greenhouse gas emissions presents a risk of harm 
to Massachusetts that is both ‗actual‘ and ‗imminent‘. …There is a ‗substantial 
likelihood that the judicial relief requested‘ will prompt the EPA to take steps to 
reduce that risk.‖80 
 
Mass. v. EPA broadens the opportunities for non-state litigants in public interest 
litigation, but does not eliminate the requirements to prove causation and 
redressability where the facts of the case cannot show a strong connection.  For 
example, in Washington Environmental Council v. Bellon, WEC and the Sierra Club, 
Washington State Chapter, under the citizen-suit provision of the federal Clean Air 
Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. sections 7401-7671q, sought to compel the Washington State 
Department of Ecology and the other regional agencies to regulate greenhouse gas 
emissions from the state‘s five oil refineries under the Clean Air Act. The 9th Circuit 
held that plaintiffs failed to satisfy the causality and redressability requirements to 
establish standing. Plaintiffs alleged that their injuries were causally linked to the 
agencies‘ failure to set and apply ―reasonably available control technology‖ standards. 
However, the court reasoned that ―greenhouse gases, once emitted from a specific 
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source, it quickly mixes and disperses in the global atmosphere and has a long 
atmospheric lifetime‖81 Plaintiffs relied on an ―attenuated chain of conjecture‖ to 
establish standing, but the court held they failed to satisfy their evidentiary burden of 
showing causality at the summary judgment stage.
82
 
 
The Court held that it is undisputed that GHG emissions are not a localized problem 
endemic to Washington, but a global occurrence.
83
 The five oil refineries in 
Washington emitted 4.94 metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalents, and were 
responsible for 4.9% of GHG emissions in Washington. The court held that the effect 
of collective emissions from the oil refineries on global climate change were 
―scientifically indiscernible‖84 
 
Besides the causation and traceability issues raised in climate change cases, the 
displacement and political question doctrines would be legal obstacles to plaintiffs in 
climate change litigation as well. In the Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil, 
Kivalina alleged that massive greenhouse gas emissions from the defendant energy 
producers had resulted in global warming, which, in turn, had severely eroded the 
land where the city of Kivalina is located and threatened it with imminent destruction. 
Kivalina sought damages under a federal common law claim of public nuisance.
85
 
The district court held that the ―political question doctrine‖ precluded judicial 
consideration of Kivalina‘s federal public nuisance claim and that these issues were 
matters more appropriately left for determination by the executive or legislative 
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branches in the first instance.
86
 The district court also held that Kivalina lacked 
standing to bring a public nuisance suit, for Kivalina could not demonstrate either a 
―substantial likelihood‖ that defendants‘ conducts caused the plaintiff‘s injury or that 
the ―seed‖ of its injury could be traced to any of the energy producers.87The court also 
concluded that Kivalina could not establish the causal connection between the injuries 
plaintiffs suffered and the alleged conducts of the defendants because of the 
remoteness of its injury claim.  
 
Upon appeal, the D.C. Circuit held that ―when federal statutes directly answer the 
federal question, federal common law does not provide a remedy because legislative 
action has displaced the common law.‖88 Under Supreme Court jurisprudence, ―if a 
cause of action is displaced, displacement is extended to all remedies.‖89 But it said 
that Kivalina might file a state law nuisance claim in state court.
90
 
 
The district court also found Kivalina failed to prove the traceability of its injury to 
the appellees from the aspects of space and time. The court reasoned ―global warming 
has been occurring for hundreds of years and is the result of a vast multitude of 
emitters worldwide whose emissions mix quickly, stay in the atmosphere for centuries, 
and, as a result, are undifferentiated in the global atmosphere. Further, Kivalina‘s 
allegations of their injury and traceability to appellees‘ activities is not bound in 
time.‖91 The court concluded that Kivalina lacked standing for seeking to hold some 
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particular appellees out of a vast number of GHG emitters throughout history liable 
for millions of dollars in damages. 
 
West Virginia v. EPA was a testing ground for climate policy in the U.S. At issue 
before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit was the 
administration‘s ambitious effort to require every state to cut CO2 emissions from 
coal-fired power plants, so as to implement the Clean Power Plan issued by the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) under Obama‘s Administration. The 
controversy in the case was whether the EPA exceeded its authority to regulate CO2 
under the Clean Air Act. The EPA and its backers argue that existing law gave it clear 
authority to regulate carbon pollution.
92
 
 
However, the 27 state attorney generals, joined by some coal companies, utilities and 
a lengthy list of Republican lawmakers led by Senate Majority Leader Mitch 
McConnell of Kentucky, proclaimed totally different views. They asserted that the 
agency was overstepping its legal authority, in part by going further than Congress 
intended in the Clean Air Act.
93
 A coalition of power companies filed a brief stating 
that ―regardless of the importance of the global issue the EPA seeks to address, it may 
not usurp lawmaking authority that belongs to Congress or judicial power that belongs 
to the courts.‖94 
 
A professor at the University of California at Los Angeles commented, ―What the 
court has to say about the EPA‘s authority…will be important for future 
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administrations. It will have consequences.‖95 The court‘s decision will not only 
affect the fate of the Clean Power Plan, a key part of Obama‘s environmental legacy, 
but also have a significant impact on U.S. efforts on global warming.  
 
An immediate effect was felt in the cap and trade program initiated by several 
Northeast U.S. states known as the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI). It 
issued a Status Report Part I: Measuring Success, showing that over the three months 
following the Supreme Court‘s stay of the Clean Power Plan allowances prices fell by 
30%. The report stated that ―these dramatic swings in prices occurred in the absence 
of material changes in RGGI policy or the region‘s fundamental energy market 
trends.‖96 The report said that the court decision in West Virginia v. EPA ―will 
undoubtedly influence the supply and demand dynamics in the RGGI market.‖97 
 
 
Chapter 2 Carbon Emission Trading as A Market-Based Measure (MBM) to 
Combat Climate Change after Paris Agreement 
 
Global warming caused by anthropogenic GHG emissions, leads to enormous 
environmental externalities to society as a whole, and causes a disproportionate 
burden to vulnerable countries and groups.
98
 Therefore, internalizing the externality 
of GHG emissions is necessary from the perspectives of climate change justice.
99
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Solutions for internalizing the social costs of carbon are many. Traditional methods 
such as command and control, still work and will continue to be effective in many 
areas. These include, for example, appliance efficiency standards, building codes and 
standards, renewable portfolio standards, vehicle standards, pollution standards, 
emission permits, carbon emission caps, carbon budgets, and carbon labeling.
100
 
 
However, market-based approaches give regulated entities more flexibility. These 
approaches promote low carbon technologies and reduce the social costs of carbon 
emission reductions. This has been demonstrated by the Acid Rain Program under the 
Clean Air Act (CAA) in the U.S.
101
 
 
The basic principle of carbon emission trading is quite simple: ―The cap (an absolute 
limit on emissions) creates scarcity, and a price incentive, which makes investment in 
environmental technology viable.‖102 ―Trading, buying and selling allowances to emit 
greenhouse gases results in participating companies abating emissions where it is 
most cost effective.‖103 Carbon emission trading is regarded as a cornerstone of the 
EU‘s policy to combat climate change among the matrix of climate policy. Carbon 
taxation requires unanimous consent of the EU member states, which is tantamount to 
giving each member state veto power over the proposal. In comparison, carbon 
trading does not need unanimous consent, and therefore is far more feasible to 
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implement.  
This chapter will discuss the feasibility of carbon emission trading compared with 
another widely used economic incentive, carbon taxation. It then briefly touches on 
the issue of what role can be played in mitigating climate change effects by carbon 
emission trading in line with the Paris Agreement.  
 
2.1 The feasibility of carbon emission trading 
Conceptually, carbon trading and a carbon tax both have some advantages and 
disadvantages.
104
 Professor Janet E. Milne at Vermont Law School in the U.S. 
claimed ―predictability of cost and efficiency lends heft to the carbon tax side, and 
certainty of result weighs in on the cap-and-trade side. But the issue should not be 
overstated.‖105 Moreover, ―either a carbon tax or an economy-wide cap and trade 
system would create the backbone for a comprehensive program, although neither 
would necessarily supplant policies targeted toward specific issues…the Western 
Climate Change Initiative is exploring how a tax may work in concert with a 
cap-and-trade regime. Policymakers can choose combinations from a large portfolio 
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of options.‖106 
 
Whether a carbon tax or carbon trading regime would be more feasible to cope with 
climate change should be in line with the specific circumstance in the communities 
affected. The author prefers carbon trading to a carbon tax based in consideration of 
the following aspects: the time framework for implementation, certainty for 
environmental benefits, cost of administrative management, the volatility of carbon 
prices, competitiveness, the market distortion effect, and transparency.  
 
2.1.1 Time framework for implementation  
Climate change is happening much faster than experts originally predicted during the 
IPCC Third and Fourth Reports. The urgency of global warming needs a rapid 
response from society. The time framework for taking prompt actions is tilting to 
carbon emission trading rather than carbon taxation after the successful climate 
negotiation of COP21 in Paris 2015. All the 195 parties of COP21 agreed to a 
voluntary reduction of GHGs emissions under the Paris Agreement, which came into 
effective on November 4, 2016. The agreement gives parties discretion to make their 
own choice to determine how to implement their Nationally Determined 
Contributions.
107
 
 
The Paris Agreement gives flexibility for parties to make policy choices. However, 
the trend toward adopting carbon emission trading by many nations and regions is 
obviously demonstrated in recent years.  
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The landmark 2014 agreement between China and the U.S.,
108
 committing each 
nation to reduce emissions and promote cleaner energy sources was the key that 
enabled the successful climate agreement in Paris. It inspired a record number of 
nations to submit their intended nationally determined contributions to climate 
mitigation and adaptation.
109
 And many of these contributions involved adoption by 
nations, regions and cities to adopt incentive programs to reduce their carbon 
emissions such as those considered here.  
 
Thus, China announced its initiation of pilot cap and trade programs that were to 
culminate in a national market of carbon emission trading in 2017 covering power 
generation, steel, cement, civil aviation, and other key industrial sectors. Despite the 
abandonment by the Trump Administration in the U.S., many U.S. states, regions and 
local governments have stepped up to the plate, several including three adoption of 
carbon markets by Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), Western Climate 
Initiative (WCI), and Midwestern Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord (MGGA). At 
the same time, carbon emission trading programs are growing in Latin America and 
the Caribbean, Asia-Pacific region and Central Asia.  
 
The European EU ETS was adopted to become by far the largest and most instructive 
carbon trading initiative. It has been proved an effective method to fight climate 
change and now covers more than 11,000 installations in 31 countries, including 28 
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EU member states, as well as Norway, Iceland and Lichtenstein and airlines 
performing aviation activities between European Economic Area (EEA) airports, 
creating a functioning market infrastructure and a liquid market.
110
  
 
A California cap-and-trade program provides a progressively declining cap serving to 
drive down emissions reductions in line with its ambitious climate change targets. 
From 2015 onwards, the state‘s cap is scheduled to be cut by about 3% each year.111 
At the same time, the program also increased revenues and job opportunities. 
―California Delivers,‖ a broad coalition of stakeholders, asserted that ―polluters are 
paying for their emissions through the cap and trade program, creating revenues that 
flow into California communities, spurring the growth of clean energy and 
contributing to more affordable housing, facilitating construction jobs across the state, 
as well as affording living opportunities for working families.‖112 
 
The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) of Northeastern U.S. states has also 
shown significant environmental and economic benefit. The RGGI report states 
―fuel-switching, improved energy efficiency, and growing renewable energy output 
have caused emissions to drop by 37% since RGGI launched.‖113  The rate of 
pollution reductions continues to exceed expectations, with 2015 emissions falling 6% 
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below an emissions cap that was tightened only in 2013.
114
 
 
RGGI has also generated significant economic benefits. By auctioning allowances, 
RGGI states raised over $1.56 billion in energy bill savings during its first six years of 
operation.
115
 The majority of program revenue (59% during the second control period, 
2012 to 2014) has been invested in renewable energy and energy efficiency programs 
that reduce consumers‘ bills and reduce demand for power.116 Furthermore, with the 
continuing downward trend of carbon emissions of recent years, electricity prices are 
lower than they were before RGGI‘s inception in 2009. Retail electricity prices from 
2008 to 2015 show that prices have dropped by 3.4% across the region.
117
 This is so 
while the rest of country experienced an average 7.2% increase in retail electricity 
prices over the same period.
118
 
 
The details of these programs will be explained further and analysis of their strengths 
and weaknesses will be presented.  
 
Finally, carbon emission trading is designed to achieve emission reductions that 
comply with the targets set. According to the RGGI report ―all nine states have 
established economy-wide GHG emissions reduction targets for 2030, and eight of the 
nine states have corresponding targets for 2050.‖119A study predicts that achieving a 
40% reduction not only yields $25.7 billion in total savings from 2016 through 2030, 
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but also generates benefit for consumers, workers, and the environment.
120
 
 
 
2.1.3 Cost of administrative management and volatility of carbon price  
The core of a carbon tax is the setting of a tax rate and selection of affected taxpayers 
- the design of a carbon tax is simple. Therefore, a carbon tax is easy to manage. By 
comparison, carbon trading is more sophisticated. Critics regard the complexity of 
carbon trading as one of its ―inherent defects.‖121 Compared with U.S. acid rain 
sulfur dioxide cap-and-trade system instituted in the early 1990s, the scale of a carbon 
trading system would be up to 100 times larger than that for sulfur. Evidence from the 
EU ETS suggests that price volatility and gaming by market participants can 
undermine the effectiveness of this complex, opaque indirect method of pricing 
carbon pollution.
122
 A report admits that ―a degree of complexity is unavoidable in 
any ETS.‖123 
 
The complexity of an ETS system also increases the transaction costs and 
administrative burden.
124
 However, a simple ETS would be possible. A recent study 
into the administrative burden of the EU ETS shows that the average burden, 
represented as transaction costs, is relatively high for small emitters and drops sharply 
as emissions increase above a certain threshold.
125
 Therefore, if small emitters were 
given the option to opt out partway through a trading period, then the ETS could be 
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made considerably more efficient.
126
 
 
Some other simplification measures could also alleviate the administrative burden and 
transaction costs. For example, simplifying requirements for monitoring, reporting 
and verification for small emitters, and improving the CO2 trading registry for 
companies that do not trade on a regular basis.
127
 
 
The volatility of carbon prices in the EU ETS is regarded as a major defect for a 
carbon trading system, which historically has discouraged investments in 
carbon-reducing energy efficiency and carbon-replacing renewable energy.
128
 There 
were a variety of reasons for the volatility of carbon price, including the surpluses of 
allowances by free over-allocating, inaccurate historical data, the economic crisis, and 
other factors.  
 
Nonetheless, this problem could be alleviated by an appropriate design. RGGI has 
designed a successful price control policy. It employs price controls to contain 
allowance prices within predetermined ranges, namely a floor price and ceiling 
price-Cost Containment Reserve.
129
 The price floor represents the minimum price at 
which allowances can be sold at auctions, beginning at $1.86 in 2009 and rising 
gradually to $2.10 in 2016.
130
 RGGI states also implemented a Cost Containment 
Reserve in 2012 to dampen allowance prices during extraordinary periods, so as to 
protect market participants and ratepayers from extreme and unexpected spikes in 
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demand.
131
 As a result, the Reserve has effectively inflated the RGGI cap by 15 
million tons during 2014 to 2015. In addition, there was a 140 million ton allowance 
surplus by the end of 2013 accumulated in the program‘s early years. In order to 
prevent this bank of allowances from undermining the program‘s future 
environmental performance, the RGGI states created a novel solution: gradually 
eliminating the redundant allowances by adjusting future cap levels accordingly.
132
 
Thus, through policy interventions, the volatile carbon price has been reduced as was 
shown in the EU ETS results. 
 
2.1.4. Competitiveness and market distortion 
Carbon pricing may lead to carbon leakage; as a result, it will affect the 
competitiveness of covered industries. However, a well-designed carbon trading 
program can avoid the weakening of competitiveness of covered industries. The 
legislative proposal for the EU ETS Phase-Four (2021-2030), submitted to the 
European Council and European Parliament by the European Commission in July 
2015, fully acknowledges the need to maintain the competitiveness of European 
industry. For this reason, it suggests the continuation of free allocation to sectors 
which are exposed to the risk of carbon leakage with a considerably reduced list for 
around 50 sectors.
133
 
 
RGGI states have experienced economic growth even as emissions have declined. A 
report claims that ―while similar trends are seen across the country, RGGI states have 
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out-paced other states on emissions reductions and economic growth.‖134 RGGI states‘ 
economies increased by 24.9% in comparison with 21.3% in states that do not 
regulate or put a price on carbon emissions during 2008 to 2015.
135
 However, the risk 
of carbon leakage exists. RGGI treats emissions from new and existing sources 
equally.  
 
In contrast, the now abandoned U.S. Clean Power Plan (CPP) only required that states 
cover emissions from existing sources, making coverage of emissions from new 
sources optional, because the EPA‘s authority to implement the CPP was drawn from 
section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act, which pertains narrowly to existing sources of 
emissions.
136
 States that choose not to cover emissions from new sources risked 
emissions leakage, because emissions from new sources were not subject to the CPP, 
which would have led to a shift of emissions from existing sources to new sources.
137
 
For the sake of avoiding carbon leakage and market distortion, the RGGI states should 
not trade with states that fail to cover emissions from new sources.  
 
Critics of cap-and-trade are concerned about polluters who offshore some emission 
cuts, for instance, by buying CO2 reductions from planting tropical tree plantations in 
foreign countries instead of cutting their domestic emissions. This is regarded as a 
loophole in the carbon trading program.
138
 But, the fact is that the reduction of GHGs 
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elsewhere means a reduced amount of GHGs emission into the atmosphere, and 
perhaps in a cheaper manner. And, with most countries engaged in the Paris 
Agreement, carbon leakage will be alleviated to a large extent.  
 
With regard to a carbon tax, offering preferential tax treatment for economic operators 
or imposing higher taxes on the emission intensive use of energy by government will 
have an effect on competitiveness. As a result, this could lead to carbon leakage and 
market distortion. Industries might shift from areas covered by carbon tax to those 
areas that are not covered in order to avoid additional cost.  
 
Opponents to carbon trade hold that ―carbon taxes are replicable across borders; since 
the price ‗metric‘ embodied in a carbon tax is far more universal than the 
quantity-reduction metric underlying cap-and-trade.‖ 139  This point of view is 
questionable. Actually, scenarios of the border tariff adjustments for carbon and like 
subsidies are regarded as competition distortion, bearing the risk of being 
non-compliant with international trade law under the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) requirements.
140
 WTO members are bound by the fundamental principles of 
WTO law, namely the obligation to accord national and most-favored nation treatment 
to the like products of all WTO members, in light of Article I and Article III of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).  
 
Regarding the design of domestic tax systems in particular, WTO members are 
obligated to abide by the nondiscrimination principle set forth in Article III of 
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GATT,
141
 that states that members shall not levy higher taxes on imported products 
than on the ―like‖, ―directly competitive‖ or ―substitutable‖ domestic products, 
according to Article III(2) of GATT.
142
 The exceptions for justification of trade 
distorting taxes and subsidies concerning environmental protection lying on the 
conservation of exhaustible natural resources in Article XX(g), and the protection of 
human, animal or plant life and health in Article XX(b) GATT. Therefore, carbon 
taxes might have effects on competitiveness as well, and would be a distorting factor 
for trade, if they are not designed well, and could possibly lead to international trade 
friction.  
 
2.1.4 Transparency and Measuring Reporting Verification (MRV) 
Non-transparency is regarded as one inherent defect of emission trading system.
143
 
Nevertheless, the so-called opaqueness of emission trading could be overcome by 
measuring reporting and verification (MRV) mechanisms. In light of Article 12, the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and Kyoto 
Protocol, Parties to the Convention are obliged to communicate information on 
actions they have taken or will take to the Conference of the Parties (COP) through 
the secretariat. This constitutes ―a key implementation aspect of the Convention, as it 
allows Parties to inform one another of their national level actions and serves as a 
basis for the COP to assess the implementation of the Convention by Parties.‖144 
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MRV was initially coined at Bali Action Plan at COP 13 in 2007.
145
 The Bali Action 
Plan introduced the principle of measuring, reporting and verification (MRV) for both 
developed and developing parties to make their enhanced mitigation actions 
measurable reportable and verifiable. This principle was further elaborated through a 
number of subsequent COP decisions,
146
 such as COP of Copenhagen, Cancun, 
Durban, resulting in a comprehensive MRV framework under the Convention. For 
developing country Parties, the MRV framework before the Paris Agreement 
encompassed submitting national communications every four years and biennial 
update reports every two years, undergoing international consultation and analysis, 
setting up a domestic MRV of domestically supported nationally appropriate 
mitigation actions (NAMAs), and undertaking MRV of REDD-plus activities for the 
purpose of obtaining and receiving results-based incentives.
147
 
 
The Paris Agreement enhanced the MRV framework and made the framework more 
concrete for both developed Parties and developing Parties in a more balanced manner. 
Article 13 of the Paris Agreement requires each Party to regularly provide a national 
inventory report of GHGs emissions by sources, removals and by sinks, this 
information related to nationally determined contribution (NDC) related to climate 
change impacts and adaptation. Developed country Parties are requested to submit 
information on financial, technology capacity-building transfer and support provided 
to developing country Parties; whereas developing country Parties are required to give 
information on financial, technology transfer and capacity-building support needed 
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and received.
148
 The above-mentioned information submitted by each party is to 
undergo ―a technical expert review‖ in accordance with decision 1/CP.21.149 In 
addition, the Paris Agreement established a mechanism of ―global stocktake‖ for the 
purpose of assessing the collective progress of the implementation of the agreement 
periodically. The first global stocktake will be undertaken in 2023 and every five 
years thereafter.
150
 
 
This MRV framework is also designed to strengthen the transparency of the programs 
of emission trading, Clean Development Mechanism and REDD-plus. For instance, 
results-based REDD-plus activities seeking payments need to undergo international 
MRV. MRV for anthropogenic forest-related emissions resulting from the 
implementation of REDD-plus emissions changes are required to be consistent with 
the methodological guidance for REDD-plus activities, and any guidance on MRV of 
NAMAs by developing country Parties.
151
 
 
Implementation of MRV guidelines by all Parties increases the reliability of data for 
GHG emission reduction, produces consistency and transparency across project types, 
and enhances the credibility of the projects with stakeholders. One expert commented 
that ―implementing a comprehensive MRV framework under the Convention will 
enable Parties and the UNFCCC to fulfill a number of important objectives.‖152 
Firstly and perhaps most obviously, accurate reporting and verification provides a 
framework for accountability. Secondly, an integrated MRV system provides 
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international recognition to the different actions. Thirdly, MRV also facilitates 
implementation of low-carbon policies and actions at the national and local levels by 
establishing baselines and facilitating improvement from experience.
153
 
 
MRV is intended to solve the transparency problem arising from emission reduction, 
and it is a building block in the climate change arena. Current MRV requirements for 
Parties reflect the nature of commitments and actions in light of the principle of equity, 
common but differentiated responsibilities, and respective capabilities, in the light of 
different national circumstances.
154
 The framework recognizes the special 
circumstances of the least developed countries (LDCs) and small island developing 
states (SIDS), and is to be implemented in a facilitative, non-intrusive, non-punitive 
manner. It gives some flexibility for developing country Parties in order to avoid 
placing too much of a burden on them. However, establishing an independent third 
party MRV regime to oversee the regulated entities would be an important added 
provision to provide for reliable, consistent, accurate and transparent information 
relating to carbon emission reductions.  
 
2.2 What role carbon emission trading can play after the Paris Agreement? 
2.2.1 Carbon emission trading under the Kyoto Protocol of the UNFCCC 
 
The significant role of the cap-and-trade approach has already been recognized by 
international treaties and agreements since the Kyoto Protocol of 1997. As one of the 
three mechanisms created by the Kyoto Protocol, international emission trading (has 
been employed for carbon emission reductions between countries with commitments 
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under the Kyoto Protocol. Article 17 which provides ―the Parties included in Annex B 
may participate in the emission trading for the purposes of fulfilling their 
commitments under Article 3.‖155 However, this approach ―shall be supplemental to 
domestic actions for the purpose of meeting quantified emission limitation and 
reduction commitments under that Article.‖156 And an international transaction log, a 
software-based accounting system, is designed to ensure secure transfer of emission 
reduction transaction units between countries.
157
 
 
The Kyoto Protocol inspired the establishment of the EU ETS and provided the 
possibility for the growth and linking of carbon emission markets regionally and 
globally. Also, the Western Climate Initiative (WCI) is a joint system among several 
U.S. States and several Canadian provincial governments. It aims to build a regional 
carbon emission trading program to cut greenhouse gas emissions collectively.
158
 
 
The Executive Vice Chairman of Rothschild observed that ―the cap-and-trade system 
is becoming the dominant methodology for CO2 control.‖159 He claimed ―unlike 
taxation, or plain regulation, cap-and-trade offers the greatest scope for private sector 
involvement and innovation.‖160 Furthermore, ―taxation and regulation can only be 
levied at local and national levels, whereas cap-and-trade can operate on a global 
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level.‖161 
 
The other mechanism created by the Kyoto Protocol is Joint Implementation (JI). 
Through the JI mechanism, countries with binding emission cut targets under Annex I, 
are allowed to achieve their commitments jointly through a JI project. The emission 
reduction units through JI projects must be real, measurable, verifiable and additional 
to what would have occurred without the project, in accordance with Article 6 of the 
Kyoto Protocol. This mechanism encourages developed countries to make joint efforts 
to control carbon emission through market-based methods. However, this mechanism 
cannot be used as a primary tool to achieve an Annex I country‘s GHGs reduction 
goal, and it ―shall be supplemental to domestic actions for the purposes of meeting 
commitments under Article 3‖ of the Kyoto Protocol.162 
 
The third mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol is the Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM). It is worth noting that the CDM under the Kyoto Protocol is a complimentary 
component to a carbon market as well. Pursuant to Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol, 
the CDM allows emission reduction projects in developing countries to earn certified 
emission reduction (CER) credits, each equivalent to one ton of CO2. These tradeable 
CERs can be used by industrialized countries to comply with part of their quantified 
emission limitation and reduction commitments under Article 3 of the Kyoto 
Protocol.
163
 The project activities for CERs are supervised by an executive board of 
the CDM and are subject to the requirements of real, measurable, verifiable emission 
reductions that are ―additional to any that would occur and in the absence of the 
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certified project activity.‖164 
 
CERs are the first global, environmental investment and credit system of its kind, 
providing a standardized emission offset instrument.
165
 The offset instrument of the 
CDM provides lower costs for industrialized countries‘ compliance with emission 
reduction targets required by the Kyoto Protocol, while the participating developing 
countries benefit from project activities resulting in certified emission reductions. 
Therefore, it‘s a win-win strategy for developed countries and developing countries. 
Nonetheless, offset credits have an effect of diluting allowances, which will 
depreciate the value of the allowances. Thus, the European Committee has set a limit 
on offset usage from the Kyoto mechanisms to a maximum of 11% for installations 
allocation.
166
 
 
2.2.2 Carbon emission trading under Paris Agreement 
The Paris Agreement follows the Kyoto Protocol‘s approach. The agreement adopts a 
holistic methodology to fight climate change. Article 5 of the Paris Agreement 
encourages ―positive incentives for activities relating to reducing emissions from 
deforestation and forest degradation‖ (REDD+) and the role of conservation. This 
includes sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks 
in developing countries and ―alternative policy approaches, such as joint mitigation 
and adaptation approaches.‖167 Given that the ―result-based payments‖ for the joint 
mitigation and adaptation approaches have not yet been defined, offset for CERs 
would be applicable for REDD+.  
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Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) constitute the primarily bottom up 
approach to fulfill the Paris Agreement by all parties. NDCs also can be achieved 
through ―cooperative approaches‖ between parties. Parties may use the 
―internationally transferred mitigation outcomes towards NDCs‖ and shall be subject 
to robust accounting to ensure the avoidance of ―double counting.‖ And the use of 
internationally transferred mitigation outcomes to achieve NDCs under the agreement 
shall be voluntary and authorized by participating parties.
168
 
 
The Paris Agreement has established a mechanism to contribute to the mitigation of 
greenhouse gas emissions and support sustainable development, which recognizes the 
contribution to the reduction of emission levels in the host party. This mechanism can 
also be used by another party to fulfill its nationally determined contributions in light 
of Article 6(4) of the agreement.
169
 Although, the wording of the Paris Agreement is 
ambiguous, it appears that either offset credits from CDM or certified emission 
reductions (CERs) could be transferred as mitigation outcomes between the 
participating parties. International emission trading and joint implementation 
mechanisms can serve the end of fulfilling its nationally determined contributions as 
well, if the parties both qualify under the Kyoto Protocol.  
 
Moreover, ―internationally transferred mitigation outcomes‖ would be a potential 
vehicle for mobilizing financial resources. A certain portion of the transaction value 
from internationally transferred mitigation outcomes could be set aside as a source of 
climate finance to support the least developed countries and small islands developing 
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States. This is similar to a portion set aside from auctioning allowances from emission 
trading system in RGGI to support renewable energy and energy efficiency.  
 
The above arrangement is a potential vehicle conforming to the common but 
differentiated responsibility principle of the UNFCCC and will make developed 
countries‘ commitments to mobilize progressive financial sources concrete, because 
developed countries with higher GHGs reduction commitments, will act as potential 
buyers in the mitigation outcomes transfer.  
 
Article 9 of the Paris Agreement emphasizes the significance of climate finance. It 
states:  ―As part of a global effort, developed country Parties should continue to take 
the lead in mobilizing climate finance from a wide variety of sources, instruments and 
channels…Such mobilization of climate finance should represent a progression 
beyond previous efforts.‖170 The availability of financial resources to developing 
countries is crucial for the successful implementation of the UNFCCC and the Paris 
climate agreement. 
 
2.2.3 Carbon Offsetting and Reduction System for International Aviation 
(CORSIA)  
The aviation sector accounts for more than 2% of global CO2 emissions produced by 
human activity; among these emissions, international aviation is responsible for 
approximately 1.3 %, according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC),
171
 and 13.1% of total transport emissions in 2014,
172
 one of the world‘s top 
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ten sources of emissions. A 2009 study conducted by eight international scientists by 
using radioactive forcing showed a stronger impact on climate change from the 
aviation sector. It claimed that aviation was responsible for 4.9% of manmade climate 
change.
173
 And if left unchecked, international aviation emissions were projected to 
increase by up to 300% by 2050.
174
 
 
To control greenhouse gases emissions from the air transport sector is a challenging 
issue for all energy and climate change policy decision makers because of the mobile 
feature of the emission sources and the involvement of a wide range of stakeholders, 
which makes an introduction of new policy more difficult. A fossil fuel tax could be a 
useful tool to reduce the domestic emissions, but any to reduce emissions from 
international aviation and shipping is not as yet widely accepted.  
 
The European Union, as the pioneer in controlling emissions from aviation sector, 
amended the Directive 2003/87/EC in Nov. 2008, to include aviation activities in the 
EU ETS system.
175
 The intention behind the inclusion of aviation in the EU ETS was 
to enable reduction of GHGs at a lower cost by allowing airline operators to purchase 
general ETS allowance.
176
 The lower the de facto cap from aviation sector, the more 
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allowances airline operators have to purchase from the general ETS.
177
 The European 
Federation for Transport and Environment estimated that airline operators had to 
purchase 42.7 million allowances to cover their emissions above the aviation cap.
178
 
The purchase of emission allowances constitutes the main cost for airline operators as 
a result of their inclusion into the aviation EU ETS. The costs associated with 
purchased allowances to airline operators were approximately €152 million in 2013, 
€148 million in 2014, and €178 million in 2015 respectively, without the inclusion of 
the costs of international credits used for compliance because the purchase and 
surrender of international credits could no longer be tracked.
179
 
 
The projected costs that would be imposed on the aviation sector from their inclusion 
in the EU ETS were at the forefront of industry attacks on the inclusion of aviation in 
the EU ETS. Emerging economies, especially China with the rapid expansion of its 
aviation industry, strongly opposed the levy of a carbon emissions fee by the EU. As 
of 2008, the International Air Transport Administration claimed that ―in its first year 
of operation, the ETS would have added €3.5 billion to industry costs and that this 
cost would rise year-on-year.‖180 
 
As mentioned above, the Directive 2003/87/EC in 2008 included aviation emissions 
under the EU ETS and provisionally capped aviation emissions below their average 
level between 2004 and 2006. The cap on aviation allowances was separated from the 
general EU ETS cap. The provisional cap on the aviation sector was set to apply for 
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the periods of 2012 and 2013-2020. Starting from the beginning of 2012, both 
commercial and non-commercial aircraft operators‘ departure from or arrival to an 
airport within the European Economic Area were required to surrender an emission 
allowance for every ton of CO2 emitted,
181
 no matter how much of the proportion 
accounting for in the total mileage of the flight was beyond the territory of the EU and 
its member states. 
 
This unilateral decision by the EU has incited fierce international resistance.
182
 After 
the EU decided to include aviation into EU ETS in 2008, US carriers acting through 
Airlines for America, a powerful US industry lobby, brought a case in the UK courts 
in December 2009 alleging that inclusion of international aviation into the EU ETS 
was illegal under international law, for both internal and international flights departing 
from and arriving at European Union airports, asserting that this inclusion violated 
international law. The American lobby was later able to convince the Obama 
Administration, specifically the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), to 
oppose and to orchestrate foreign resistance to the EU legislation.
183
 However, the 
European Court of Justice ruled in late 2011 that the full scope of the EU ETS was 
fully consistent with international law.
184
 China also strongly opposed the inclusion 
of international aviation in the EU ETS, and threatened not to purchase aircraft from 
Airbus on order, despite the fact that it had paid a non-refundable deposit.
185
 
 
As a result of this resistance, the European Commission waived its independent right 
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to propose new laws in such an unprecedented manner and issued a proposal to stop 
the clock on imposition of the aviation proposal on 12 November 2012.
186
 This 
stop-the-clock law formally agreed between the European Council and European 
Parliament in April 2013, came just before airline operators would have been required 
to surrender allowances for their emissions in the previous year. The justification 
claimed by the European Commission‘s decision to stop the clock for a year was to 
gather the political momentum at the approaching 2013 International Civil Aviation 
Organization Assembly to develop a Global Market Based Mechanism.
187
 In March 
2014, the EU issued a regulation (421/2014) to extend the stop-the-clock a second 
time until the end of 2016, with provision for a full snap back of the original scope of 
the EU ETS from the beginning of 2017, unless otherwise amended in light of the 
2016 International Aviation Organization assembly.
188
 
 
After many rounds of negotiations among member states, consensus to mitigate 
greenhouse gas emission by using market-based solutions in the international aviation 
sector was achieved. In October 2013, the 38
th
 Session of the International Civil 
Aviation Organization (ICAO) Assembly adopted Resolution A38-18, which set a 
medium term global goal of maintaining the net CO2 emissions from international 
aviation sector from 2020 at the same level as then existed, a so-called ―carbon 
neutral growth 2020.‖189 The Assembly also defined a basket of measures designed to 
help reach the global goal, including market-based measures.  
 
In October 2016, the 39
th
 International Civil Aviation Organization passed Assembly 
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Resolution A39 and decided to implement a global ―Market-Based Measures‖ system 
in the form of the Carbon Offsetting and Reduction System for International Aviation, 
so as to address any annual increase in total CO2 emissions from this sector. Sixty six 
countries have already declared to support this ―CORSIA‖190 agreement, representing 
87% of total international aviation emissions. The CORSIA system makes 
international aviation the first sector at global scale to set a target of carbon neutral 
growth from 2020. Member states will use the market-based measures to offset their 
international aviation emissions above 2020 levels.  
 
In line with Assembly Resolution A39, the CORSIA system will be implemented in 
phases, starting with a pilot phase with participation of states on a voluntary basis, 
followed by participation of all states except certain exempted states. The pilot phase 
runs from 2021 through 2023, and first phase runs from 2024 through 2026, and 
Second phase runs from 2027 through 2035.
191
 
 
The CORSIA agreement calls for international aviation to address and offset 
emissions through market-based measures, namely, to offset a member‘s emissions 
from other sectors by emission trading or crediting mechanism. The carbon emissions 
from an international aviation operator can be offset by buying emission allowances 
from emission trading systems, or by buying certified emission reduction credits 
(CERs) from a crediting mechanism, such as CDM and REDD+ mechanisms, or other 
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projects.
192
 
 
The coverage of CORSIA is on the basis of routes between states participating in the 
CORSIA system. A route will be covered by the system if both states connecting it are 
under CORSIA; otherwise, a route will not be covered, in line with paragraph 10 of 
the Assembly Resolution A39.
193
 
 
Given that CO2 emissions from the international aviation sector are not covered under 
the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement, and as a result, are not included in the 
Nationally Determined Contributions of the Parties, CORSIA complements the level 
of ambition set by the Paris Agreement. Because the CORSIA system provides for 
participating states to use market-based measures to offset their carbon emissions, it 
will increase the demand for emission units, thus increasing incentives to invest in 
emissions reduction projects in the participating states. The CORSIA system is 
regarded as significant progress in the climate change arena after the Paris Agreement, 
for it is a sector-wide action at a global level to reduce carbon emissions from the 
international community and sets a model for other sectors to fight climate change, a 
global challenge.  
 
 
 
Chapter 3 The Typical Carbon Emission Trading Markets in the World 
 
Many regard a carbon emission trading mechanism (ETS) as ―the most promising 
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policy tool for reducing the emission of traditional air pollutants as well as 
greenhouse gases.‖194 A U.S. professor concluded that the political success of the 
mechanism can be credited to‖ its ability to accommodate the very distinct interests at 
play in environmental policy.‖195 The political acceptability of ETS is a key 
advantage in comparison with alternative regulatory tools
196
 compared to the failed 
efforts to establish a carbon tax in Europe in the 1990s and resistance to stringent 
environmental regulations.
197
 
 
A carbon emission trading regime provides individual regulated sources much greater 
flexibility than any other approaches under conventional regulation ―to decide if, how, 
and when they will reduce emissions.‖198 Environmentalists, on the other hand, like 
the regime because of the cap: certainty for environmental benefit.
199
 For these 
reasons, carbon emission trading has been prevalent in the world since the 
establishment of European Union Emission Trading System (EU ETS).  
 
This chapter will analyze in detail the carbon emission trading systems, their pluses 
and minuses, which presently exist worldwide, elaborating on the references above to 
many of them. 
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3.1 EU ETS 
The European Union has been the consistent world leader in promoting climate 
change mitigation measures and set an example for the world in its own emission 
trading system (ETS). The evolution of the ETS in its successful creation of a 
multi-country carbon market and the problems it encountered along the way have 
provided invaluable guidance for all the other world trading systems.  
 
3.1.1 The origin and the evolution of EU ETS 
The Emission Trading System in the EU follows the cap-and-trade approach where a 
fixed number of permits are created and allow a specific unit of emission. These 
allowances are then allocated for free or are auctioned to firms which may trade them 
on the open market on the condition of surrendering the equivalent number of 
allowances for their actual emissions.
200
 
 
The Europe ETS was greatly influenced by the success of the U.S. acid rain cap and 
trade program.
201
 Commentators contend that the acid rain program has significantly 
reduced the sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions from power plants responsible for acid 
deposition and its adverse health effects.
202
 
 
Pursuant to the Directive of Establishing a System for Greenhouse Gas Emission 
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Allowance Trading adopted in 2003 (Directive 2003/87/EC)
203
, the EU formally 
commenced to build its Emission Trading System (ETS). Preliminary efforts can be 
divided into two phases: Phase I (2005-2007), and Phase II (2008-2012). Thereafter 
the EU adopted Phase III (2013-2020) and Phase IV (2021-2030) providing the most 
comprehensive and thorough revisions to the ETS.  
 
Phase I and Phase II  
Phase I (2005-2007) of the EU ETS was regarded as a ―learning by doing‖ pilot phase. 
The EU faced problems of political opposition to a centralized (top down) approach 
and a lack of historical emission data on industry emissions.
204
 As a compromise, it 
allowed member countries to submit National Allocation Plans which established caps 
country-wide and for each individual installation, resulting in an ETS for every EU 
country (bottom up), resulting in the ETS‘ initial National Allocation Plan.205 
 
Under both Phase I and Phase II each individual Member country‘s allocations had to 
be approved or adjusted by the European Commission, and a sum of the member 
country national emission caps was to be the emission cap at the EU level.  
 
The National Allocation Plan was required to be based on objective and transparent 
criteria, taking due account of comments from the public. It was to be published and 
notified to the Commission and to other Member countries within the specified period. 
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Plans were to be considered within a special committee under the Commission. The 
Commission could reject a plan or any aspect thereof, on the basis that it was 
incompatible with the criteria adopted and give reasons for the rejection. A Member 
country could propose a new amendment, and could only take a decision if the 
proposed amendment was accepted by the Commission.  
 
The Commission allowed a substantial cut to the National Allocation Plans of a 
number of countries, for example, a 6% cut for Germany and 56% cut for Latvia. In 
Phase I and Phase II, the European Court of Justice accepted a great number of cases 
filed by the Member countries that were dissatisfied with the plan cuts made by the 
Commission. Eventually, the Court ruled in favor of Poland and Estonia on the 
ground that the Commission did not follow due process and exceeded its scope of 
authority.
206
 
 
The difference of the base level in Phase I and II plans is that the plans in Phase I 
were based on emission levels in 1990 (8% emission reduction compared to 1990 
levels), while those in Phase II were based on 2005 levels, resulting in a 6.5% 
reduction in emission caps compared to 2005 levels.  
 
As for allowance allocations, including methodology and calculation criteria, to avoid 
resistance to the EU ETS, in Phase I emission allowances were awarded mostly for 
free. Member countries were allowed to auction no more than 5% of emission 
allowances, and in Phase II, this figure was raised to 10%. However, in fact, 
allowances auctioned accounted for no more than 0.2% in Phase I and only around 3% 
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in Phase II.
207
 To ensure the fairness of allocation, Phase I and Phase II both provided 
a New Entrants Reserve with the allocations decided by Member Countries in their 
Plans. On average, the Reserve accounted for 2.4% of emission caps in Phase I and up 
to 5.8% in Phase II. However, Member countries did not have consistent rules on new 
entrants. For allowance calculation criteria, free allocation in Phase I and Phase II 
both adopted an historical-emission-based grandfather clause. 
 
In Phase I and Phase II only carbon dioxide was covered, and enterprises were limited 
to heavy industry, heavy pollution, heavy emission and energy-intensive production 
enterprises with a rated thermal input exceeding 29 MW, including power stations, 
refineries, coke ovens, steel plants, and manufacturers of cement, glass, lime, brick, 
ceramic product, pulp, paper and paper board. Aviation emissions initially were 
expected to be included in Phase II, but due to complaints by various air carriers and 
other countries, this had to be postponed to Phase III.
208
 
 
Described below are provisions for market controls and regulation mechanisms, 
including systems for monitoring, reporting and verification; registry; carbon price 
intervention and compliance safeguards.  
 
From 2005 to 2012, Member countries were responsible for measuring, reporting and 
verifying respective carbon missions, and the EU just promulgated the Guidelines for 
Monitoring and Reporting Greenhouse Gas Emissions, which was instructive but not 
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legally binding. So, in practice, Member countries had different understandings of key 
terms and data selection and reporting requirements; combined with the absence of 
historical emission data and pursuit for self-interest, they varied from each other in 
terms of data reliability, rationality and validity.
209
 
 
As for registry in Phase I and Phase II, the EU and each Member State established and 
maintained a registry. At the EU level there was a Community Independent 
Transaction Log for recording the issue, transfer and cancellation of allowances 
within the EU and to check each transaction. At the national level Member countries, 
separately or jointly, established a national registry to record and track the issuance, 
ownership, transfer and cancellation of allowances within national territory and to 
directly connect to the Community Log.
210
 
 
Carbon price intervention mechanisms in Phase I and Phase II were limited and had 
much to be improved, including: (1) inter-period banking and usage: pursuant to the 
Directive, allowances within Phase I could be used in the preceding or following year 
during the same period, but could not be extended to Phase II. So, allowances in 
Phase I were cancelled by the end of 2007; (2) allowances banking and borrowing: 
pursuant to the Directive 2003/87/EC, allowances allocated to the same emission 
producers during the same period could be deposited and borrowed; (3) emission 
offset mechanism: Phase I permitted unlimited offsets with ―offset credits‖ from 
CDM/JI projects, and Phase II allowed the use of ―offset credits‖ from most CDM/JI 
projects, with varying degrees of application in Member countries with the exception 
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that offsets were not allowed for verified emissions from land use, land use change, 
nuclear facilities and large hydropower stations.
211
 
 
As for compliance safeguards and penalty mechanisms, according to the Directive, 
the excess emissions penalty was EUR 40 for 1 tCO2e in Phase I and raised to EUR 
100 in Phase II.
212
 
 
Post-Kyoto Period – Phases III and IV 
After 2013 and after more than three years of reforms, the EU ETS formally entered 
into Phase III (2013-2020), which is also referred to as ―the Post-Kyoto Period.‖213 In 
mid-July 2015 the European Commission presented a legislative proposal to revise 
the EU ETS for the period after 2020 (Phase IV (2021-2030)). It proposed to revise 
the system in four aspects: emission reduction, carbon leakage, green energy and 
low-carbon technology, and reform of traditional energy.  
 
In emission reduction the overall number of emission allowances in the sectors 
covered by the ETS is to decline at an annual rate of 2.2% from 2021 onwards, 
compared to 1.74% currently. In carbon leakage it was proposed to further narrow the 
list of sectors exposed to potential risk of carbon leakage, and classify them into 
different groups in accordance with risk. In green energy and low-carbon technology 
it was proposed to set up an Innovation Fund to encourage investment in green energy, 
                                                             
211
 Zhuo Li & Xiaofen Li, A Discussion on the Offset Mechanism in the Carbon Emission Permit 
Trading System, 11RESOURCES ECONOMIZATION & ENVTL PROTECTION 133, 133 (2015). 
212
 Long Zhang, A Study of Core Mechanisms of the EU ETS, 1 MODERN ECON. INFORMATION 25, 26 
(2015).  
213
 Minken Chen & Jianying He, The Building of EU Carbon Emission Permit Trading Market and Its 
Revelations, 8 GLOBAL MARKET INFORMATION GUIDE 23, 23 (2015). 
63 
 
carbon capture technology, carbon storage and low-carbon technology. In reform of 
traditional energy it was proposed to create a Modernization Fund with 2% of the 
overall gains of allowances emissions to facilitate Member countries‘ modernization 
of their traditional energy sectors which the Fund projected to amount to around EUR 
8 billion, to be allocated pro rata to Member countries with a GDP per capita in 2013 
below 60% of the EU average.
214
 
 
The new Directive 2009/29/EC has made the most extensive revisions to the previous 
regime in Directive 2003/87/EC, including new measures relating to emission cap 
determinations, allowance allocation modes, scope of emission control, and 
mechanisms for market control and regulation as follows: 
 
Emission cap determination revisions: To avoid imposing too high emission caps and 
excessive allowances, from the start of Phase III, there was to be a centralized 
allocation of allowances through a top-down approach. Specifically, the European 
Commission was to decide on an EU ETS-wide emission cap on the basis of an 
emission and linear reduction rate in a base year and then allocate it in accordance 
with specific principles to various Member countries, and the latter were to submit its 
action to the Commission for its National Implementation Measures.
215
 According to 
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the EU commitment in 2007, by 2020 greenhouse gas emissions in the EU are to be 
reduced at least by 20% below 1990 levels and by 14% below 2005 levels. Some 
sectors included in the ETS are required to reduce their emissions by 21% below 2005 
levels. Meanwhile, the Commission is to decide to implement strict linear emission 
reduction limits with annual decreases of the new cap at 1.74% from 2013 to 2020 
and after, and the quantity of allowances for initial allocation are to be determined and 
adjusted on the average of the quantities of the national plans from 2008 to 2012 and 
the expanded coverage of the ETS.
216
 
 
Allowance allocation methods are also to be revised. Pursuant to the Directive, free 
allocation is to be gradually replaced by auctioning. In 2013 allowances allocated 
through auctioning are to be 40%, and by 2020 this figure is to be 70%. However, 
considering the effect on enterprises of different categories that may be in different 
circumstances, Phase III still allows some exceptions. For example, allowances for 
energy production enterprises (such as power sector) are to be completely auctioned, 
while, for energy-concentration sectors (such as district heating and high-efficiency 
cogeneration), new entrants and sectors with risk of carbon leakage (mainly 
energy-intensive sectors), will be allowed a period of transition; that is, in Phase III, 
they will enjoy free allocation of a considerable proportion of allowances, but this 
proportion will gradually decrease until full replacement by auctioning.  
 
In Phase III a benchmark is to be used to calculate free allocations and to address 
market distortions arising from a ―grandfather clause.‖ The benchmark is to be the 
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average emission of the 10 percent most efficient installations in a sector or subsector 
in a community, and this benchmark multiplied by installation output is to be the total 
allowance permitted for this installation. However, existing installations are not 
subject to the same proportion of free allocations, depending on objective 
circumstances. The Directive divides them into power and carbon capture and 
sequestration installations, installations with risk of carbon leakage and those other 
than the first two categories, and subjects them to different allocation proportions and 
transition periods.
217
 
 
New entrants and those that opt out are to be subject to harmonized rules. 5% of the 
emission caps from 2013 to 2020 will be set aside as a New Entrants Reserve, and the 
allocation approach is to be consistent with provisional measures for existing 
installations of the same category. With the benchmark rule installations no longer 
will be allowed to continue with inefficient operations for the sake of obtaining free 
allocations, and an installation with operations that have ceased will not be qualified 
for free allocations unless it can demonstrate that it will resume production within a 
specified and reasonable time.  
 
There are specific arrangements to be made for the auctioning of allowances, 
including 88 percent as basic allowances, 10 percent for the purpose of the Joint 
Implementation (JI) mechanism, and 2 percent to be distributed to reward Member 
countries with outstanding emission performance in the preceding period.
218
 
 
The scope of emission control also is revised. In Phase III the scope of emission 
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control is expanded by including nitrous oxide and perfluorocarbon as greenhouse. 
Sectors previously not included are incorporated, including new industries like the 
chemical industry, ammonia manufacturers and aluminum manufacturers, carbon 
capture and carbon sequestration. The cap limit of some previous sectors is revised to 
incorporate other industry activities, including gypsum, nonferrous metals, 
calcinations of dolomite, Also, Directive 2009/29/EC provides an explicit broad 
definition of ―combustion installations‖ and greenhouse gases covered with increases 
of about 40-50 million tons. Finally, in order to avoid the high administrative costs in 
Phase I and Phase II due to inclusion of many small installations, in Phase III Member 
countries are allowed to exclude installations the emissions from which do not exceed 
a threshold of 25,000 tons per year and units with a rated thermal input under 3 
MW.
219
 
 
The mechanisms for market control and regulation also are reformed. To eliminate 
monitoring and reporting inconsistencies between Member countries and to improve 
data quality and comparability, Directive 2009/29/EC empowers the Commission to 
formulate and harmonize the Monitoring and Reporting Regulation and the 
Accreditation and Verification Regulation, normalizing third-party verification 
institutions the oversight of which was adopted and became effective in 2012. The 
Shipping MRV Regulation became effective in July 2015.
220
 
 
Directive 2009/29/EC creates a single registry system to administer emission accounts, 
allocate, surrender or cancel allowances. This will greatly improve security of the 
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carbon market and facilitate settlement of carbon transactions;
221
 a unified registry 
should overcome the problems arising from relying on the national registry system of 
each of the member countries. 
 
To resolve the carbon price volatility that was experienced in Phase I and Phase II, 
carbon price intervention mechanisms in Phase III were subject to substantial 
revisions and improvements, including:  
(1) Pursuant to the directive, allowances accumulated in Phase II could be used in 
Phase III to prevent the kind of drastic drop in the carbon price at the end of 
2012; 
(2) In order to address loosely verified credits under CDM/JI in Phases I & II, in 
Phase III, offset mechanisms were readjusted, and there were different 
institutional arrangements specified depending on whether the Paris 
international agreement on climate change would be reached in 2012. 
Meanwhile, pursuant to the Directive 2009/29/EC, at EU level, the use of 
carbon credits was required not to exceed 50 percent of total emissions in 
Phase III;
222
  
 
(3) In order to reduce trade volume and raise the carbon price, the Commission 
proposed to auction a lesser amount, or delay auctions in Phase III, freeze a 
total of 900 million allowances for the period 2014-2015, and postpone their 
auction to the end of Phase III, and to increase by 300 million and 600 million 
allowances for auctioning in 2019 and 2020 respectively, so that the supply of 
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emission allowances can be more fairly redistributed;
223
 
 
(4) To compensate for the deficiency of delayed auctioning in the initial stage of 
Phase III, the Commission proposed to introduce a Market Stability Reserve in 
2021, so that, when excessive allowances exceed 833 million, the Reserve 
would be increased to stabilize market, and the reserved allowances would be 
deducted from future auctions; when excessive allowances fall under 400 
million, some allowances would be released from the Reserve and included in 
future auctions;
224
 
 
(5) In order to stabilize carbon price, under the Directive, the Commission was 
empowered with three additional functions, including the requirement to 
monitor the performance of the EU carbon market and submit an annual report 
to the European Parliament and the European Council, offer a proposal to the 
European Parliament and the Council when it has evidence that the carbon 
market is not functioning properly, and auction future allowances when the 
allowance price for more than six consecutive months is more than three times 
the average price of allowances during the two preceding years on the 
European carbon market.
225
As for a compliance safeguard and penalty 
mechanism, penalties in Phase III were more rational and will link with the 
European index of consumer prices.
226
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4.1.4．Carbon leakage and trade conflict in the ETS 
There are two kinds of carbon leakage. One is industrial leakage, which occurs when 
a country outside the EU expands production on the basis of cost advantage and 
causes a substantial increase in carbon emissions outside the EU, and Member 
countries move their industries out of the EU, with emissions moved out as a 
consequence. Such leakage is a sort of ―race to the bottom.‖ A typical example is that 
under fierce international competition some petrochemical companies have 
successively moved to countries where greenhouse gas emission regulation is relaxed 
to avoid high emission reduction costs.  
 
The other is rebound leakage, which occurs when a high carbon price inside the EU 
reduces emission demand and thus pulls down the global carbon price and raises 
emissions outside the EU.
227
 
 
At present, industrial leakage is the focus of the EU action. Under industrial leakage 
greenhouse gas emissions in technically backward countries or regions are increasing 
without actual emission reductions by relevant enterprises, causing an illusion that the 
ETS has greatly reduced greenhouse gas emissions in the EU. Currently, the EU has 
164 sectors and subsectors (steel, manufacturing, heating, etc.) that are susceptible to 
carbon leakage, and their outputs account for 77% of the EU manufacturing industry 
and their emissions account for 1/4 of the total of the EU ETS.
228
 In light of this risk, 
the European Council is requiring that some sectors have fewer allowances for 
auctioning, and it will regularly prepare and update a catalogue and grant more free 
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allowances to enterprises listed in this catalogue.
229
 
 
Rebound leakage often occurs in global carbon markets. For the present, the EU 
neither pays due attention to this phenomenon nor takes into full consideration that 
the rebound and global unfairness may offset the effect of its carbon emission policy. 
 
The EU ETS is an incentive-based regulatory instrument adopted to address 
greenhouse gas emission reduction inside the EU. Its main purpose is to encourage 
enterprises to invest in low carbon activities and emission reduction and to prevent 
global climate change from further deterioration by trading increasingly scarcer 
emission allowances in Member Countries. However, like its efforts to establish a 
global carbon market, its ETS is not a stand-alone trade mechanism, and rather it is 
closely connected to and even sometimes conflicting with other countries and regions 
across the world. 
 
For example, an international dispute arose when the European Commission in 2012 
proposed to include aviation under the coverage as described above.
230
 Also, a 
shipping MRV Regulation was adopted in 2015, incorporating the shipping industry 
under the coverage of its ETS. This no doubt would also clash with other trade 
mechanisms. 
 
ETS Critiques 
The ETS system has been severely criticized mainly owing to problems of a large 
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oversupply of allowances, windfall profits and questions regarding achievement of its 
purpose.
231
 Political acceptability of ETS and political compromise to gain 
acceptance led at the beginning to free allocation of at least 95% of estimated 
emissions.
232
 Over-allocation of allowances along with the prohibition of transferring 
allowances from Phase I to Phase II and the economic recession contributed to lack of 
demand and led to a free fall of the carbon prices reaching near zero levels by 
mid-2007.
233
A professor of law at University of San Diego asserted that lower 
allowance prices caused by over allocation resulted in fewer emission reductions, 
which greatly limited the extent to which the program created incentives for emissions 
reductions.
234
 
 
Moreover, when a cap-and-trade program provides for banking allowances, 
over-allocation can result in accumulation of a huge allowance bank, which allows 
emissions beyond the emission caps set for future years.
235
 The banked allowances 
will not represent emissions reductions designed by the program, instead they will 
allow installations to emit more in the future.
236
 As a result, this leads to delays in 
emission reductions.
237
 In these ways over-allocation reduces the environmental 
effectiveness of cap-and-trade programs.
238
 
 
In addition, due to the sub-global nature of the EU ETS program, its implementation 
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caused some carbon leakage rather than inducing carbon emission reduction. One 
researcher indicated that ―where the coverage of an emissions trading system (ETS) is 
sub-global, covered installations face higher cost of production, ceteris paribus, than 
similar installations in countries without, or with less stringent emissions 
constraints.‖239 Thus, in the world of unequal carbon prices, carbon intensive 
production flees to regions without costly climate policies.
240
 
 
Further, if a carbon price induces a decrease of fossil fuel prices, it stimulates their 
consumption in countries where stringent climate regulations are lacking.
241
 In this 
scenario, a sub-global ETS could threaten competitiveness and lead to carbon leakage, 
where emissions were simply displaced rather than reduced.
242
 So far, the 
enforcement of EU ETS has not yet adopted measures to adequately address these 
concerns.
243
 The professor further explained that in the absence of a uniformly 
applicable global climate policy, companies engaging in carbon-intensive production 
inevitably encounter different emissions constraints in different jurisdictions.
244
 The 
specific designs of the climate change regulation will influence the availability of 
cost-effective abatement options and affect industries‘ ability to pass through the 
carbon costs to consumers without losing their market share or profits.
245
 He 
explained that highly carbon intensive industries are likely to face higher carbon 
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reduction costs than the less carbon intensive ones.
246
 
 
A firm‘s ability to pass through the carbon costs to its consumers depends, inter alia, 
on the elasticity of demand, the structure of the market in which it is operating, and its 
trade exposure.
247
 Competitiveness and leakage concerns would be acute within those 
sectors and sub-sectors that shoulder high carbon costs where demand is elastic, ―but 
are unable to pass through these costs without losing market share or profits.‖248 Thus, 
in the long run, the ―differentiated carbon policy may cause some industries to 
migrate to emission-unconstrained regions.‖249 These differentiated carbon policies 
also encourages investors to make their decisions in favor of less efficient 
technologies and energy sources in the ―pollution havens‖250 resulting in 
environmental ineffectiveness policy and an increased societal carbon reduction cost. 
 
3.2 The regional carbon emission trading markets in US 
3.2.1 The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) 
The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) was the first mandatory 
cap-and-trade program for greenhouse gas emissions in the United States. RGGI 
involves nine states—Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New 
Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont, after the withdrawal of New 
Jersey at the end of 2011. RGGI was established in 2005 and administered its first 
auction of CO2 emissions allowances in 2008. The RGGI CO2 cap is projected to 
contribute to a 45 percent CO2 emission reduction in the region‘s annual power sector 
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emissions by 2020 from 2005 levels, or between 80 and 90 million short tons of 
CO2.
251
 
 
The RGGI program applies only to carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from electric 
power plants with capacities to generate 25 megawatts or more--approximately 168 
facilities.
252
 The total CO2 emissions from the nine RGGI states account for 
approximately 7 percent of U.S. CO2 emissions and 16 percent of its gross domestic 
production. RGGI‘s aggregate emissions rank in the top 20 among all nations.253 
 
RGGI‘s history can be traced back to at least 2003, beginning with discussions and 
meetings among governors in the northeastern and mid-Atlantic region, according to a 
report by a specialist in environmental policy.
254
 These activities eventually led to a 
2005 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with seven signatory states: 
Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, and Vermont. 
As of 2007, RGGI was expanded to include Maryland, Massachusetts, and Rhode 
Island. The ten signatory states agreed to be jointly responsible for carrying out the 
provisions featured in the MOU.
255
 
 
The ten states addressed two key issues that led to the ultimate implementation of the 
RGGI program. First, they ―agreed to adopt individual shares of the overall RGGI 
CO2 cap by agreeing to implement state-level CO2 emissions budgets specified in the 
                                                             
251Lucas Bifera, Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, CENTER FOR CLIMATE AND ENERGY SOLUTIONS, (Dec. 2013).  
252Jonathon L. Ramseur, The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative: Lessons Learned and Issues for Congress, CRS 
Report R41836 2 (Apr. 27, 2016).  
253Id.  
254Supra note .252, at 5.  
255Supra note 251.  
75 
 
MOU.‖256 Second, the ten states ―assumed responsibility for developing a Model 
Rule to serve as a common framework for individual state-level regulations.‖257 
 
On December 31, 2008, a final version of the Model Rule of cap-and-trade 
regulations was issued by the states, which served as a regulatory blueprint for the 
program. Under the Model Rule framework, each member state enacted individual 
regulations by which covered entities were required to comply to participate in the 
regional cap-and-trade program.
258
 The CO2 emissions from covered entities in the 
RGGI states accounted for approximately 20 percent of all GHG emissions in the 
RGGI states. The remaining majority of GHG emissions came from fossil fuel 
combustion in the industrial, commercial, residential, and transportation sectors.
259
 
 
The RGGI program includes many of the design elements of the EU ETS, such as 
three-year compliance periods, emission allowance banking, emission allowance 
auctions, consumer benefit allocation, cost containment, and offset use.
260
 
 
In the first control period from 2009 to 2011 RGGI auctioned 395 million CO2 
allowances, starting when the allowance submission requirements became effective. 
The clearing price
261
 for CO2 allowances ranged as high as $3.35 and as low as 
$1.86.
262
 The first control period yielded over $922 million in revenue from auctions 
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of CO2 allowances.
263
 Nonetheless, CO2 emissions in RGGI states fell below the cap 
during this period, leaving a surplus of unsold CO2 allowances.
264
 
 
Some analyses attribute the decrease of CO2 emissions in the region to fuel-switching 
from petroleum and coal generation to less carbon-intensive natural gas generation, 
lower demand for electricity by consumers, and increased nuclear and renewable 
capacity.
265
 Thus, in the Program Review for the first control period compiled by 
member state agencies and stakeholder groups as required by RGGI MOU, a stronger 
reduced cap was strongly recommended. The Program Review culminated with the 
release of the updated Model Rule on February 7, 2013, which lowered the 2014 CO2 
cap to 91 million tons and demand for allowances increased dramatically. As a result, 
clearing prices soared as high as $3.21 during auction with 100 percent of allowances 
sold upon the release of the reduced cap for 2014.
266
 
 
The second control period of RGGI ran from 2012 to 2014. From the beginning of 
2014, member states began to implement the update Model Rule adopted in late 2013. 
The reduced cap of 2014 with 91 million tons of CO2 represents a 45 percent 
reduction from the previous year. The cap will further decline 2.5 percent annually 
until 2020.
267
 
 
The updated Model Rule also allows allowance banking. CO2 allowances acquired by 
compliance entities before 2014 can be used in the future. In 2014 RGGI designers 
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determined that these banked emissions accounted for 140 million tons of CO2, a 
considerable amount when compared to the 91 million tons of the CO2 emission cap 
of 2014.
268
 To ensure the annual target is met with real reductions rather than with the 
use of banked allowances since the latter would lead to the actual emissions higher 
than the revised emissions cap, RGGI has made cap adjustments, which are applied 
each year between 2014 and 2020.
269
 This novel solution may gradually eliminate the 
allowance surplus by adjusting future cap levels downward.   
 
The updated Model Rule also alters the cost containment provisions in the RGGI 
program. Under the original model rule (2009-2013), potential cost concerns were 
addressed by allowing for the use of additional offsets if emission allowances reached 
specific levels.
270
 The updated Model Rule which took effect in 2014 eliminated this 
approach and added a Cost Containment Reserve to the cap-and-trade program, 
intended to prevent the price of allowances from rising above a program-wide trigger 
price. The Reserve consists of a limited supply of additional CO2 allowances separate 
from the annual RGGI program CO2 budget.
271
 The Reserve was triggered in 2014 
and 2015, allowing for the sale of 5 million and 10 million additional allowances 
respectively.
272
 In the abovementioned circumstances, all the additional allowances 
for the Reserve were successfully sold, thus effectively inflating the cap.  
 
The RGGI program sets a clear limit on greenhouse gas emissions and translates this 
limit into tradeable emission allowances, which are auctioned or allocated to regulated 
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emitters. At the end of each compliance period, each regulated entity must surrender 
to the state enough allowances to cover its actual emissions for the compliance period. 
Power plants within the region may comply with the cap by purchasing emission 
allowances through quarterly auctions, purchase from other emitters within the region 
or offset projects.
273
 Otherwise, any breach will induce a penalty.  
 
With some variance among the RGGI states, particularly in the early years, a 
substantial percentage of emission allowances were distributed through quarterly 
auctions.
274
 During 2008 to 2015, the RGGI states had offered 91 percent of their 
budgeted emission allowances at auction.
275
 Some of the offered allowances that 
were not sold subsequently have been retired. Other allowances were sold at fixed 
prices or distributed to various entities to support a variety of objectives.
276
 
 
The auctions include a reserve price below which the seller refuses to part with the 
allowances for sale. The reserve price started at $1.86 in 2008, increasing to $2.10 in 
2016 because RGGI states decided to increase the reserve price by 2.5 percent each 
year after 2014.
277
 One expert indicated that ―a reserve price may address certain 
logistical concerns, such as bidder collusion, that may be associated with auctions.‖278 
In addition, a reserve price may provide assurance to parties making emission 
reductions that will have a minimum value in the allowance market.
279
 The clearing 
price equaled the reserve price in auctions conducted between June 2010 and 
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December 2012, reflecting the abundance of emission allowances in the market.
280
 In 
this scenario, the reserve price acted like an emissions fee or carbon tax.
281
 
 
The RGGI allowance auctions have generated over $2.4billion revenue in cumulative 
auction proceeds.
282
 RGGI states have experienced economic growth with the decline 
of emissions and outpaced other states in this regard over the same period. During 
2008 to 2015, RGGI states‘ economies grew by 24.9 percent versus 21.3 percent in 
non-RGGI states except California.
283
 At the same time emissions in the RGGI 
region dropped by 30 percent versus 14 percent in other states.
284
 
 
Member states have agreed under the RGGI MOU to direct at least 25 percent of all 
revenues generated at auction to consumer benefits such as renewable energy or 
energy efficiency programs.
285
 A report attributed over $679 million in funding for 
energy efficiency, $151 million in funding for direct bill assistance programs for 
low-income families through the RGGI states.
286
 Many viewed the allowance 
auctions as successful in terms of price discovery, transparency, transaction costs, 
logistical issues, and revenue generation.
287
 
 
The RGGI program also has an offset provision. An offset is a measurable reduction, 
avoidance, or sequestration of GHG emissions from a source not covered by an 
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emission reduction program.
288
 Experts have observed that an offset has the potential 
to provide considerable cost savings and other benefits if it is allowed as a compliance 
option in a cap-and-trade program. However, offsets have generated considerable 
controversy ―primarily over the concern that illegitimate offsets could undermine the 
ultimate objective of a cap-and-trade program: emission reduction.‖289 RGGI sets a 
3.3 percent limit for entities to use offsets to cover their allowance submission, a 
relatively low percentage compared to 8 percent by California‘s cap-and-trade system 
and some federal proposals.
290
 RGGI also limits offset projects to five types, which 
must be located within RGGI states. Some offset projects raise concerns because they 
may not represent real emission reductions.
291
 Nevertheless, there are no offset 
projects developed under the RGGI program yet, according to the RGGI offsets 
tracking database.
292
 
 
The RGGI program is regarded an effective one.
293
 Through almost eight years of 
operation after its inception from January 1, 2009, RGGI has helped northeast and 
Mid-Atlantic States achieve significant reductions in emissions of CO2 and other 
pollutants from the electric power sector. Fuel-switching, improved energy efficiency, 
and growing renewable energy output have caused emissions to drop by 37 percent 
since RGGI was launched.
294
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A 2015 report by the Acadia Center claims that ―the decline in carbon dioxide 
emissions from power plants in the RGGI region has been accompanied by reductions 
in hazardous pollutants that threaten public health. Emissions of sulfur dioxide (SO2), 
nitrogen oxides (NOx), and mercury (Hg) are all down significantly since the program 
began.‖295 The 2015 Acadia Center report estimated that over $10 billion health 
benefits have been achieved from the regional reductions in SO2 and NOx since 
RGGI‘s launch.296 
 
All nine RGGI states now have Renewable Portfolio Standards that require electric 
utilities to procure increasing quantities of renewable electricity.
297
 Many of the 
RGGI states are increasing commitments to renewable energy. New York has 
committed to a 50 percent renewable energy supply by 2030, and Rhode Island 
recently adopted a 40 percent renewable energy requirement by 2035.
298
 
 
However, the design of RGGI cannot avoid emission leakage by importing electricity 
from non-RGGI states. In the worst case scenario, maximum leakage would occur if 
imported electricity from a coal-fired power plant replaced in-state electricity 
generated from a zero-emission source.
299
 
 
The Cost Containment Reserve also needs to be improved. When the price thresholds 
are reached Reserve allowances will be sold, thus leading to emissions additional to 
the original cap. To overcome the current shortcomings of the Reserve, the cost 
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containment approach adopted by the California emissions trading program has been 
recommended.
300
 Unlike the Reserve in RGGI, about 4 percent of California‘s 
original number of allowances from the capped budget is held back in the allowance 
price containment reserve.
301
 If this reserve of allowances is exhausted, limited 
borrowing is allowed from the latest program years. Thus, the cumulative supply of 
allowances would not be increased when the Reserve prices‘ threshold are triggered.  
 
In addition, it is worth noting that the proposed striking down of the Clean Power Plan 
(CPP) by the courts and the current U.S. Administration will undoubtedly impact the 
supply and demand dynamics in the RGGI market, even though the RGGI program 
has offered an attractive option for states considering how best to meet CPP 
requirements.
302
 The announcements related to the Clean Power Plant proposal 
appear to have driven speculative behavior in the RGGI market. From first auction 
following the release of the drafted Clean Power Plant proposal to the auction in 
December 2015, RGGI allowances prices soared by 49 percent. Over the three months 
after the Supreme Court suspended the enforcement of the Proposal, allowances 
prices plunged by 30 percent.
303
 
 
3.2.2 The Western Climate Action Initiative (WCI) 
The Western Climate Action Initiative (WCI) is a multi-jurisdictional collaboration 
that aims to develop regional strategies to combat climate change in North America. 
WCI partners originally include 11 jurisdictions: Arizona, California, Montana, New 
Mexico, Oregon, Utah, and Washington in the US; and British Columbia, Manitoba, 
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Ontario and Quebec in Canada. The program encompassed 19 percent of the 
population of the US and 79 percent of the population of Canada. The program began 
in January 2012 with these original jurisdictions.
304
 However, the WCI is currently 
composed of British Colombia, California, Ontario, Quebec, and Manitoba.
305
 Other 
participating states in the US and the provinces in Canada either withdrew from the 
WCI program or remained within the program nominally without any substantial 
actions for a variety of reasons.
306
 
 
Along with other two regional climate initiatives in North America, RGGI, MGGRA 
and WCI had joined in a cooperative effort to share experiences in the design and 
implementation of regional cap-and-trade programs, inform federal decision making 
on climate change policy, and explore the potential for further collaboration among 
the three regional programs in the future. The three regional programs together 
included 23 U.S. states and 4 Canadian Provinces accounting for approximately 
one-half of the U.S. population, over one-third of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions, over 
three-quarters of the Canadian population and one-half of Canadian greenhouse gas 
emissions.
307
 
 
The WCI was the most ambitious North American cap-and-trade system under 
development. It was anticipated that it would become the second-largest program on 
the globe from the beginning of the program and many felt that it would be an initial 
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platform for US and Canadian federal systems. However, federal cap-and-trade was 
not adopted by the two national governments, with only California and the three 
Canadian Provinces remaining committed.
308
 
 
Only California and Quebec started their first compliance periods on January 1, 2013 
independently. One year later, on 1 January 2014, California and Quebec linked their 
systems creating the first international cap-and-trade system consisting of 
sub-national jurisdictions. In 2015, Ontario and Manitoba then announced plans to 
develop an ETS.
309
 
 
The program experienced three periods: 2003-2008, when the WCI was coalescing; 
2008-2011, when it largely disintegrated; and 2011 to the present, when its 
membership has greatly reduced.
310
 
 
The shared WCI emissions cut target for greenhouse gases was 15 percent below 2005 
levels by 2020. The covered entities with the first phase included direct emissions 
from stationary installations with emissions of over 25,000 tCO2e annually.
311
 The 
WCI program intended to cover emissions of carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, 
hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons and sulfur hexafluoride. Covered industries 
include electric utilities, industrial and commercial facilities, industrial processing 
(including oil and gas), residential, commercial and fuel combustion facilities, and 
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transportation fuel combustion.
312
 The program was to be expanded to cover 90 
percent of regional greenhouse gas emissions by 2015.  
 
The WCI program is a decentralized structure, which allows each jurisdiction to 
develop its own targets and regulations, a typical bottom-up approach. This 
decentralized structure and bottom-up approach have aided the early development of 
the WCI program and probably facilitated its coalescence.
313
 
 
Despite the rapid coalescence of the WCI up to 2008, the policy landscape had 
changed dramatically by the middle of 2010; this, along with other reasons, led to 
disintegration of the WCI. Sonja Klinsky, a researcher at Cambridge Centre for 
Climate Change Mitigation, attributed the disintegration of the original WCI due to 
the economic crisis and increased emphasis on state-specific economic cost; 
increasing climate skepticism, which changed electoral politics among states; and 
political polarization and a shift within the Republican Party in the US.
314
 
 
As a result, by the beginning of 2011, only California and the four Canadian 
Provinces remained in the WCI program. And the maintenance of the WCI program is 
still encountering challenges, such as fractures due to the unbalanced structure that 
would be created.  
 
California has always been a leader within the WCI with a large portion of the market. 
California‘s decisions made it difficult for the remaining partners to design their own 
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regulations that reflect their economic and political needs.
315
 However, the diversity 
of the WCI policies encompass a portfolio approach allowing jurisdictions to stay 
nominally within the WCI, even those who rejected cap-and-trade.
316
 Some experts 
have concluded that the WCI program cannot be regarded as a complete success, but 
neither should be regarded as a failure.
317
 
 
3.2.3 California Cap-and-Trade Program 
The California Cap-and-Trade Program was inaugurated in 2012. California has been 
part of the Western Climate Initiative (WCI) since 2007, and formally linked its 
system with Quebec‘s on January 1, 2014.318 The cap-and-trade program covers 
approximately 85 percent sources of greenhouse gas emissions in the state. Sectors 
covered by the program include transportation, electricity, commercial and residential 
sector, industries, agriculture and forestry.
319
 
 
The targets of emission reduction set by the California cap-and-trade program are as 
follows: reducing emission to 1990 GHG levels by 2020; reducing emission by 40 
percent from 1990 GHG levels by 2040; and reducing emission by 80 percent from 
1990 GHG levels by 2050. The program also set the caps for three compliance 
periods: first compliance period (2013-2014); second compliance period (2015-2017); 
and third compliance period (2018-2020).
320
 The cap of the program was designed to 
strengthen by declining slightly each year.  
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Greenhouse gases targeted by the California cap-and-trade program encompass CO2, 
CH4, and N2O with a threshold for the covered entities being facilities with 25,000 
tCO2e (metric) or more per data year. Allowances are distributed either through 
auction or free allocation. Industrial facilities receive free allowances for transition 
assistance and to prevent leakage. Transition assistance will decline from 2018. The 
amount of free allowances is determined by leakage risk in line with emission 
intensity and trade exposure and sector-specific benchmarks. Each entity‘s allocation 
declines annually in proportion to the cap. The majority of industrial allocation is 
based on production benchmarks and is updated annually based on verified 
production data.
321
 
 
The California cap-and-trade program provides flexibility in enforcement. The 
program allows allowances‘ banking for future use, but the emitter is subject to a 
general holding limit. Borrowing
322
 of future vintage
323
 allowances is not allowed. 
Offsets and credits are also permitted by the program with some restraints. The 
quantitative limit for offsets and credits is less than 8 percent of each entity‘s 
compliance obligation. The qualitative limit for offsets and credits is also provided by 
the program. Only six domestic offset types are accepted as compliance units 
originating from projects carried out in light of the projects protocols.
324
 The six 
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types of offset projects include U.S. forest projects, urban forest projects, livestock 
projects (methane management), ozone depleting substances projects, mine methane 
capture projects, and rice cultivation projects.  
 
The California cap-and-trade program also has provisions for price management. The 
program set a floor price for allowances at auction. The 2017 Auction Reserve Price, 
serving as the floor price, is $13.57 per allowance. The auction reserve price increases 
annually by 5 percent plus inflation measured by Consumer Price Index. A ceiling 
price for allowance auction, referred to as Allowance Containment Reserve, is also 
provided by the program.  
 
There is a reserve sale administrator who can sell accumulated allowances on a 
regular basis in three equal price tiers. Take the year 2017 as an example; the prices 
are $50.69, 57.04, and 63.37 respectively. Tier prices increase by 5 percent plus 
inflation measured by the Consumer Price Index on the basis of the closest previous 
price of the reserved allowances.
325
 An Allowance Containment Reserve will be 
allocated allowances from various budgets, the total amount of allowances being 1 
percent for budget years 2013-2014; 4 percent for budget years 2015-2017; and 7 
percent for budget years 2018-2020.
326
 If the allowances in the Allowance 
Containment Reserve from a current year are sold out, allowances from future years 
are transferred to the reserve and made available for sale.
327
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The California cap-and-trade program, which anchors North America‘s largest carbon 
market,
328
 was created by a 2006 climate law known as AB32. The market has 
generated more than $4 billion in revenue from carbon emission reductions.
329
 AB32 
stated that the market-based system for achieving pollution cuts was ―applicable‖ 
until the end of 2020.
330
 
 
The performance of the carbon prices has been far below anticipation at the beginning 
of the launch of the program. Prices for allowance trading on the secondary market
331
 
remained consistently below the auction price floor, the minimum price set by the 
California Air Resources Board, the state environmental protection agency, being in 
charge of air quality and the carbon market in the state.
332
 Several events accounted 
for the weak auction prices since the inception of the market from 2012. First, 
California‘s relatively gradual recovery from the recession in 2008 curbed industrial 
activities and the demand for carbon credits.
333
 Second, California progressed toward 
its 2020 emission reduction target much faster than predicted due to the success of 
other state policies,
334
 such as renewable portfolio standards, and energy efficiency 
standards for vehicles and buildings. These policies reduced the overall demand for 
carbon allowances on the cap-and-trade market.
335
 Another factor was the legal 
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uncertainty that the cap-and-trade program would be continued after its expiration 
date in 2020. The plain language of state law dictates that the state‘s cap-and-trade 
program ―may not be applied or used‖ after 2020.336 
 
It is still unclear that whether the legislature will renew cap-and-trade program after 
its expiration date. The Senior Science Writer at Climate Central maintained that legal 
doubts over the cap-and-trade program‘s future are coinciding with long-running 
legislative battles in Sacramento over efforts to enact California climate laws affecting 
the period after 2020. And the battle over cap-and-trade is stated to be more 
confounding than the battle over California‘s climate targets.337 Additionally, several 
business groups are challenging the constitutionality of the program before the 3
rd
 
District Court of Appeal. All of this is occurring despite the fact that state Governor 
Jerry Brown reiterated his commitment to extending cap and trade beyond 2020.
338
 
The secondary market data, which reflects transactions between allowances holders 
and buyers outside of government-managed auctions, now indicates a price increase 
from the November 2016 quarterly auction will continue in the upcoming auctions, 
due to increasing legal certainty over the program‘s future.339 
 
It‘s worth mentioning that California‘s program has been linked with the Canadian 
Province of Quebec‘s cap-and-trade system since January 1, 2014. This is the first 
time sub-national jurisdictions have coordinated and linked their cap-and-trade  
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systems.
340
 The successful joint carbon market provides a model for future linkage, 
as carbon markets continue to grow and mature across North America and the rest of 
the world.
341
 This joint program between California and Quebec will expand further 
with the amendment proposal to link it with the emerging emissions trading system of 
Ontario in 2018.
342
 
 
 
3.3 Emission trading in other countries 
3.3.1 Emission trading in South Korea 
 
At the 60
th
 anniversary of the foundation of the Republic of Korea on August 15, 2008, 
President Lee Myung-bak proclaimed ‗Low Carbon Green Growth‘ as a national 
strategy for the next 60 years. To realize a low carbon economy, ROK announced its 
voluntary mid-term carbon reduction target—30 percent below business-as-usual 
(BAU) levels by 2020, at the Copenhagen climate summit in 2009. The country then 
became the first non-Annex I country of the UNFCCC to set the maximum 
recommended reduction target voluntarily in the world.
343
 On April 14, 2010, the 
Framework Act on Low Carbon, Green Growth (hereinafter Framework Act) was 
enacted. Article 46 of the Framework Act endorsed for the government to establish 
market mechanisms to meet the national GHGs reduction goals.
344
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With the enactment of the Act on the Allocation and Trading of Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions Allowances (hereinafter ―Emissions Trading Act‖) for a national emission 
trading system on May 2, 2012, the Republic of South Korea chose an emissions 
trading system as its main mitigation policy to achieve its voluntary mid-term carbon 
reduction target of 30 percent below business-as-usual levels by 2020.
345
 The 
Emissions Trading Act lays out a general framework of the carbon emission trading 
system. More specifics on carbon emissions trading system are provided by a 
Presidential Decree, based on the legislation aforementioned.
346
 
 
Take allocation as an example, the Enforcement Decree provided that 100 percent free 
allocation to eligible industries for the first commitment period, and 97 percent for 
second commitment period. From 2021, the allocation rate of free allowances will be 
decided through the Presidential Decree and is expected to be around 90 percent.
347
 
The Enforcement Decree also provided for an emission allowance exchange, trading,  
measures for market stabilization, offsets, surrender of allowances, MRV, and 
penalties in a concrete manner.  
 
With the enactment of the Framework Act, the Republic of Korea established a 
Greenhouse Gas and Energy Target Management System (hereinafter Management 
System) in 2010, serving the purpose of introduction of a mandatory ETS.
348
 The 
entities which were subject to the Management System include administrative 
agencies, local governments, public institutions, local public corporations, public 
universities, hospitals, each with emissions above the 25,000 t/CO2e threshold (the 
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threshold will be subject to adjustments). These entities accounted for more than 60 
percent of national GHGs emissions. In 2011, 470 entities participated in the Target 
Management System. Covered entities that exceeded their annual cap were simply 
required to pay a one-off penalty.
349
 
 
Though, the Target Management System did not have provisions for credits or 
emissions trading, it enabled a much smoother transition for corporations and public 
entities leading up to the later requirement for the emissions trading system because 
of the accumulated data and experience in reporting, monitoring and achieving carbon 
emission reduction goals.
350
 
 
On January 1, 2015, the Republic of Korea launched its national ETS (KETS), the 
first nation-wide cap-and-trade program in operation in East Asia. The KETS covers 
525 of the South Korea‘s largest emitters including 5 domestic airlines, which account 
for about 68 percent of its national greenhouse gas emissions.
351
 Direct emissions 
from six gases specified in the Kyoto Protocol
352
 as well as indirect emissions from 
electricity consumption are covered by the system. The sectors covered by KETS also 
include fuel combustion, transport, fugitive emissions, industrial processes, 
agriculture and waste. The KETS set the goals of cutting carbon emissions by 30 
percent below business as usual by 2020, and 37 percent 2030. The latter represents a 
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22 percent carbon emissions reduction below 2012 greenhouse gas levels.
353
 
 
The KETS set up three trading periods: phase one for 3 years, starting from 2015until 
2017; phase two for 3 years, 2018 to 2020; phase three for 5 years, 2021 to 2025. 
During the first phase, all of the allowances were to be allocated for free. Most sectors 
were to receive free allowances according to the average GHG emissions of the base 
year (2011-2013). Three sectors (grey clinker, oil refinery, and aviation) were to be 
allocated free allowances following the benchmarks in light of their previous activity 
data from the base year (2011-2013).
354
 
 
Around 5 percent of total allowances were to be retained in a reserve for market 
stabilization measures, early action, new entrants and other purposes in the first Phase. 
In addition, any unallocated allowances and withdrawn allowances were to be 
transferred to the reserve.
355
 
 
In Phase two, 97 percent of the allowances were to be free, allocated to covered 
entities; 3 percent of the allowances were to be auctioned. In Phase three, less than 90 
percent of allowances are to be distributed for free, more than 10 percent of the 
allowances are to be auctioned.
356
 Energy-intensive and trade-exposed sectors will 
receive 100 percent free allowances in all phases,
357
 because of the consideration of 
international competitiveness of relevant industries, impacts on the national economy, 
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and other factors.
358
 
 
The KETS also has provisions on banking and borrowing. Banking is allowed without 
any restrictions. Borrowing is allowed only within a single trading phase, with the 
limitation of a maximum of 10 percent of entity‘s obligation in 2015. The ratio of 
borrowing has been increased to 20 percent in 2016 and 2017. Offsets and credits are 
provided by KETS as well, with some qualitative and quantitative limits. Only 
domestic credits from external reduction activities implemented by non-ETS entities, 
that meet international standards, may be used for compliance, as the qualitative 
requirements.
359
 Eligible activities include those eligible under the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) and Carbon Capture and Storage.
360
 Offset credits 
submitting for each entity‘s compliance obligation cannot exceed 10 percent, as a 
quantitative limit.
361
 
 
The KETS also has provisions regarding price stabilization. The stabilization 
measures include additional allocation from the reserve of up to 25 percent, 
establishment of an allowance retention limit: minimum 70 percent or maximum 150 
percent of the allowance of the compliance year, an increase or decrease of the 
borrowing limit up to 20 percent currently, an increase or decrease of the offsets limit 
up to 10 percent currently, the temporary establishment of a price ceiling or price 
floor.
362
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Measuring, reporting, and verification (MRV) is mandatory for the covered entities, 
according to article 31 of the Enforcement Decree.
363
 Annual reporting of emissions 
must be submitted within three months from the end of a given compliance year by 
the end of March.  
 
With a statement of emissions, the regulated entities are also required to make an 
electronic submission of a verification report issued by an independent third party 
verifier. If a regulated entity fails to report emissions correctly, the report will be 
disqualified. A third party verifier is required to be an institution equipped with skilled 
personnel and necessary resources to conduct professional verification.
364
 It is also 
required to be accredited by the competent authority to verify emissions. In addition, a 
verifier has an obligation to purchase liability insurance re greenhouse gas emission 
verification.
365
 
 
There are penalties for the violations of KETS laws and regulations, including 
securities and trading laws and regulations relating to market manipulation, fraudulent 
market transactions, and insider information. The penalty for not submitting or not 
submitting enough allowances is three times the average market price for that given 
compliance year (EUR70/ton).
366
 Civil and criminal penalties can also be assessed 
against individuals and corporations for fraud, market manipulation, insider trading, 
and negligent failure to comply with the Emissions Trading Act.
367
 
 
                                                             
363 Supra note 343, at 25.  
364 Supra note 343, at 26.  
365 Id. 
366 Supra note 319. 
367 Supra note 343, at 27.  
97 
 
3.3.2 Emission trading in Japan 
3.3.2.1 JVETS 
Japan is the world‘s third largest economy with a GDP of $4.41 trillion,368 and overall 
greenhouse gas emissions of 1,365 million tons of carbon dioxide equivalent (tCO2e) 
in 2014, a 7.5 percent increase in comparison with 1990 levels.
369
 In 2014, CO2 
emissions from the energy sector accounted for 87.2 percent of total emissions.
370
 
 
In 1998, Japan enacted the Act on the Promotion of Global Warming 
Countermeasures. The act was amended to implement the Japan Voluntary Emission 
Trading System (JVETS) in 2005, the first carbon emissions trading system ever 
implemented in the country.
371
 The scope of the JVETS covered CO2 emissions from 
industrial process (production and energy consumption), offices (energy consumption) 
and waste management (waste incineration, waste combustion, and waste 
recycling).
372
 Certified Emissions Reduction credits (CERs) for compliance were 
allowed with the condition that these credits were not the primary means for 
achieving reduction targets. Unlimited banking of allowances and credits was also 
allowed between compliance periods, while borrowing was not allowed.
373
 At Phase 
7 in 2012, the final phase of the JVETS, the system had 389 participants and achieved 
a 59,419-tCO2 emission reduction. The average carbon price was roughly 
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$2.60/tCO2.
374
 During fiscal year 2006 to 2012, the accumulative carbon emission 
reductions achieved were 2,217 million tCO2e. The average price from fiscal year 
2006 to 2012 was $9.76/tCO2.
375
 
 
The Act on the Promotion of Global Warming Countermeasures was amended again 
in 2008 for the purpose to establish the Japanese Verified Emissions Reduction, which 
was launched in November 2008.
376
 In 2008, Japan enacted the Action Plan for 
Achieving a Low-Carbon Society established by Council on the Global Warming 
Issue. The action plan began in October 2008 and ended in 2012, and it implemented  
experimental introduction of an integrated domestic market for emissions trading. The 
experimental ETS is comprised of two parts: the experimental domestic ETS and two 
offset crediting systems.
377
 The former requires firms setting their emissions 
reduction targets and surrendering allowances and credits to comply their obligation. 
The latter provides credits to participating firms from the Internal Crediting system 
(domestic CDM) and the international Kyoto crediting mechanism. A certification 
Committee was established in 2013 to supervise the new credit system and is 
responsible for the approval of the methodologies and protocols from the offset 
projects.
378
 
 
The objective of the credit system is to support regional joint efforts within Japan‘s 
territory to achieve the greenhouse gas emissions reduction goal. Firms may earn 
certified credits through the implementation of energy saving equipment, usage of 
                                                             
374 Id. 
375 Supra note 371, at 4. 
376 Id. 
377Supra note 371, at 3. 
378 Supra note 371, at 4. 
99 
 
renewable energy, and emissions removal through forest management in Japan.
379
 
The credit system will expire on 31 March, 2021. Credits from the Domestic CDM 
will expire as well at the same time.
380
 
 
Japan also launched a Bilateral Offset Crediting System, which is known as the Joint 
Crediting Mechanism. The end of the Mechanism is to assist Japan achieving its 2020 
emissions cut target at a lower cost and to develop export markets for low carbon 
technology, products and services.
381
This system allows Japanese firms acquiring 
offset credits through investing greenhouse gas emissions reduction projects in 
developing nations. To date, Japan has already signed bilateral agreements with 12 
countries, including Bangladesh, Cambodia, Costa Rica, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Kenya, 
Laos, Maldives, Mexico, Mongolia, Paula, and Vietnam.
382
 The first bilateral project 
was conducted with Mongolia and was signed in January 2013, and the first registered 
project was conducted with Indonesia in October 2014. The scope of this project 
covers electricity generation and distribution, transportation, industry and waste 
management, renewable energy and energy efficiency, avoided deforestation, etc.  
 
The Japanese government also enacted a Basic Act on Global Warming 
Countermeasures in 2010, which encompassed the following aspects: a mid-term 
target to reduce GHG emissions 25 percent by 2020 below 1990 levels; a long-term 
target to cut GHG emissions 80 percent by 2050 below 1990 levels; a target to 
increasing the share of renewable energy within the total primary energy mix to 10 
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percent by 2020; a carbon tax, and; the introduction of a feed-in-tariff program.
383
 
 
Nevertheless, Japan declined to sign up for a second commitment period under the 
Kyoto Protocol at the end of 2010, and abandoned the proposed national ETS in 2012. 
After the Fukushima nuclear power plant accident, the Japanese govern halted 
electricity generation from the country‘s nuclear power plants. This led to a 
downwards revision in the country‘s 2020 GHG reduction target to 3.8 percent by 
2020 below 2005 levels, a significant setback from the original target.
384
 
 
The Japan Voluntary Emission Trading System (JVETS) was launched by the 
Ministry of the Environment in 2005, aiming to provide companies with opportunities 
to master technical skills regarding emissions trading procedures, such as validation, 
verification, monitoring, reporting, and trading.
385
 Although JVETS was based on 
entities‘ voluntary participation, participants were required to set an absolute emission 
target. The targeted gas was CO2, direct emissions and indirect emissions from 
electricity and heat usage. Participants were free to sell the allowances but needed to 
ensure that they held allowances equal to their actual verified emissions by the end of 
the compliance period.  
 
Thirty-one parties participated in Round 1, which was from April 2005 to August 
2007. Fifty-eight parties were involved in Round 2, from April 2006 to August 2008. 
And 61 participants engaged in Round 3, which ran from April 2007 to August 
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2009.
386
 The total emission reduction in Round 1 was 377,056 tCO2, accounting for 
29 percent of the aggregated base-year emission of the participants and was increased 
comparing with the assumed emission reduction. The total transactions of emission 
trading were 24 times and the total amount of allowances transferred was 82,624 
tCO2, excluding allocation, retirements, and cancellations.
387
 
 
Unlike EU ETS, the JVETS system was based on entities, including all emission 
sources within a factory building, while EU ETS was based on facilities. A researcher 
at Mitsubishi Research Institute explained why EU chose installations as the 
boundaries of EU ETS. The main reason was because EU already regulated 
companies to report emissions from each installation including greenhouse gases 
under an Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control program at the time of 
introducing EU ETS. But, in Japan, regulated companies are required to 
monitor/report all emissions within a factory (building) under law specifically 
regulating greenhouse gases emissions and Energy Conservation Law.
388
 
 
MRV was recognized to be of significantly importance under the JVETS. Unlike  
commodities such as food or energy, which have an inherent value of their own, 
carbon credits in themselves have no inherent value but only have value in the context 
that they can be used to satisfy an emission target.
389
 Thus, consistent and transparent 
rules for MRV had to be established to ensure a reliable carbon credit market and 
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achieve environmental goals.
390
 
 
However, JVETS showed that there was over a 10 percent gap between the actual 
emission reduction and the estimated one. This posed a question regarding the 
credibility of carbon credits issued under the system.
391
 If the MRV rule is not 
sufficiently robust, there is a perceived opportunity to systematically under report 
annual emissions, or over report emission reductions, which will undermine the 
credibility of carbon credits.
392
It was therefore suggested that designing an MRV 
system based on transaction data of entities would be superior to a system based on 
the data from actual measurements, because the data in a transaction monitored by 
proper entity measurements is governed by measurement law and transaction law, 
while the data from actual measurements is internally controlled and, being less 
reliable, must be checked by an independent third party, such as a verifier.
393
 
 
3.3.2.2 Tokyo Cap-and-Trade Program 
Japan abandoned its national ETS proposal in 2012.Instead it established a 
Feed-in-tariff and global warming tax. However, an emission trading system still 
exists at the local level. Tokyo Metropolitan Government Cap-and-Trade Program is a 
good example. After the approval of the Climate Change Strategy, and the amendment 
of the Tokyo Metropolitan Environmental Security Ordinance in June 2008, the Tokyo 
Greenhouse Gas Emission Trading System was officially created.
394
 The Tokyo CO2 
Emissions Reduction Program provided Tokyo with necessary capacity to enact 
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Japan‘s first mandatory ETS in April 2010.395Tokyo was the first large scale city to 
implement a cap-and-trade program in the world, which targeted energy-related 
 
carbon dioxide.
396
 The Tokyo ETS includes coverage of large scale office 
buildings.
397
 
 
As of 9 January 2015, 1232 facilities had reporting obligations under the Tokyo 
ETS.
398
 The threshold of the system for the covered facilities applied to facilities with 
fuel consumption over 1, 500 kiloliters of crude oil-equivalent annually. The base year 
emissions were determined by average annual emissions from any three consecutive 
fiscal years (FYs) between FY2002 and FY2007.
399
 Its first compliance period was 
from FY2010 to FY2014, with a 6 to 8 percent reduction for this period. Its second 
compliance period began from FY2015 until FY2019, a 15 to17 percent reduction for 
this period. The third compliance period will run through from 2020 to 2022, without 
a determined target.
400
 
 
The principle for allowances allocation was based on historical emissions, a 
grandfathering approach. Base-year emissions for the first compliance period were 
based on the average emissions of three consecutive years between FY2002-FY2007. 
Allocation to new entrants was based on past emissions or on emissions intensity 
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standards: emissions activity (floor area)×emission intensity standard.
401
 The formula 
of allocation was as follows: base year emissions-compliance factor (6-8percent, or 
15-17percent)×compliance period (5 years). For the second year of each compliance 
period, reductions in excess of annual obligations could be traded as credits, subject to 
a limitation of one-half of base year emissions.
402
 
 
Overall GHG emissions by sector covered include commercial, transport, residential, 
industrial and waste. The overall targets of GHG reduction set by Tokyo ETS program 
encompass a 25 percent reduction by 2020 from 2000 GHG levels, and a 30 percent 
reduction by 2030 from 2000 GHG levels.
403
 
 
The Tokyo ETS set an absolute cap at the facility level that aggregates to a 
Tokyo-wide cap. The formula for calculation is the sum of base year emissions of  
covered facilities × compliance factor × number of years of compliance period (five 
years).
404
 
 
Regarding flexibility issues in the Tokyo ETS, banking is allowed between the two 
compliance periods. Banking from first compliance period to the second compliance 
period is allowed, but banking from the first to third is not. Borrowing allowances are 
not permitted. Currently, credits from the following four types of loans are allowed. 
The amount of emission reductions achieved by implementing emission reduction 
measures from non-covered small and medium sized facilities in Tokyo since FY2010 
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can be used for compliance without limit.
405
 Emission reductions achieved from large 
facilities outside of the Tokyo area can be used for compliance for up to one-third of a 
facilities‘ obligation. Credits from renewable energy, such as solar, wind, geothermal, 
or hydro (under 1,000 kW) can be used for compliance without limit as well. In 
addition, two types of Saitama Credits, including excess credits from the Saitama 
system, and small and mid-size Facility Credits issued by the Saitama Prefecture can 
also be used for compliance without limit.
406
 All offsets have to be verified by 
verification agencies. There are no provisions for price management. However, the 
supply of credits available for trading may be increased in case of excessive price 
increases.
407
 
 
Monitoring, reporting, and verification are required in the compliance process in the 
Tokyo ETS. If the regulated entities do not comply with laws and regulations, 
enforcement measures are prescribed. In the first stage of enforcement, the Governor 
orders the facility to reduce emissions by the amount of the reduction shortfall 
multiplied by 1.3. In the second stage of enforcement, any facility that fails to carry 
out the order will be publicly named, and subject to fine up to JPY500,000 ($4,360), 
with 1.3 times the shortfall surcharges.
408
 
 
Information on market prices has been very limited. This first trade was announced in 
August 2010, when 22 tons were traded at JPY12,000 ($142). In 2012, 600 tons of 
offsets from green electricity certificate were sold in the Tokyo ETS market. Two 
estimated reference prices were recorded: JPY15,000 ($131) per ton based on the 
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price of solar energy under the Renewable Portfolio Standard law, and between 
JPY8,000 ($70) and JPY26,000 ($227) per ton based on the price of Green Energy 
Certificates as reported by the Japan Ministry of Environment.
409
 The average carbon 
price in 2014 was $95.
410
A report attributes the relatively limited trading activities 
under the Tokyo ETS to the fact that it does not intend for trading to be a primary 
option. Instead, trading is intended as the last option for facilities that are unable to 
meet their reduction obligations by other means.
411
 
 
The Tokyo TMG ETS has been expanded to the Saitama prefecture which decided to 
adopt a city-based ETS in 2009. Tokyo and Saitama have agreed to link their markets 
with each other since 2010. The two cities agreed that participating facilities in each 
ETS can trade credits across the boundary between Tokyo and Saitama. Specifically, 
excessive reductions from a large facility in either jurisdiction can be utilized by a 
facility in the other jurisdiction to fulfill its reduction obligation, from the end of the 
first compliance period in 2015. Credits from small and medium sized facilities in 
either jurisdiction can also be used by a large facility in the other jurisdiction to fulfill 
reduction obligation from 2012.
412
 
 
The experience of the Tokyo ETS since 2010 clearly demonstrates the effectiveness of 
a cap-and-trade approach. It demonstrates that the availability of data is essential for a 
robust monitoring, reporting and verification. The Tokyo ETS also provides flexibility 
for participating facilities, such as with the selection of the base year for emissions. In 
addition, predictability enables participants to plan and implement their emissions 
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reduction activities well in advance,
413
fostering a benign market environment for 
participating facilities to shape their long term planning for investment. However, the 
efforts to implement a national ETS in Japan were postponed in December 2010, and 
there is no momentum surrounding such a policy at present in Japan.
414
 
 
 
Chapter 4 The China ETS Experience 
4.1 Introduction  
In 2014, carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions in China accounted for 29.6 percent of the 
world‘s total415. The amount of CO2 emissions in 2013 and 2012 accounted for 29 
416
 
and 26 percent respectively.
417
 Indeed, as the largest CO2 emitting country, China‘s 
carbon dioxide emissions have continued to increase since 2007, when China first 
exceeded the annual GHG emissions of the US.
418
 And it is predicted to soar to over 
1/3 of the total global amount by 2023, when the first global stocktake, a mechanism 
for National Determined Contribution (NDC) adjustments, will be implemented 
according to article 14 of the Paris Climate Change Agreement.
419
 The International 
Energy Agency (IEA 2009) has estimated that about half the growth in global 
energy-related CO2 emissions from now until 2030 will come from China.
420
 And 
                                                             
413 Supra note 396, at 6. 
414 Supra note 371, at 9.  
415 Guangdong Will For a Carbon Emissions Trading Market, CHINA IRN (March 1, 2013). 
http://www.chinairn.com/news/20160120/163542488.shtml. 
416
 China’s Total Carbon Emissions Exceed the Sum of Carbon Emissions Per Capita in Europe and the United 
States the First Ultra-EU, GUANCHA (Sept. 22, 2014) http://www.guancha.cn/strategy/2014_09_22_269609.shtml. 
417
 Environmentalist China Carbon Market Research Report 2016, Environmentalist, International Finance 
Corporation [hereinafter IFC], at 17.  
418 Id. 
419
 Art.14, Paris Agreement of UNFCCC. 
420 Guoyi Han, Marie Olsson, Karl Hallding, David Lunsford, China’s Carbon Emission Trading: An Overview of 
Current Development, 1FORES Study 1, 1(2012).  
108 
 
China‘s per capita CO2 emissions had already reached 6.8 tons in 2014,
421
 higher than 
France‘s and on a par with Italy‘s.422 
 
Consequently, China has faced intense international pressure in last decade regarding 
its GHG emissions.
423
 If China would like to build a responsible image for itself in 
the international community and mitigate the ―China threat‖ theory, it should make a 
fair contribution to reducing carbon emissions.
424
 Under this background, the Chinese 
government announced its target of cutting GHG emissions per unit of gross domestic 
production (GDP) by 40-45 percent by 2020 based on 2005 levels existing before the 
commencement of the Copenhagen UN climate conference (COP15) in 2009.   
 
In addition, China and U.S. signed two landmark joint statements committing each 
nation to reduce emissions and promote cleaner energy sources which inspired a 
record number of nations to submit their nationally determined contributions (NDCs) 
to promote climate mitigation and adaptation under the Paris climate change 
accord.
425
 In a 2015 U.S.-China Joint Presidential Statement on Climate Change, 
China announced its target of decreasing GHG emissions per unit of gross domestic 
production (GDP) by 60-65 percent by 2030 compared with 2005, and to enact a 
national emission trading system in 2017.
426
 China and U.S. deserve a great deal of 
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credit for the successful outcome in Paris UN climate conference (COP21).
427
 But 
very sadly, the new U.S. Administration has declared that it will renege on its 
commitment. China, however, has stuck with its commitment and taken over from the 
U.S. the world climate change leadership role.  
 
The construction of the national emission trading system is divided into three stages: 
2015-2016 was the preparatory stage during which work on the carbon market 
infrastructure was completed; 2017-2020 is the stage for improving operation, which 
will witness the inception of carbon emission trading nationwide; and post 2020 is the 
stage for deepening the role of emission trading system when coverage will be further 
expanded, the rules of the system will be improved, and an international carbon 
market linkage is to be explored and researched.
428
 
 
With energy supply and consumption deeply trapped in dependence on fossil fuels, 
China will be unquestionably confronting challenges of energy shortages and growing 
carbon emissions in the present and future. But this is also an opportunity for China to 
achieve a transformation from the pattern of economic growth dependent on a fossil 
fuels driven economy to a green and low-carbon economy.
429
 
 
A study conducted by the International Finance Corporation claims that decisions 
needed to combat climate change, considering the reality of the Chinese energy 
situation facing policy makers, are as follows: first, China must curb its use of fossil 
fuels no matter what other major powers do, both because of energy security, the 
                                                             
427 Supra note 425, at 10194.  
428 Supra note 417, at 23.  
429 Id. 
110 
 
health and economic effects of fossil fuel caused pollution, and its vulnerability to the 
effects of global warming; second, the command and control approaches to cut carbon 
emissions used by the Chinese government to date, such as the shutdown of coal-fired 
plants by fiat are less efficient than a market-based approach.
430
 Some experts have 
concluded that ―the 11th Five Year Plan showed the inadequacy and cost-inefficiency 
of heavy reliance on administrative and political measures.‖ 431 One prominent 
authority held that ―China had relied mostly on administrative means to achieve its 20 
percent energy-intensity reduction goal for 2010.‖ 432 And ―such administrative 
measures were effective but not efficient.‖433 As a result, China had limited success 
in meeting the goal.
434
 
 
Others believe that these lessons also ―provide a strong motivation for the Chinese 
government to build and rely much more on market-based instruments, such as 
environmental taxation and emission trading systems to ensure continued energy and 
carbon intensity reduction‖.435 
 
The 12
th
 Five Year Plan was the first official government document that explicitly 
identified a carbon trading market as one of the major measures for achieving the 
energy and carbon intensity reduction goals.
436
 In the key decision of the third 
Plenum of the 18
th
 Central Committee of Communist Party of China in 2013, the 
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market was assigned as a decisive role in allocating resources.
437
 This served as the 
guiding principle on mapping out the 13
th
 five-year plan (2016-2020), which called 
for increasing use of market-based approaches to complement conventionally 
dominated use of administrative measures.
438
 
 
Since President Xi Jinping‘s landmark announcement in September 2015 on 
establishing the national emission trading system, draft legislation for the national 
ETS was submitted to China‘s State Council by the National Development and 
Reform Commission (NDRC) in 2016.
439
 On January 19, 2016, the NDRC circulated 
a notice about China‘s national ETS to all provincial Development and Reform 
Commissions (DRCs), relevant governmental agencies, state-owned enterprises, and 
major industry associations in China.
440
 The notice specified that companies from 
eight sectors and 18 sub-sectors with the consumption of over 10,000 tons of coal 
equivalent per year would be included in China‘s ETS.441 These eight sectors include 
petrochemicals, chemicals, building materials, steel, ferrous metals, paper-making, 
power-generation and aviation. Over 7,000 such companies have been identified, 
accounting for about half of all China‘s carbon emissions.442 
 
China‘s ETS is to set the carbon emissions reduction target according to carbon 
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intensity, and adjust allowances annually based on output. The criteria for allowance 
allocation will be based on sectoral baselines rather than a grandfathering principle
443
 
in order to avoid of unfair allocation to firms that have taken early actions. But an 
analyst of the International Green Development Partnership (IGDP) said it is likely 
that the Chinese national carbon market will start with three industries instead of 
eight.
444
 The power industry, the cement industry, and the electrolytic aluminum 
industry will be included at the starting stage. National allocation plans of China‘s 
ETS for the three sectors were released at a training workshop in Sichuan in May 
2017. Benchmarks for the above mentioned three industries were discussed in the 
training workshop.
445
 
 
The presence of a China‘s ETS will have significant implications for climate 
policymaking around the world, and it will substantially change the dynamics and 
landmarks of current carbon markets. With a projected cap size of at least four billion 
tons, China‘s ETS would be twice the size of the EU ETS and greater than all existing 
carbon markets combined.
446
 To date, 56 jurisdictions, including 35 national and 21 
sub-national jurisdictions, have adopted a carbon trading system. These jurisdictions 
accounted for 40 percent of global GDP by early 2016.
447
 The presence of a China‘s 
ETS has the potential to create a dynamic towards scaling up climate action through a 
carbon trading system, for example by incentivizing other nations to implement 
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carbon pricing policies, committing a more ambitious National Determined 
Contribution (NDC), and encouraging further carbon market cooperation.
448
 This 
ultimately will facilitate the implementation of the Paris Agreement and better curtail 
global warming. The current global NDC commitments will only be able to limit 
global warming to within 2.7℃ by 2100. By 2030, the total levels of GHGs in the 
atmosphere are projected to reach 55 billion tons.
449
 This means that future carbon 
emission reduction efforts need to be far greater than those associated with the current 
NDCs alone so as to cut emissions to 40 billion tons. Only then can global average 
temperature increases be contained below 2℃ in contrast with the pre-industrial level, 
let alone 1.5℃.450 
 
China officially launched pilot programs of emission trading in seven places in 2013, 
and is expected to establish a uniform national carbon emission trading market from 
2017 to 2020. In practice, these pilots have proved effective to some extent, but 
exposed some deficiencies. There are a number of problems displayed in the seven 
pilots, for example: weak investor confidence in carbon markets in the future since the 
emission trading regime does not have a sufficient legal basis at the national level, 
inactive trading, volatility of carbon prices, a lack of historical emission data and 
oversupply of emission allowances.  
 
These problems, on the one hand have affected the performance of the pilots to some 
extent. And on the other hand, they have given rise to different views on an emission 
trading system among decision makers, regulated sectors, the public and academia. 
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For regulators, an emission trading system is still a primary market instrument, and a 
uniform market will be piloted across the country at the end of 2017 onwards. 
Therefore, national legislation and specific carbon emission trading regulations will 
be focal points in the short run.  
 
At the same time, the combination of traditional command and control methods, a 
carbon tax and other market instruments will also come to the notice of the decision 
makers, the general public and scholars. The roles of an emission trading program and 
a carbon tax in addressing climate change and their compatibility with each other as 
well as future development of the emission trading policies in China will be an 
important subject matter for research, and may have a significant impact on future 
policy making. 
 
4.2. An overview of the emission trading of the seven pilots in China 
At the beginning of 21
st
 century, China set ambitious goals of energy saving and 
climate related policies as a cornerstone of the 11
th
 Five Year Plan (2006-2010). The 
program was implemented through top down measures, which fit well with the 
Chinese administrative system, but came at a higher cost than market-based 
measures,
451
 and gave no flexibility for the enterprises. Recognizing the limited 
efficacy of the conventional command and control approach and the difficulties in 
maintain their efforts, China then sought market-based alternatives to reduce the 
energy and carbon intensity of its economy.
452
 
 
Apart from the activities relating to the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) 
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provided by the Kyoto Protocol, China had no experience with any functional carbon 
market at all until 2012.
453
 While the CDM was helpful to introduce the concept and 
practice of carbon trading into China, it has several serious deficiencies including 
many ―that would differentiate it substantially from a functional domestic carbon 
trading system in China.‖454 
 
First of all, the CDM does not encourage competition within sectors or between 
regions in China to find cheaper ways to reduce carbon intensity and increase energy 
efficiency, because the buyers of CDM projects are almost exclusively from other 
countries.
455
 Second, the CDM means much less for China in terms of actual 
emission reductions than would be expected, in comparison with other measures. 
China had avoided about 1.6 billion tons of CO2 emission through energy intensity 
reductions during its 11
th
 Five Year Plan. Nevertheless, with the direct experience 
from the Clean Development Mechanism projects, China‘s major industrial firms 
likely had a large influence on the NDRC‘s policymaking and confidence in 
establishing the seven pilot programs, and also led to the creation of the Chinese 
Certified Emissions Reductions (CCER) offset program.
456
 
 
In 2012, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) inaugurated the 
Chinese Certified Emission Reduction program described below. Its purpose was to 
promote project-based Post-Kyoto-Protocol emission trading. Without statutory 
restraints on carbon emissions, however, this system provided poor motivation 
resulting in considerable inertia. To overcome this deficiency, the State Council, 
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China‘s Cabinet, promulgated the Working Plan for Curbing Greenhouse Gas 
Emission during the Twelfth Five-Year in December 2011. To facilitate the 
implementation of the 12th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social 
Development; the cabinet explicitly required measures to establish and improve 
greenhouse gas emission reduction compliance, including requirements for provision 
of statistics and accounting systems, and thus to establish a reliable emission trading 
market. In 2013, China introduced its seven pilot allowance-based emission trading 
programs.
457
 
 
The seven places in which the pilot programs were initiated are Beijing, Tianjin, 
Shanghai, Chongqing, Hubei, Guangdong and Shenzhen. However, other provinces, 
such as Qinghai and Shandong, are also voluntarily exploring and attempting to 
establish an emission trading market within their respective administrative areas.  
 
Moreover, emission trading pilots in the initial seven places are not confined to their 
respective administrative areas. Some of them have tried to establish regional 
emission markets on the basis of their own circumstances. For instance, at the end of 
2014, Beijing worked with the city of Chengde in Hebei province and, Erdos and 
Hohhot of Inner Mongolia to pilot cross-region emission trading, and with emission 
reduction projects of six cement manufacturers in Chengde incorporated into the 
Beijing carbon market. Shenzhen has achieved substantial cooperation with Baotou of 
Inner Mongolia and Huai‘an of Jiangsu Province in building a regional emission 
trading market and capacity.
458
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4.2.1 The performance of emission trading from the seven pilots 
The maximum amount of CCER credits allowed for use as an offset to the obligation 
by regulated enterprises is 5 or 10 percent in the seven pilots.
459
 By August 2016, 
there were a total of 2,310 CCER projects approved, 762 projects filed, 254 projects 
with emission reduction filed, and emission reductions already filed totaling about 
43.90 million metric ton of CO2e.
460
 
 
Upon official launch of the CCER in January 2015, it had become an object of trading 
in pilot markets. On March 9, 2015, the Guangdong Emission Exchange completed 
the first CCER transaction, which comprised two 100,000 tons traded. The price of 
the transaction disclosed for only one of those trades was $3.06/ton. The Beijing 
Environment Exchange made its first CCER trade on March 12, 2015. The 378,000 
tons transaction was the single largest CCER trade. The emission reductions were 
mostly generated from hydro projects.
461
 The Tianjin Emission Exchange also 
completed a CCER trade of 60,000 tons from waste heat recovery projects without 
disclosure of price information.
462
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By June 2016, CCER trading in the seven pilots totaled 92.053 million metric tons.
463
 
As of June 30, 2017, the aggregated carbon turnover was 446 million tons, totally 
100.71 billion Yuan in value.
464
 The seven pilots cover a wide range of different 
economic, industrial, and geographic circumstances.
465
 Together they comprise about 
25 percent of China‘s annual GDP and represent the spectrum of economic 
development and wealth within the country.
466
  
 
In order to improve market activity and liquidity, some areas have introduced carbon 
financial derivatives, such as carbon collateral security, carbon bonds, carbon funds 
and other carbon-related financial products or services with local allowances or 
CCER as the subject. Carbon collateral security refers to a situation in which a debtor 
or a third party submits his carbon assets to a lender as collateral security for debt. 
The lender has right to priority payment by selling the carbon assets under its 
possession when the lender cannot otherwise recover debt repayment under the law. 
Usually, carbon collateral security is regarded as a means for using carbon assets, 
such as credits from project or carbon emission allowances as collateral security to 
receive loans from financial institutions.
467
 For instance, in August 2015, Hubei 
Branch of Export-Import Bank of China signed an agreement providing RMB 100  
 
                                                             
463 A Summary of Recent Developments in CCER Projects, China Emission Trading, available at 
http://www.tanpaifang.com/CCER/201607/2054761.html.  
464 Climate Action in partnership with UN Environment, China is about to launch the biggest national Carbon 
Trading System in the world, Climate Change Programme (August 3, 2017), 
http://www.climateactionprogramme.org/news/china-is-about-to-launch-the-biggest-national-carbon-trading-syste
m.  
465 Supra note 425, at 10195. 
466 Id. 
467 Comprehensive Analysis of Carbon Asset Management Classification and Business Model, Carbon Emission 
Trading Network, (Nov. 14, 2016), http://www.tanpaifang.com/tanzichanguanli/2016/1114/57575_4.html.  
119 
 
million carbon emission credits as collateral security under a loan for the Hubei Yihua 
Group.
468
 
 
A carbon bond is a debt certificate issued by government or companies, for the 
purpose of encouraging loans from investors for low carbon projects, with the 
condition for repaying the payment of interest and principal when the debt is due.
469
 
 
A carbon fund is a special fund provided by government, financial institutions, 
enterprises, or individuals, aiming at purchasing credits from carbon emission 
reduction projects or investing in projects of greenhouse gases emissions reduction. A 
carbon fund has a function to mitigate global climate change.
470
 For example, China 
has a Green Carbon Foundation which makes carbon reduction grants. It has operated 
since 2010 under the supervision of the State Forestry Administration of the PRC.
471
 
The China National Petroleum Corporation, a state-owned oil and gas company, 
injected RMB300 million into the foundation for afforestation and forestry 
management pursuant to reducing the concentration of greenhouse gases in the 
atmosphere.
472
 
 
In contrast with the EU, where emission trading amounted to $119.2 billion in 2010 
alone, the seven emission trading pilots still have a long way to go; but in the course 
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of their exploration and practice activities, they can provide valuable experience for 
future establishment of a national emission trading market. Some of the achievements 
from the seven pilots in terms of rules, emission cap determinations and allowance 
allocations, trading capacity and compliance mechanisms are described below. 
 
First, as for rules, China has put in place a set of policies and rules concerning core 
elements of emission trading, mainly including departmental rules and local rules and 
regulations promulgated in pilot provinces and municipalities. Currently, at the local 
level, the seven pilot provinces and municipalities have promulgated their own 
interim measures and supporting rules for emission trading administration. At the 
national level, the NDRC has promulgated the Measures for Administration on the 
Operation of the Clean Development Mechanism Projects (2005, revised 2011),
473
 
the Interim Measures for the Administration of Transactions in Voluntary Emission 
Reduction of Greenhouse Gas (2012),
474
 and the Interim Administrative Measures on 
Carbon Emission Trading(2014).
475
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However, in the future, the promulgation of national administrative regulations or 
laws, such as the promulgation of the Regulations for Carbon Emission Trading 
Administration,
476
 or the Law on Dealing with Climate Change,
477
 may alter the 
existing set of rules. The NDRC has drafted and submitted the Regulations for 
Carbon Emission Trading Administration to the State Council, with a purpose of 
providing legal foundation for the carbon market, since carbon emission reduction, as 
an obligation imposed on enterprises, is required to be specified by laws or 
administrative regulations. 
 
Regulations for Carbon Emission Trading Administration provides some fundamental 
requirements for China‘s carbon markets under construction, including the total 
amount of allowances to be issued and their distribution, allowances and credit 
transactions, monitoring and verification of emission reductions, a carbon emissions‘ 
report by key emitters, offset mechanisms, property of allowances as intangible assets, 
and accountabilities for non-compliance, etc.
478
Unlike a natural market formed by 
demand and supply, such as a food market, where the goods supplied by the market 
have their practical value-in-use because of their scarcity, carbon allowances or 
credits don‘t; their scarcity is created by law, as a result, they have value-in-exchange. 
Otherwise, there wouldn‘t be a market for carbon, because it would not have 
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value-in-use. Thus, it‘s crucial for a carbon market to have a legal foundation.479 
 
For the emission cap determination and allowance allocations, pilot provinces and 
municipalities respectively determine an annual emission cap on the basis of different 
factors and allocated emission allowances to specific emission producers in specific 
sectors in accordance with diverse approaches. 
 
As for emission caps, they reflect regional carbon intensity goals set by the local 
governments; therefore, they are subject to adjustment because the actual GDP growth 
would differ based on projected economic growth.
480
The pilot areas have also taken 
into account other factors, including their actual carbon emissions, economic and 
social development, total energy consumption and incremental target, energy intensity 
target, historical emission data and emission reduction potential and capacity of those 
emission producers that are incorporated into the emission trading system. For 
instance, carbon intensity between the eastern area and western areas is different. The 
former has more intensive carbon in its economy and thus the NRDC would give a 
preferential treatment to the western area in cap setting. For the power sector, because 
it is exposed to trade competition and cannot automatically pass through all of its 
costs to the consumer, it will be given a feasible carbon emission reduction target; the 
allowances allocation will be based on its historical emission data. 
 
During the process of policy making, stakeholders are involved in order to obtain their 
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opinions and address their concerns. A lot of meetings among governmental agencies, 
covered enterprises, and environmental groups were convened in public hearings held 
by a local competent governmental agency, mainly the local Development and 
Reform Commission.   
 
The agency was required to have determined sectors covered by the emission trading 
system and an annual emission cap through a combination of top down and bottom up 
approaches, including allowances for existing enterprises, allowances for additional 
production capacity and allowances for reserve containment. For instance, the covered 
entities were required to provide their emission data and their production, and a 
provincial DRC was entrusted as an accredited verifying institute to evaluate the data 
submitted by the entities. If there was a reasonable doubt to the data, the verifying 
institute was charged with scrutinizing the data submitted.   
 
Allowance allocations initially were totally free of charge in some pilot areas such as 
Beijing, Shanghai, Chongqing and Hubei, while subject to a combination of free of 
and auctioned allowances in Shenzhen, Tianjin and Guangdong. Where allocation was 
made free of charge, a historical emission approach, benchmark approach or a 
combination of both was adopted. With different institutional arrangements, these 
pilot provinces and municipalities have offered a variety of explorations, which may 
have a positive role in analyzing pilot experiences and forming a better carbon 
emission allowance allocation approach appropriate to China‘s national conditions. 
 
Third, for trading capacity, pilot provinces and municipalities have taken the lead in 
setting up a trading and settlement management platform and have worked 
124 
 
consistently to enhance technical support and third-party service to ensure effective 
implementation of the MRV (Measurable, Reportable and Verifiable) rules,
481
 which 
are essential for a successful emission trading system. Pilot provinces and 
municipalities have formulated a great number of technical criteria for emission 
trading, including criteria for truthful and accurate carbon emission reporting, an 
emission registry, and for the entire emission trading system, approaches and 
guidelines for carbon emission measurement and reporting, and third-party inspection 
standards. They also have set up relevant exchanges and trading systems.  
 
Emission data reported in the past three years by more than 2,000 enterprises that are 
incorporated in the emission trading system has filled the data gap, and at the same 
time, third-party service providers in connection with emission trading producers have 
grown and expanded out of nothing, including carbon asset management bodies, 
carbon emission monitoring, and reporting and certifying institutions. Nonetheless, 
international companies are currently not allowed to perform data verification services 
for the seven pilots.
482
 
 
As for compliance mechanisms, pilot provinces and municipalities have required 
emission producers to surrender allowances to them, as well as enforcement through 
relevant penalties; penalties may differ from place to place. At present, all pilots have 
built a variety of information disclosure and punishment mechanisms. Some pilots 
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include non-compliance in the credit record of non-complying entities and make it 
public. Some pilots also deprive those non-complying corporations from applying for 
public energy saving funds for a certain period of time and other projects with 
preferential treatment.
483
 
 
For example, in Tianjin, there are just some general provisions on legal liabilities. In 
case of violation by a covered enterprise, the municipal Development and Reform 
Commission will demand a violator to rectify within a specified period and be 
disqualified for three years from relevant preferential policies (such as precedence in 
obtaining a bank loan and from applying for recycling economy, energy saving and 
emission reduction projects). In Shanghai, where a fine is imposed a non-performing 
enterprise may be subject to a fine of more than RMB 50,000 and less than RMB 
100,000 ($7,900–$14,900). One professor held that, ―these sticks are necessary, but 
not enough‖.484  
 
4.2 .2Problems of Emission Trading in the Seven Pilot Locations 
A functional carbon trading system requires five main components: (1) setting a cap 
on total emissions; (2) allocating allowances or quotas; (3) enacting stringent rules on 
measuring, reporting and verification (MRV); (4) creating transaction infrastructures, 
such as registries and exchanges; and (5) establishing an accountability system in case 
of non-compliance.
485One expert study held that, ―each of these components is 
indispensable, and together they require not only creditable carbon emission 
measurement and statistics, but also a fair allocation mechanism, free market 
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conditions and reliable oversight, as well as strict monitoring.‖486 The study indicated 
that the measurement of the performance of a carbon emission market includes its 
effectiveness (emission reduction), efficiency (reduction cost), innovation and 
investment in clean technology, and dealing with any resulting carbon leakage.
487
 
These elements for measuring the performance of a carbon trading market will be 
helpful to identify the problems reflected in China‘s pilot programs.  
 
With three compliance periods respectively expired in June 2014, June 2015 and June 
2016, the seven Chinese emission trading pilot programs have proved effective in 
implementing greenhouse gases emission reduction and control targets and providing 
a pragmatic basis for future establishment of a uniform national carbon market. 
However, the emission trading pilots also revealed a number of problems, and some 
of them have caused damage to the perception of the fairness of an emission trading 
system and the policy target of cost-effective emission reduction. Through 
overhauling emission trading pilot practice and experience in the seven pilot programs, 
this paper identifies problems in four aspects, as follows: (a) emission trading rules‘ 
lack of a national law basis; (b) primary emission trading market‘s lack of a uniform 
legal system; (c) secondary emission trading market‘s lack of adequate regulation; and 
(d) emission trading market‘s lack of a sound monitoring and regulatory mechanisms. 
 
4.2.2.1 Emission trading rules lack of a national law basis 
Pursuant to Article 80.2 of the Legislation Law of the PRC, without laws or 
administrative regulations, and with decisions or orders of the State Council as the 
basis, no provision in departmental rules shall lessen rights of citizens, legal persons 
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or other organizations or increase their obligations.
488
Therefore, it is obviously 
inconsistent with the Legislation Law of the PRC for the NDRC, through 
departmental rules, and pilot provinces and municipalities, through local regulations 
and governmental rules, to subject emission producers to additional fixed-period 
allowances or surrender their entitlements and be subject to penalties. In addition, 
regulating emission trading through local governmental rules or regulations results in 
lack of authoritativeness, stability and transparency of the relevant rules, and this is 
not conducive to the implementation and overall effectiveness of emission trading.  
 
Governmental agencies and experts have expressed the need for a strong legal 
foundation for the national ETS for effective implementation and for potential 
punishment for non-compliance. NDRC is well aware of these legal challenges and is 
working with the Legislative Affairs Office under the State Council to have the 
interim measures and regulations promoted by State Council regulation.
489
The draft of 
such legislation has already been submitted to State Council in 2016.
490
Meanwhile, 
the draft of a Law on Dealing with Climate Change of the PRC is also under 
discussion. But due to procedures and a compulsory hearing requirement, its passage 
will take time. The valuable experience from Beijing and Shenzhen is worthwhile 
                                                             
488 Article 80.2 of the Legislation Law of the PRC provides departmental rules may provide for matters in 
connection with enforcement of laws or administrative regulations, decisions or orders of the State Council. 
Without laws or administrative regulations, decisions or orders of the State Council as the basis, no provision in 
departmental rules shall lessen rights of citizens, legal persons or other organizations or increase their obligations, 
or increase departmental authority or lessen statutory departmental duty.‖ Legislation Law of the People’s 
Republic of China (2015), available at http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?id=19023&lib=law.   
488 Supra note 417, at 24.  
489 Id. 
490 Carbon Emissions Trading Regulations, Tan Pai Fang (March 29, 2016), 
http://www.tanpaifang.com/zhengcefagui/2016/032951731.html.  
128 
 
sharing with other pilot programs starting to initiate carbon markets.
491
 
 
4.2.2 .2Primary emission trading market lack of a uniform legal system 
A primary emission trading market is the cornerstone for establishing and effectively 
operating the entire emission trading market, and mainly consists of emission cap 
determination and primary allowance allocation. Currently, a primary emission 
trading market in China lacks a uniform legal system. 
 
First, each pilot adopted a different method to determine emission caps and allocate 
allowances. For the moment, each of the seven pilots employs a dispersed 
decision-making approach similar to that adopted by the EU ETS at Phase I and Phase 
II. The EU ETS has two approaches to determine its emission cap and allocated 
relevant allowance. In Phase I and Phase II, a dispersed approach was adopted; that is, 
each Member State formulated its own emission cap and allowance targets according 
to national allocation plans, and the EU had no authority to change or adjust specific 
allowances submitted by them. In Phase III, a centralized approach has been 
employed, that is, Member States no longer have the discretion, and instead, the 
European Commission determines the emission cap and allowance allocations for the 
entire EU.  
 
However, the dispersed approach and a centralized approach each have its own 
advantages and disadvantages. The former will result in uncertainty and 
unpredictability. Member States are inclined to offer preferential treatment to 
domestic enterprises. While the centralized approach is likely to give rise to extra 
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emission reduction efforts in one Member State to the industry involving emission 
trading that can be offset by relaxation in other Member States.
492
 
 
However, the draft Regulations on Carbon Emission Trading submitted to the State 
Council for approval for the China pilots have specified a centralized approach for 
decision making. Pursuant to its article 6, the ―competent department under the State 
Council shall determine the national emission allowance allocation plan on the basis 
of the national greenhouse gases emission control targets and circumstances of key 
emission producers, and define the allowance to be allocated to various provinces, 
autonomous regions, municipalities directly under the Central Government, cities 
separately listed in the national plan and the Xinjiang Production and Construction 
Corps.‖493 
 
No doubt, the dispersed approach, by allowing provinces and cities to decide their 
own cap and allowance allocation, may undermine fair competition among enterprises 
and consistency among provincial emission targets. Nevertheless, by allowing the 
Central Government to directly decide national, provincial and municipal emission 
targets, under a centralized approach it is hard to accommodate local differences and 
may give rise to free rider issues, which have to be further clarified in future legal 
frameworks.   
 
The legal status of carbon emission allowances or certified emission reductions is not 
well defined in the Interim Administrative Measures on Carbon Emission Trading and 
the draft Regulations for Carbon Emission Trading Administration. The two 
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documents define allowances as a certificate of carbon emission right.
494
 Pursuant to 
article 11 of the Regulations for Carbon Emission Trading Administration (Draft), an 
emission allowance is defined as an intangible asset which shall be affirmed by the 
national registry system for the carbon trading system; and competent authorities 
under the State Council are responsible for establishing, operating, maintaining and 
supervising the national carbon trading registration system.
495
 
 
In the supplementary provisions of the Interim Measures for the Administration of 
Emission Trading,
496
an emission allowance is also defined as a carbon emission quota 
allocated by the government to key emitters for a certain period of time and a 
certificate of carbon emission right. One allowance means that the key emitting unit 
that holds it is allowed to emit greenhouse gas equal to 1 ton of CO2e.
497
 
 
The above two documents both regard an allowance as a certificate of carbon 
emission right. The draft Regulations for Carbon Emission Trading Administration 
even further defines it as an intangible asset, implying that allowance has economic 
value and is tradable. However, its legal nature is still ambiguous, for an asset is a 
concept of economics, not a legal terminology. 
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The nature of a carbon emission allowance would have a significant impact on its 
holders‘ right and the stability and predictability of the carbon market. If it is defined 
as private property, its holders enjoy full autonomy. The adjustment of a carbon 
emission allowance, or Chinese Certified Emission Reduction (CCER), by the 
government would constitute taking private property and create a need to compensate 
the property owner; this is not conducive to macro control by the government for the 
carbon market, but it is conducive for protecting private property. Otherwise, if a 
CCER is defined as a certificate of carbon emission right under public law issued to 
emitters by government through administrative license, its affirmation, alteration and 
cancellation will be determined by the government, which will have a significant 
impact on allowance acquisition or disposition. As a result protection to its holders 
would be weaker than for a private property right. Nonetheless, those legal provisions 
have not clarified legal nature of allowances up to now.  
 
Similarly, the legal property of a Chinese Certified Emission Reduction (CCER) is 
also vague in the aforesaid two documents. In article 47 of the draft Regulations for 
Carbon Emission Trading Administration, CCER is defined as a voluntary greenhouse 
gas emission reduction registered in the national registration system by competent 
authorities of carbon trading under the State Council in accordance with relevant 
provisions.
498
This draft text is similar with the Interim Measures for the 
Administration of Emission Trading,
499
 the Interim Measures for the Administration 
of Transactions in Voluntary Emission Reduction of Greenhouse Gas,
500
 and 
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provisions promulgated by the various pilot areas.  
 
For example, the Tentative Measures of Guangdong Province for Emission Trading 
Administration has specified that an emission allowance refers to the quantitative 
index of CO2 emissions allocated by the government for enterprises to produce and 
operate.
501
A Chinese Certified Emission Reduction refers to the Certified Emission 
Reduction arising from voluntary greenhouse gas emission reduction projects as 
recorded by the NDRC in accordance with the Interim Measures for the 
Administration of Transactions in Voluntary Emission Reduction of Greenhouse 
Gas.
502
  
 
Obviously, without clearly defining the legal nature of an emission allowance or 
CCER, this may negatively affect the stability and predictability of national emission 
trading markets and thus undermine the confidence of relevant market players.  
 
Emission caps and allowance allocation approaches are not aligned in the seven pilots. 
As for emission caps, since pilot areas all lack basic emission data and cap and trade 
methodology and capacity, some key issues remain uncertain, including determination 
of current and future carbon emission caps, emission reduction goals, etc.  
 
Moreover, inconsistency between data obtained by relevant governmental agencies 
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and those obtained from enterprises reporting creates confusion
503
from repetitive 
calculation of emissions in the power sector, lack of assessment of the impact of 
emission caps on economic and social development, and lack of analysis of emission 
potentials and costs of various industries and enterprises. At present, emission cap 
setting is quite problematic, and as a result, some pilot areas have adopted rather loose 
definitions of allowances so as to mitigate resistance to implementation from the 
regulated entities. Only a few pilot areas have strict allowance allocation rules or 
modulate the loose caps ex post. Therefore, it is imperative to conduct total emission 
control in a more scientific and accurate manner so as to reliably define a national 
emission cap.  
 
Consistency and fairness of allocation approaches and criteria are crucial to carbon 
markets. In some areas, allowances initially are allocated for free. And in other areas, 
a combination of auction and free allocation is employed. Allocations to existing 
emissions sources are either based on historical emissions in light of a grandfather 
clause, emission intensities or a benchmark rule (equipment output or sector output) 
depending on sectors.
504
 
 
Moreover, the pilots allow the regulated entities to apply for adjustments in 
allowances in case a significant shortage of allowances occurs under specific 
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circumstances.
505
At present, the allocation in some areas, based on a grandfather 
clause or benchmark rule of equipment output is unfair since the treatment of early 
abatement actions differs among pilots in terms of the profile of historical emissions 
in certain periods of time, allocation methods, and allowance rewards.
506
 This is 
sometimes due to emission producers‘ false reporting because of lack of reliable 
carbon emission data. The fairness of allocation based on a benchmark rule of sector 
output is also questioned.
507
 
 
For the future national carbon market, equity issues may arise from the allocation of 
the carbon emission allowances, given the wide economic and emission intensity 
discrepancy of the provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities.
508
 Some 
analyses examine the implication of different principles of carbon emission allowance 
allocations for different provinces and grandfathering principles based on historical 
emissions and per capita principles based on population. The former produces results 
that the larger the historical emissions, the greater the emission allowances will be 
available; the latter creates results that the larger the population of the province, the 
more emission allowances will be available.
509
 Both scenarios result in the largest 
welfare losses to the western provinces with rich energy resources but scarcer 
populations relative to the eastern provinces. In contrast, the eastern provinces with 
high emissions and low emission intensity will suffer less welfare losses.
510
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The present emission trading system has a narrow and inconsistent coverage. 
Coverage means sectors and specific emission producers to be included into the 
emission trading system. A proper coverage is critical for the system‘s normal 
operation. Pilot areas have defined sectors and emission producers to be included in 
accordance with their respective economic development, proportion of different 
sectors of local greenhouse gas emissions, and the different emission quantities of 
emissions from different industrial sectors, mainly including power plants, chemical, 
steel and iron, paper making, transportation, construction and service sectors.  
 
The seven pilots cover not only direct CO2 emissions but also indirect CO2 emissions 
from fields such as heating and electricity consumption.
511
The coverage of indirect 
CO2 emissions is a new initiative that has rarely been carried out by other 
jurisdictions.
512
 
 
The primary reason for including indirect CO2 emissions in the pilot systems is that a 
considerable amount of the electricity consumed in some pilot areas is purchased from 
other jurisdictions. For example, over 60 percent of the electricity consumed by 
Beijing is purchased from other regions. Thus, the indirect CO2 emissions have 
become the dominant emissions in Beijing.
513
This would be a strength of the Chinese 
pilot ETS programs in that it has the potential to raise standards for other 
jurisdictions.
514
However, the scope of industrial enterprises varies, and in some areas, 
industrial enterprises and non-industrial enterprises are subject to different criteria of 
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inclusion. Obviously, this does not help the establishment of a uniform national 
carbon market.  
 
In some provinces and municipalities, the coverage of enterprises to be included in the 
emission trading is too narrow, and does not include non-industrial enterprises, most 
of which are in service sector. Without a sufficient number of main market players, it 
will be hard to maintain a stable and active emission trading market and to reduce 
costs through economies of scale.
515
 
 
4.2.2.3 Secondary emission trading markets lack adequate regulations 
Secondary emission trading markets refers to places where emission allowances or 
emission credits are traded and relevant transaction activities occur. Namely, those 
that are included into an emission trading system may buy or sell their allowances or 
credits as needed in secondary markets. Therefore, the efficacy of secondary market 
regulation will have a direct impact on the success or failure of the emission trading 
system. Currently, regulatory provisions tend to focus on primary emission trading 
market establishments and overlook the regulations of secondary markets. 
 
Secondary markets have a number of defects: for example, allowances can be 
monopolized, and a sound price formation mechanism may be absent.  
 
Emission allowances tend to concentrate in the hands of a few large enterprises, and 
the markets lack sufficient activity and liquidity to deal with it. Since key enterprises 
included in the emission trading system come from different sectors and their size 
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varies greatly, there is a tendency for a monopoly of allowances in Shanghai, 
Guangdong and Hubei. This is quite similar to ―windfall profits‖ arising from free 
over-allocation of permits at early stages of the EU ETS. 
 
According to published statistics, in Shanghai, of allowances for 2013, about 70% 
were held by just a few enterprises, such as Baosteel, Huaneng Group and Shenergy 
Group. Combined allowances for the majority of enterprises in pilots are less than 30% 
of total allowances.
516
As a result, if a few enterprises with a great quantity of 
allowances only account for a small amount for trading so as to timely comply with 
their obligations during the pilot period, total carbon trade volume will be sparse in 
emission trading market. Moreover, the Interim Measures for the Administration of 
Carbon Emission Trading and relevant provincial or municipal provisions all fail to 
provide for adequate competition regulations for secondary emission trading markets. 
The emission allowances are very likely to have an ―inborn‖ lack of liquidity, and this 
is not conducive to emission trading market‘s liquidity and efficiency.  
 
Also, emission reduction targets are not directly linked to energy efficiency 
assessments, and thus, some enterprises do not have motivation to participate in an 
emission trading system. In contrast with energy efficiency subsidies that have been 
implemented for a number of years and accompanied by a lot of policy support, an 
emission trading pilot is still in the process of exploration and learning by doing.  
 
On the one hand, some new incoming enterprises often cannot distinguish energy 
efficiency targets and emission reduction targets and have to spend much time 
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studying and comparing them. On the other hand, some enterprises are veterans in the 
energy efficiency program and prefer the former one, which will bring them a higher 
subsidy, resulting in substantially reduced participation and volume in the emission 
trading pilots. Meanwhile, at the present time it is worth mentioning that energy 
efficiency and emission trading belong to different competent authorities, and their 
powers are not clarified clearly.
517
 
 
Emission trading markets lack a sound price formation mechanism. Behavioral choice 
of the enterprises and investors that are included into the emission trading system 
depends upon a predictable price signal for the emission allowance or CER.  
 
From the past experience of the trial program of sulphur dioxide (SO2) emission 
trading that has been implemented in China at the local level since the 1990s, 
excessive government intervention prevailed in the emission markets.
518
 Trading 
prices of SO2 emissions were modulated or instructed by arbitrary political 
manipulation and regulation to a great extent.
519
 As a result, the SO2 emissions 
trading system in China has been distorted by the legacy of a planned economy.
520
 
 
This phenomenon also was reflected in the energy efficiency targets during 11
th
five 
year plan. One oft-cited example is China‘s achievement in reducing its energy 
intensity by 19.6 percent from 2006 to 2010 against the set target of 20 percent, which 
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was attributed to its governmental intervention, such as the electricity rationing.
521
 
Under severe scrutiny towards the end of 2010, data showed that many regulated 
entities stopped or slowed production rather than improving energy efficiency to 
achieve their energy targets, which led to a slight rebound of energy intensity in early 
2011.
522
 
 
Once a price signal is distorted or unpredictable, enterprises will find it hard to make a 
rational choice, and as a consequence, the efficiency of emission trading market will 
be affected. At present, emission trading pilots are seven segmented and closed 
markets that are independent and isolated from each other. And what‘s more, narrow 
coverage results in limited trade volume, and policy and market formation is just at 
the primary stage. Thus, trade volume and price cannot fairly reflect supply and 
demand of the market, emission reduction cost, compliance and the like. Besides, 
despite the fact that the volatility of allowance prices in the seven pilots is tending to 
be stable, carbon allowance transaction prices vary greatly between them. This means 
that carbon allowances in different areas lack homogeneity, while the establishment of 
a uniform national carbon market is preconditioned on mutual recognition and 
homogeneity of emission allowances in various areas. For future establishment of a 
uniform national emission trading market, the key is the homogenization of emission 
allowances in different pilot areas.
523
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4.2.2.4 Emission trading market lacks of sound supervision and regulatory 
system 
Unlike the ordinary commodity markets, the emission trading market is subject to 
forceful state intervention, and it cannot be formed and operated without government 
regulation and control. However, the emission trading market in China is just at the 
very beginning and still has a number of problems with respect to management, such 
as an adequate supervision and regulatory system, a price intervention mechanism, 
compliance safeguard measures, third-party management, and carbon leakage 
supervision. 
 
Emission trading lacks a sound regulatory system, in part due to the overlap of duty 
and power for different departments. For the present, a combination of centralization 
(Development and Reform Commission, DRC) and decentralization (relevant 
functional departments)in its regulatory system, as established in accordance with the 
Interim Measures for the Administration of Carbon Emission Trading, may easily 
give rise to government failure, such as over-regulation or under-regulation, 
aggravated corporate burdens, and incurred resistance from enterprises. Moreover, 
irrational static division of powers may result in a number of institutional obstacles, 
including with information collection, regulation and enforcement, technical criteria 
and third-party inspection.  
 
Emission allowances are subject to improper price intervention, and the compliance 
cost for enterprises is uncertain. Under current emission trading pilots, mostly reserve 
allowances are used to control and regulate price. Namely, when the carbon allowance 
price is too high, the government will sell reserve allowances to lower the price. 
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Moreover, enterprises may employ the CER offset mechanism, and to some extent, 
this may indirectly alleviate the tight supply of allowances. When the carbon 
allowance price is too low, only some pilot areas like Shenzhen and Beijing allow the 
government to reduce market supply via allowance repurchases.
524
 In the Beijing 
pilot program, the municipal government sets aside up to 5% of total annual 
allowances for cost containment purposes. In the Shenzhen pilot program, the 
allowances reserved for this purpose include those buybacks that the competent 
agency purchases from the carbon market at the preset conditions, the annual buyback 
maximum amount of 10% of the total allowances in that year.
525
This cost containment 
mechanism aims to reduce market supply or increase market demand for allowances 
in order not to let the allowance price go below the predetermined floor level.
526
 In 
addition, banking is also allowed in the pilot phase, but borrowing is prohibited to 
improve the liquidity of the carbon market. And all pilot programs allow the use of the 
Chinese Certified Emission Reductions (CCERs) to some extent that meet the 
requirements of China‘s national measuring reporting and verification (MRV) 
regulation, ranging from 5% of their CO2 compliance obligation in Beijing and 
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Shanghai to 10% in Guangdong, Shenzhen and Tianjin.
527
 
 
Compared with European ETS practice and experience in other countries, the carbon 
emission allowance price intervention mechanism in China is rather imperfect; its 
feasibility may be confined to the narrow scope of provincial or municipal markets, 
but will not facilitate any future national emission trading market establishment. 
 
Inadequate compliance mechanisms result in low violation penalties, and cannot 
provide adequate safeguards and restraints to make enterprises comply with their 
obligations as required. Currently, pilot areas have stipulated different compliance 
obligation penalties for emission producers, including, among others, fines, allowance 
deductions for the next year, social credit exposure, and disqualification for 
government grants or incentive mechanisms; but overall, the deterrence is not enough.  
 
For example, Tianjin just disqualifies a breaching enterprise from enjoying relevant 
preferential policies,
528
 such as preferential policies of financial service,
529
recycling 
economy projects, energy saving projects for three years,
530
and Beijing only imposes 
fines.
531
Where fines are imposed, punishment is quite lenient. For instance, in 
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Shanghai, a breaching enterprise will be subject to a fine of RMB 50,000 to RMB 
100,000,
532
and in Guangdong, the fine is only RMB 50,000.
533
 
 
Trade capacity building is inadequate to facilitate future establishment of a uniform 
carbon market. China has promulgated Accounting Methods and Reporting 
Guidelines for the Greenhouse Gas Emission by the industries for carbon emission 
monitoring and reporting since 2013, and subjected certificated agencies to 
registration.
534
 
 
Up to date, three groups of industries are included in the guidelines. The first group of 
industries included 10 industries in 2013, such as electricity generation enterprises, 
electric grid enterprises, steel and iron, chemical production industries, electrolytic 
aluminum, magnesium smelting, plate glass, cement production enterprises, ceramics 
production enterprises, and aviation enterprises.
535
 The second group of 4 industries 
                                                                                                                                                                              
more than RMB 50,000 when it fails to rectify it within the specified period. When emissions by a key enterprise 
exceed its allowances, the municipal department responsible for climate change must order it to comply with its 
emission control obligations within a specified period, and may impose a fine of three to five times of average 
market price upon the excess allowance. See 
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more than RMB 100,000.  
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comply with its allowance surrender obligations, and if it refuses to surrender, in addition to a fine of RMB 50,000, 
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has been included in the guidelines since 2014, including oil and gas production 
enterprises, petrochemical engineering, coking, and coal production 
enterprises.
536
Subsequently, the accounting methods and reporting guidelines for 
GHG emissions for the third group of industries was issued by NDRC in 2015, 
encompassing paper and its products, nonferrous metals, electric equipment, 
mechanic equipment, mining, food tobacco alcohol and beverage, public building 
operating enterprises, land based transportation firms, fluorinated chemical, and other 
industries.
537
 
 
However, as for the regulation of MRV agencies, there are only general and principle 
provisions, without specific operational rules. Except for Shanghai, Beijing and 
Shenzhen, where detailed accounting and reporting guidelines have been promulgated, 
in pilot areas there are just principle and generalized provisions or no provisions at all 
and lack detailed implementing rules and consistency among existing rules.
538
Also, 
pilot areas have set up their own trading platforms, trading systems and registration 
and settlement mechanisms which vary greatly from place to place. This does not help 
the establishment of a uniform national carbon market in the future. 
 
Emission trading pilots in various areas are independent from each other, with very 
laggard exploration of regional carbon markets. So, those pilots that are included in 
the emission trading system in one area may move out of that area, giving rise to 
carbon leakage and emission regulation failure. For the moment, emission 
administration measures promulgated by pilot areas all fail to address the carbon 
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leakage issue, and this has and will restrain the efficacy of emission trading.  
 
However, China‘s national carbon market measures under discussion would have a 
positive effect on existing carbon markets as they will likely reduce competitiveness 
concerns amongst emission intensive and trade exposed industries and large 
manufacturers in other countries.
539
 And as more and more nations are exploring the 
introduction of carbon emissions trading regimes, the risks of carbon leakage and 
competitiveness distortions amongst China‘s major industries also could be 
reduced.
540
 
 
4.3. Different views for policy choice on an emission trading and a carbon tax 
With the development of an international climate negotiation agenda and the 
unfolding of negative impacts of climate change, countries across the world gradually 
have come to realize that they must employ proper policy instruments to regulate 
present and future greenhouse gas emissions so as to prevent the global climate from 
further disruption. Overall, emission regulation instruments adopted by countries 
across the world can be divided into three categories, that is, command and control 
regulation, market-based regulation and informational regulation. 
 
Specifically, nations and international society have been arguing over strengths, 
weaknesses, choice and applicability of these regulatory instruments, in particular, 
over comparison and selection of various incentive-based instruments.
541
China is not 
an exception, and for a long time, decision makers, regulated sectors, the public and 
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the academia have been thinking and discussing conflict and compatibility between a 
carbon tax and emission trading. Especially, seeing the drawbacks of present emission 
trading pilots, people are beginning to consider the possibility of introducing other 
regulatory instruments to control greenhouse gas emission. In short, different 
stakeholders, with different backgrounds and interest considerations, are likely to 
choose different regulatory instruments.  
 
Policy makers still take emission trading as a primary means of regulation up to now; 
regulated sectors, confined by existing administrative and industrial systems in China, 
are likely to accept what regulators have selected, but such support is based on their 
own interest. At present, without fair social cognition of climate change, the public 
tends to consider climate change as a less urgent environmental issue compared with 
environmental pollution. In fact, air pollution is correlated to carbon emission. 
Reduction of many air pollutants results in concomitant reductions of greenhouse 
gases or their precursors with global warming mitigation potential. The actions to 
remedy air pollution will also remediate climate change. Thus, the public in China 
right now prefers to give priority to treat pollution even though it equates with climate 
change mitigation and adaptation.  
 
4.3.1 Regulators: emission trading is still regarded as a primary means of 
regulation 
For regulators, the choice of incentive-based instruments for greenhouse gas emission 
reduction can be divided into two phases. In Phase 1 (before 2012), regulators were 
inclined to choose a carbon tax to control greenhouse gas emissions. In 2006, the 
Energy Research Institute of the NDRC assessed the effect of relevant taxes in China, 
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including an energy tax, fuel tax and carbon tax. In 2008, the Ministry of 
Environmental Protection (MEP) published a report, the Study of Carbon Balance 
Trade Framework in China, mentioning for the first time the adoption of a carbon tax 
policy. Later, in 2009, the Energy Research Institute conducted a separate study on a 
carbon tax and published the report Study of Carbon Tax Policy for China to Address 
Climate Changes, proposing a tax rate determination principle and implementation 
plan for a carbon tax in China.
542
Thereafter, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of 
Environmental Protection, the NDRC and the State Administration of Taxation, 
separately or jointly, began to carry out a series of studies on carbon tax policy. With 
such extensive research, a carbon tax seemed to be flourishing in China. In 2010, 
China promulgated the Carbon Tax Framework Design in China
543and ―Carbon Tax 
Policy Roadmap,‖ 544  expecting to impose a carbon tax after 2012. Relevant 
taskforces also drafted the proposal for the scope, basis and rate of taxation. For this, 
some experts even predicted that ―China will introduce carbon tax before an 
environmental tax‖545and ―a carbon tax will be introduced in China before an 
emission trading market.‖546 
 
However, the year 2012 was a turning point, and a carbon tax did not proceed as 
planned. Instead, in June 2012, a NDRC official openly suggested that a carbon tax is 
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an alternative rather than a must. The choice might be a carbon tax or emission 
trading. The reasoning for this was mainly that, if allowances are auctioned off, the 
purchase of the carbon emission permit in itself will have an effect of taxation, and a 
separate carbon tax would be unnecessary; if allowances are allocated for free, a 
carbon tax might be an additional choice.
547
Thereafter, the choice of instruments 
entered into Phase 2; that is, regulators proposed an emission trading system without 
fully giving up a carbon tax. As a possible means for regulation, a carbon tax would 
no longer stand alone, and would be incorporated into a broader environmental 
tax.
548
This provision was postponed until 2020.
549
 
 
Besides, with a consumption tax in China expanding to the goods with high pollution, 
high energy consumption and luxury items or services, it came to include an element 
of a carbon tax; and in order to avoid double taxation arising from a separate carbon 
tax, China decided not to be in a hurry to impose a carbon tax or perhaps choose to 
incorporate it into environmental tax rather than as a separate item of taxation.  
 
In recent years, China enacted a consumption tax, and overall, the direction is to 
expand its coverage, especially to items of high energy consumption, high pollution 
and high-grade consumer goods. Specifically, high energy consumption is closely 
related to carbon emissions, since carbon dioxide mainly comes from fossil fuel 
consumption, and high energy consumption usually results in high carbon dioxide 
emission and high pollution.  
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In August 2013, the NDRC issued a Notice on Stepping up Efforts to Ensure 
Accomplishing Energy Efficiency and Emission Reduction Target for 2013,
550
 
proposing to adjust the scope and rate structure of a consumption tax to apply to 
products that are energy-intensive and likely to cause environmental pollution. On 19 
November, 2014, the General Office of the State Council issued the Action Plan for 
Energy Development Strategy (2014-2020), explicitly requiring adjustment of the 
collection and rate of the energy consumption tax and included some products with 
high energy consumption and high pollution into the scope of collection.
551
 
Although international society generally has advised China to impose a carbon tax for 
greenhouse gas emission control, in March 2016, the Chinese Minister of Finance 
(MF) openly said, ―China will maintain adequate vigilance over a carbon tax, and 
instead of a separate carbon tax, China may include it into environmental tax or 
resource tax.‖552 
 
However, a carbon tax has not been included under the Law of Environmental Tax of 
PRC 2016.
553
 Therefore, for regulators, the China emission trading system is still the 
primary market means of emission control, and a uniform national carbon market will 
be piloted, while a carbon tax might be integrated into a resource or environmental tax 
and will no longer be considered as a separate regulatory instrument. So, in the short 
run, legislation and specific trading provisions and measures at national level will be 
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the focus and issues to be resolved.  
 
4.3.2 Regulated sectors: the emission trading system is relatively well accepted 
In China, due to its special administrative and industrial system, regulated sectors, 
including, among others, coal, chemical, power, petrochemical and cement, do not 
have any direct and final say in the choice of instruments for greenhouse gas emission 
reduction. However for a regulatory instrument adopted by the government, an 
enterprise would support the policy affirmatively or relatively, that is, support in an 
affirmative manner when the policy is favorable for it, and support it only in principle 
but raise a reservation when the policy is unfavorable to it. Generally, regulated 
sectors might prefer a carbon trading system instead of environmental taxation, but 
most of them are cautious about a carbon tax. For instance, prior to introduction of the 
emission trading system, there was a period of hot and extensive discussions about a 
carbon tax.  
 
A typical example is, in 2012, the Director of the CNOOC New Energy Research 
Center suggested that energy-intensive sectors should make early preparation to find 
solutions for a possible carbon tax to promote healthy and sustainable development. 
Specifically, he said that the following measures might be adopted: (1) active study 
and learning about carbon tax collection provisions promulgated by other countries 
for energy companies to find out possible responses; (2) active participation in 
formulating a national policy to promote the formulation of a carbon tax favorable to 
their development; (3) active carrying out CO2emission reduction, storage and 
utilization to seek a policy and fiscal support as well as tax exemption or refund in 
some projects as a carbon reduction incentive; (4) active development of a new energy 
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development strategy raising the share of green energy in total energy consumption; 
(5) active promotion of technical reform and innovation, enabling science and 
technology to play a more important role in reducing CO2emissions; (6) 
 
 
internationally, further publicizing their new CO2 emission reduction, storage and 
utilization activities.
554
 
 
Some sectors, such as power, proposed to postpone adoption of a carbon tax so as to 
avoid losses to their enterprises, but without firm and fundamental opposition to 
adoption of a carbon tax.
555
In 2013, when the Chinese government turned its attention 
from a carbon tax to an emission trading system, relevant enterprises, including those 
in power sector, also turned to study how to deal with an emission trading system.
556
 
 
Regulated sectors were reluctant to choose a carbon tax and called for prudence even 
if a carbon tax might make it easier for them to predict future behaviors and the 
principle of taxation neutrality would ensure no significant change of their tax burden. 
Reasons for caution might include that:  
 
(1) A carbon tax might significantly raise their cost burden, with a possible huge 
shock to the energy and chemical sectors and considerable impact on the entire 
                                                             
554 How Shall Energy Enterprises Take Precautions for Carbon Tax, CNOOC (March 12, 2012) 
http://www.boraid.cn/company_news/read_79651.html. 
555 Xuerui Zhu, Coal-fired Power Generation Is Not Yet Ready for Carbon Tax, China Energy News, at 18. 
(October 18, 2010). 
556 How Shall Power Generation Enterprises Respond to Carbon Emission Permit Trading? China Emission 
Trading (Dec. 30, 2013) http://www.tanpaifang.com/tanguihua/2013/1230/27597.html. 
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national economy. Take the chemical industry for example: a carbon tax might be 
tolerable if it was charged at RMB 10.00 per ton, but at RMB 100.00 per ton chemical 
products would see a sharp fall in profitability, and some might lose 
competitiveness.
557
So, some experts even thought that, if China were to adopt a 
carbon tax now, it might easily fall into a trap advantaging western countries, and the 
process and efficiency of its environmental governance might be affected. 
 
(2) Unlike developed countries, where greenhouse gas emission reduction is the 
priority, China has very serious about reducing conventional environmental pollution, 
and smog control was seen to be more imperative than carbon control. Although air 
pollutants and greenhouse gases are from the same sources: combustion of fossil fuels, 
even with de-sulphurization dioxide and de-nitrogen processing was thought to be 
cheaper and easier than de-carbonization from taxation. Imposition of a carbon tax 
was thought to increase the economic burden for industrial sectors. Furthermore, the 
reduction of air pollutants also has an effect to mitigate greenhouse gases emission 
simultaneously. 
 
(3) Some climate skeptics and deniers mistakenly maintained that the causation 
between greenhouse gas emission and climate change and human health was still 
unclear, and the assumption that anthropogenic greenhouse gases emissions cause 
global warming was questionable.
558
 
 
(4) Currently, the consumption tax has contained measures that include the results of a 
                                                             
557 Hongmei Han, Zongqin Gu et al., An analysis of the Impact of A Carbon Tax on Chemical Industry in China, 1 
Chemical Industry 1,10 (2014). 
558 Jijun Chen, The Industry is Calling for Prudence in Carbon Tax, China Chemical Industry News, at 6. 
(November 25, 2013).  
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carbon tax, and a separate carbon tax might lead to double taxation and aggravate 
enterprises‘ tax burden;559 
 
After 2013, as China began to pilot emission trading and quicken the establishment of 
a national carbon market, the petrochemical and other sectors all turned to be actively 
involved in creation of a domestic carbon market. Three reasons may explain this: in 
the first place, with previous experience from international project-based CDM, they 
were more ready to accept an emission trading system; in the second place, when an 
emission trading system represented a general trend, it was a necessary and rational 
choice for relevant enterprises since early participation might bring more benefits 
(mainly including an exemption period and free allowances) and avoid having a 
disadvantaged market position; in the third place, state-owned enterprises have 
actively participated in and played an exemplary role.  
 
For example, the three largest oil companies CNPC, Sinopec and CNOOC have 
carried out a ―Carbon Asset Management practice‖ for participation in emission 
trading system.
560
 According to estimates, Sinopec, CNPC and CNOOC respectively 
have 26, 8 and 8 enterprises being included in carbon trading pilots. Sinopec has the 
largest number of enterprises included, and so has attached great importance to carbon 
trading. In May 2014, Sinopec printed and distributed the Measures of Sinopec for 
Carbon Asset Management (Trial), with a purpose to strengthen carbon asset 
management, realize the value of carbon assets and promote the green development 
                                                             
559 Is Carbon Tax the Only Choice for Energy Saving and Emission Reduction? China Energy Saving Industry 
(May 4, 2016) http://www.china-esi.com/pat/61754.html. 
560 Carbon Asset Management refers to activities relating to carbon monitoring, disclosure, mitigation, trade, 
avoidance of risks, seizing opportunities and improving competitiveness in the low-carbon era. Tan Pai Fang 
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strategy. The Measures have defined in detail the responsibility and division of duties 
for functional departments, branches and subsidiaries under Sinopec, and forcefully 
promoted Sinopec‘s carbon asset management.  
 
As was estimated, in the two compliance periods alone, i.e. 2013 and 2014, 26 pilot 
enterprises under Sinopec traded up to 3.89 million tons, amounting to RMB 140 
million and accounting for 8% of the total volume in China. The extent of Sinopec‘s 
participation in emission trading, in terms of scale as well as depth, is one of the 
greatest among state-owned enterprises. Moreover, it has participated in the China 
Beijing Environment Exchange and Shanghai Environment and Energy Exchange, 
becoming the only central enterprise that has participated in two carbon exchanges.  
 
Besides, Sinopec has been planning and responding to the national carbon markets for 
the future, and at Sinopec‘s Energy Saving and Environmental Protection Conference 
2016, Sinopec Chairman Yupu Wang proposed to manage carbon assets with 
reference to foreign experience, and subject carbon assets to centralized management, 
unify emission trading operations, maximize carbon asset values, and strengthen the 
tracking and study of uniform national carbon market rules. Meanwhile, the largest 
central enterprises in the petrochemical sector, such as CNPC, CNOOC and 
CHEMCHINA, have actively taken inventory of carbon emissions and built their 
capacity to prepare for a national carbon market.
561
 
 
However, the power sector raised opinions and suggestions on an emission trading 
system, including the following: (1) with stricter allowances and rising of paid 
                                                             
561 Rui Jia, Lei Meng, Carbon Asset Management Practice and Recommendations for Chinese Oil Companies, 12 
Commercial Accounting 7, 9 (2015).  
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allowances, enterprises would be under growing operation pressures; (2) due to a 
recent economic downturn, annual load rates would be decreasing, renovation would 
not result in effective emission reduction, and compliance would be affected; (3) the 
benchmark for Combined Heat and Power (CHP) installations was not reasonable, 
and there were a lot of loopholes of the current policies from the industrial 
dimension.
562
 
 
4.3.3 The public has not formed any specific preference in instrument choice 
In a democratic society, the principle of accountability requires decision makers to be 
responsible to the electorate, and so, their policy agenda and choice of regulatory 
instruments all should take into account the public interest; that is, policy makers have 
to prioritize various policy issues and choose proper regulatory instruments for them 
on the basis of analyzing and considering public interests and needs. Therefore, at 
least theoretically, public attention to a certain issue directly relates to whether the 
government will take it as something important to be resolved immediately, and 
public reaction to a regulatory instrument adopted by the government for a certain 
issue also serves as a basis for the government to insist on or improve or even give up 
this instrument.  
 
In China, there is not a public preference as to which regulatory instrument should be 
employed to curb greenhouse gas emission. A main reason is that, currently, climate 
change, as a social issue, is not a top public priority among environmental issues. The 
public is unaware of the importance of climate change and thus does not consider 
                                                             
562 Yuping Wei, An Interview with Zhixuan Wang, the Vice Secretary General of the China Electricity Council: 
Power Companies all to be included into National Carbon Market and Allowances to be Reformed, 21ST CENTURY 
BUSINESS HERALD, at 20 (February 18, 2016). 
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climate change as an important issue, let alone thinking about the choice of regulatory 
instruments.  
 
According to an authoritative survey of the public‘s knowledge of and reaction to 
climate change, only 5.5% of respondents consider environmental issue being the 
most important, and of them, only 5.7% think climate change as the most important 
environmental issue for China, while the top ones are chemical and fertilizer pollution 
(10.1%), household waste disposal (17.7%), water pollution (20%) and air pollution 
(34.7%).
563
As for the environmental issue that has the greatest impact on individuals 
and households, the Chinese are even more inattentive to the impact of climate change, 
choosing air pollution (25.6%) and household waste disposal (20.9%) and water 
pollution (18.6%), with climate change in the 7
th
 place with only (3.8%).
564
 
 
Certainly, there is one thing not to be overlooked. In the future, with climate change 
study rapidly developing in China and elsewhere and the impact of climate change 
increasingly prominent, public knowledge of and reaction to climate change will have 
a significant change, and the public will turn to think about which instrument is the 
best choice for greenhouse gas emission reduction. For the public, as consumers, their 
interests are naturally separated from or to some extent even opposed to various 
emitters of greenhouse gas (enterprises want to reduce production cost and raise price, 
while consumers wish them to raise quality and reduce the selling price). 
 
In thinking about the choice of regulatory instruments, the Chinese may have the 
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Climate Change, 4 Sociological Review of China 1,6 (2013). 
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following inclinations: (1) consumers seldom pay attention to enterprises‘ production 
cost, and just care about product quality and the customer‘s unit price. So, extra cost 
pressure incurred by enterprises due to greenhouse gas emissions reduction is not the 
focus of public attention. On the contrary, they might be concerned about the 
regulatory efficiency of the chosen instrument;  
 
(2) Command and control instruments, backed by public authority, are the most 
efficient. Regarding incentive-based instruments, a carbon trade would lead to 
leveling the ground for competition among companies; with the innovation of state of 
art low carbon technology, the top companies would provide cheaper commodities for 
consumers. Thus, a carbon trade system would be more attractive than a carbon tax to 
consumers. With a relative preference for efficiency, the public might choose a 
command and control instrument in the first place, then a carbon trade, and last 
carbon tax;  
 
(3) The public might choose a carbon trade, not only because it would offer a cheaper 
price for consumers, but also because individuals would be allowed to participate in 
the emission trading system;
565
 and  
 
(4) In the future, when the public might have a better knowledge of climate change, 
instruments for informational regulation are expected to play a better role; for 
example, low-carbon product certification may be employed to promote public 
participation in combating climate change.  
                                                             
565 Art. 19, Interim Administrative Measures on Carbon Emission Trading, NRDC 
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4.3.4 Academia: combines emission trading with carbon tax instruments 
The academic circle has had the most heated and detailed debate over the choice 
between emission trading and a carbon tax. Relevant discussions are based on a basic 
assumption: the hypothesis of perfect competition and zero transaction cost is hard to 
be satisfied. Thus, carbon tax and emission trading, as two regulatory instruments, 
often have different effects.
566
As previously stated, a tax increases the price of 
emissions in the market but has no assured emission reduction. It is much simpler. It 
requires a measure to relieve the burden of higher prices on the poor. Cap and Trade 
by contrast assures the quantity of emission reduction, but does not directly affect the 
price. Ideally, it permits emission reductions that can be made at least cost while 
relieving a reduction obligation from polluters for whom reduction is more expensive, 
thus reducing the overall cost of emission reduction. However, the high cost producer 
which purchases emission trading rights may cause severe health and pollution 
damages; and the system can be more easily gamed. 
 
Despite varying opinions in the academia, there is a basic consensus that carbon taxes 
and cap and trade need not be an ―either-or‖ proposition. Instead, they can be 
supplementary and made compatible with each other.
567
 
 
In summary, at present, emission trading and carbon tax are both candidate choices 
for greenhouse gas emission regulation in China, and there are the following three 
opinions in general: 
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(1) The first theory proposes to make a choice between a carbon tax and emission 
trading in both the short run and long run. Given their characteristics and national 
conditions, in the short run, China may introduce a carbon tax to induce enterprises to 
update technology and adjust industrial structure. But in the long run, carbon emission 
trading would be a better means for regulation.
568
 It is reported that, a carbon tax pilot 
may be launched in 2019, and in 2020 when a national uniform carbon emission 
trading market has achieved a stable operation, China can formally turn to a mix of a 
carbon tax and carbon emission trading to subject carbon emissions to price as well as 
quantity control.
569
In this viewpoint, based on marginal analysis, introducing a carbon 
tax in the short run, carrying out emission control, monitoring and verification and 
establishing a relevant legal system and regulatory measures are required first, and 
then an emission trading system can be adopted when conditions are more mature.
570
 
 
(2) The second theory proposes to employ a carbon tax and an emission trading by 
categories of the regulated enterprises. For example, the author of one paper has 
suggested applying emission trading to large emitters, and a carbon tax to the 
multitude of small and medium enterprises.
571
Another author has proposed to subject 
large pollution sources to online monitoring and a carbon emission trading system, 
and using a carbon tax to regulate dispersed sources of emission outside the carbon 
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emission trading system, enabling both of them to fully play their roles.
572
 
 
(3)The third theory proposes to connect emission trading to a carbon tax. For example, 
one expert has proposed to adopt an inclusive approach to deal with their connection; 
that is, enterprises that are subject to carbon tax and have joined the ETS may be 
entitled to a lower carbon tax.
573
 For instance, Switzerland has introduced a carbon 
tax and carbon trade subsequently, and allowed firms making choice between the two 
options by their discretion. If a firm signed carbon emission reduction agreement, it 
will be exempted from a carbon tax.
574
 UK has also implemented a carbon tax and 
carbon trading at the same time. British government allows firms to sign carbon 
emission reduction agreement. According to the agreement, energy intensive 
enterprises may receive 80 percent climate change levy reduction if they achieve their 
carbon reduction targets.
575
 
 
 
Chapter 5 Policy and Legislation Recommendations for  
National Carbon Trading System in China 
 
As mentioned above, for regulators, in the future, emission trading is still a primary 
means of regulation, and would be combined with carbon tax when political and 
policy environment is proper. So, for future establishment of a national carbon market, 
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a focal point is whether and how to effectively solve problems found during the 
emission trading pilot, and whether a carbon tax and emission trading are compatible.  
 
The EU ETS was launched in 2005 and has made extraordinary institutional 
achievements in the past decade. An analysis and diagnosis of the evolution of the EU 
ETS, problems identified up to now and relevant factors may provide meaningful 
information to help China to develop and improve its carbon market and to avoid 
detours and exploit its advantages as a late comer in establishing a uniform national 
carbon market.  
 
Similar to the evolution of the EU ETS, emission trading in China is also found to 
have a number of systematic and structural deficiencies. Undoubtedly, the expansion 
of emission trading market will contribute to market stability on the one hand and 
have a scale effect on the other hand, and thus reduce transaction costs, minimize 
emission reduction costs and realize the policy objective of greenhouse gas emission 
reduction.  
 
But, when the market expands, its unresolved systematic deficiencies are likely to 
escalate and to disrupt the orderly and healthy development of the emission trading 
market; it may even affect economic development and greenhouse gas emission 
reduction efforts in other countries. As a result, China should be prudent in 
establishing a national emission trading market, removing possible structural 
deficiencies in connection with present emission trading and resolving them through 
policy and legislation on the basis of national conditions and with reference to 
experience in other countries, so as to build a more scientific and reasonable emission 
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trading system. Hence, this chapter has two recommendations for future development 
of the ETS in China: 1) to consistently establish and improve a Chinese characteristic 
legal system for emission trading, and 2) to design a hybrid governance framework 
that integrates various regulatory instruments for carbon emissions. 
 
 
5.1 Build a sound legal system for emission trading in China 
5.1.1. Upgrade and improve laws and regulations on emission trading 
Emission trading involves cap determination, allocation and trading of carbon 
emission allowances and relevant market control and regulation mechanisms. While 
making decisions on the determination and allocation of carbon emission allowances, 
the government imposes corresponding obligations upon greenhouse gases emitters 
covered by the emission trading system, including surrendering allowances within a 
specified time.  
 
Pursuant to the Legislation Law of PRC, imposing a regulated entity‘s or individual‘s 
obligation shall be specified by laws or administrative regulations.
576
 China now is 
drafting the Law on Dealing with Climate Change, under which emission trading 
legislation should be established.
577
 China can set forth a special clause or section to 
provide for principles in connection with emission trading, and formulate 
administrative regulations to define specific rules of law for emission trading, for 
example, in drafting regulations for the Carbon Emission Trading Administration.
578
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No doubt, future new regulations should combine the present Interim Measures for 
the Carbon Emission Trading Administration,
579
 and Interim Measures for the 
Administration of Transactions in Voluntary Emission Reduction of Greenhouse 
Gas.
580
The regulations should set forth specific, explicitly required and harmonized 
emission trading rules on the basis of relevant policy and legislative experience in 
other countries and pilot practices at provincial and municipal levels.  
 
Besides, implementing rules and technical measures should be formulated within 
relevant legal frameworks, including operational guidelines, technical standards, rules 
and measures in connection with greenhouse gas emission monitoring, reporting and 
verification, certification and the like. For this purpose, a national emission trading 
law or regulation is necessary to authorize emission trading at the national level, 
providing uniform guidelines and methodologies on ETS design and operation, with 
enforcement of MRV and penalties for non-compliance at the minimum, ascribing 
allowances as financial assets, and so forth.
581
 
 
 
5.1.2. Modify and improve rules for the primary emission trading market 
To meet the obligations of its Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) for 
emission reductions under the Paris Agreement of the UNFCCC, in light of the 
economic impact in China of the cap and trade program emission caps, China caps 
                                                                                                                                                                              
http://www.tanpaifang.com/zhengcefagui/2016/032951731.html. 
579 Interim Measures for Carbon Emission Trading Administration NDRC, (2014). 
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should be calibrated in accordance with their intensity reduction, rather than a 
quantitative reduction requirement as adopted in the EU ETS. This is more flexible, 
and can be proportionally connected to greenhouse gas emission through other factors, 
such as output, taxation, etc. In this way emission reduction would perhaps not have a 
significant impact on economic growth.  
 
However, since the climate problem comes from ongoing accumulation of total 
greenhouse gas emissions, a relative target, without assuring reduction of total 
emissions, is often criticized. Because an intensity target does not necessarily require 
firms to decrease overall production emissions, the allocations under intensity targets 
could be adjusted ex-post, and this could lead to over allocation of allowances.
582
 
However, unlike developed countries, developing countries have to face the double 
challenges of reducing emissions and maintaining economic growth and improvement 
of peoples‘ livelihoods. Thus, in the short or medium term, it is more practical for 
China to choose a relative target.  
 
In short, ―a carbon intensity cap, is less controversial within China, because it is seen 
as less likely to conflict with rapid GDP growth‖,583though an absolute carbon cap has 
the advantage of making emission reductions predictable.
584
Unlike most existing cap 
and trade systems, China‘s carbon market should allow for additional emission growth, 
just less than would be expected without a carbon trading system.
585
 
 
Currently, the seven pilot areas all have proposed their own emission control targets 
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(cutting down CO2emissions per unit of gross output value) on the basis of a period 
from 2010 to 2015, with intensity reduction targets of 18 percent in Beijing, 19 
percent in Shanghai, 15 percent in Tianjin, 17 percent in Chongqing, 15 percent in 
Shenzhen, 19.5 percent in Guangdong and 17 percent in Hubei.
586
 
  
 
Also, the proposed draft Law on Dealing with Climate Change of the PRC or the draft 
Regulations on Carbon Emission Trading Administration should explicitly provide for 
the legal nature of emission allowances or certified emission reductions (CERs) as a 
new sort of property right to avoid the drawbacks of taking allowances as a permit 
and to provide the market with stable expectations.  
 
To prevent local protectionism from causing similar oversupply of allowances as in 
early stages of the EU ETS, China should adopt a centralized allocation approach. It is 
up to central government to decide a national cap and allocate it as per specific 
principles to various provinces and municipalities, with due consideration of 
―waterbed effect‖587associated with centralized allocations.588 Regarding this national 
distribution of carbon allowances, carbon reduction from one area should not be 
allowed to be offset by the increases in another area, because of lax regulation or 
oversupply of allowances. The proposed law or regulation should ensure that this 
phenomenon is avoided.  
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With reference to policy and legislation practice in the EU, China should gradually 
raise the share of auctioning until free allocation is totally revoked and grant different 
transition periods and decreased free allowances to different sectors in accordance 
with their specific circumstances. It also should harmonize rules for new entrants and 
those that opt out to avoid adverse selection or misplaced incentives, and allocate free 
allowances on the basis of a ―benchmark rule‖, i.e. the average performance of the 10 
percent most efficient installations in a sector or subsector, instead of a ―grandfather 
clause.‖ Moreover, to resolve information asymmetry between government and 
businesses, misstatements of installation output should be subject to ex post 
accountability.
589
 
 
China should gradually expand the scope of emission control, including greenhouse 
gas categories and sectors covered by the ETS, and exclude small installations that 
may not easily absorb administrative costs.  
 
To avoid of unfair competition and carbon leakage, China should establish a ―carbon 
leakage list‖ for the emissions of intensive and trade exposed industries, such as 
aluminum or steel, such as what the EU has already done.
590
 
 
5.1.3. Enhance the efficacy of secondary emission trading market regulation 
After four decades of market economy oriented reform, China is ―closer than ever to a 
real market economy‖, but ―it still differs from a mature free market economy in 
several substantial ways, including heavy government control and intervention, the 
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significant share of state-owned enterprises, as well as a non-liberalized price control 
system and distortions within the financial sector‖.591 
 
China‘s pilot ETS programs experienced low carbon prices accompanied by low 
trading volumes. The liquidity of carbon credits is extremely low in comparison with 
the total emissions cap.
592
In order to facilitate more efficient and healthy development 
of the secondary emission trading market, China should consistently improve its 
emission trading market liquidity and activity.  
 
China should diversify market participants. Currently, not only enterprises but also 
individuals are allowed to participate in the ETS pilots as voluntary participants. This 
initiative has been explicitly regulated in the implementation plans of Shenzhen, 
Tianjin, Hubei and Chongqing.
593
 The purpose of the design for allowing individuals 
to participate in the pilot ETS programs is to promote the trading activity, and absorb 
more social funds and investments to combat climate change. In addition, 
policymakers expect that the involvement of individuals in the ETS might also raise 
their awareness of social responsibility.
594
 However, individuals‘ involvement in 
carbon trading market is similar to futures trading in the pilot ETS programs, and it 
could cause carbon price deviation from the exact abatement costs. The money 
collected from individuals is likely not to be available for carbon emissions‘ 
reduction.
595
 In this regard, incentives for enterprises participation and restrictions on 
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individual trading are necessary.
596
 
 
China should also promote active participation of market players. On the one hand, 
regulators should insist on a long-term emission reduction policy so that market 
participants may anticipate the future and properly arrange their emission reductions. 
On the other hand, non-compliance penalties should be increased enough so as to 
restrain or deter the potential violations from the participants in the carbon market. 
  
 
Orderly participation of various market players should be promoted. China should 
improve and harmonize provisions on allowances and CER credit trading as soon as 
possible, and use a format contract to stipulate rights and obligations of various 
market players.  
 
Legal tools to regulate allowance monopolies identified in the process of carbon 
trading pilots should be adopted to enhance market liquidity and activity, and to 
formulate anti-unfair competition and anti-monopoly rules for emission allowance 
and CER credit trading. Stakeholders of the ETS programs, particularly policymakers 
and those who are able to access the information of policymaking and allowances 
allocation should be prohibited from participating in emissions trading, from the 
perspective of risk prevention.
597
 
 
China should identify synergies between the ETS and other climate and energy 
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policies.
598
 Industrial energy efficiency is regarded as crucial to reduce energy 
demand and GHG emissions. The significance of policy coherence between the 
energy saving programs and the national carbon market cannot be overlooked as 
industry is the main contributor to China‘s carbon emissions. For China to achieve a 
peak in its carbon emissions by 2030 or earlier, industry emissions will have to peak 
in 2020.
599
 
 
China is exploring energy markets through energy saving credit transactions. Thus, 
corporations participating in energy efficiency and conservation could have quotas for 
energy use, and the credits from energy saving and conservation program could be 
allowed to trade in the energy credit market. These policies could have offsetting 
effects to each other, and thus lead to less effectiveness of the carbon market under 
construction. Thus, how to synergize these intertwining policies is a tough question 
for the carbon market.  
 
5.1.4. Improve emission trading market control and regulation mechanisms 
China should rationalize the emission trading administration system and clarify 
competent authorities and specific departments in charge of emission trading and their 
respective powers and duties. 
 
In addition to creating provisions for an allowance reserve, inter-period usage and 
government buyback, and allowances for banking and borrowing, China should 
further improve an emission offset mechanism in pilot areas and introduce a pricing 
mechanism to form a sounder carbon price intervention mechanism. 
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While the pilots reserve some allowances for cost containment purposes, the difficulty 
lies in setting aside an appropriate level of allowances for this end. The triggering 
conditions for a cost containment mechanism have not yet been determined for most 
of the seven pilot programs.
600
 Though the Beijing pilot program has already set the 
triggering conditions based on the average price of allowances over ten consecutive 
trading days, it‘s unclear whether the size of reserved allowances is sufficient at a 
given triggering price.
601
 
 
A price ceiling and a price floor in the market has been suggested. A price floor will 
remove downside risks for investors while delivering its objective of cutting carbon 
emissions efficiently.
602
 As for a price ceiling, it would be very helpful to limit the 
potential market power of a few of given larger players in a small, fragmented 
market.
603
A price floor should be set to be higher than the lowest abatement cost 
projected for the trading sectors, but no less than carbon tax levels to be introduced.
604
 
Moreover, for the purpose of reducing the number of allowances in circulation and 
increasing the price, further incentivizing other parties to reduce carbon emissions by 
allowing non-emitting parties to purchase allowances should be allowed.
605
 
 
It is necessary to establish a strong compliance and enforcement regime, and build a 
uniform national compliance mechanism on the basis of the penalty provisions 
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adopted in some of the pilots. Compared with the penalty of EUR 100 for 1 ton CO2e 
imposed by the EU, in China, incentives, disincentives and penalties in connection 
with carbon trading pilots are inadequate or missing, and as a result, in the area of 
environmental legislation, it is frequently mentioned that compliance is expensive and 
violation is cheap.
606
 
 
China is confronting a serious challenge in reducing its overall carbon emissions and 
aiming to peak its emissions by 2030 with the possibility of peaking them by 2025. 
Having a binding emission reduction goal, with an ambitious cap supported by rule of 
law, will enable the national carbon market to be an effective climate policy 
instrument.
607
 Thus, a carrot-and-stick approach should be employed by the national 
market, in which there are rewards for effective compliance and implementation, but 
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negative legal consequences if a regulated entity is non-compliant.
608
 
 
Harmonized and more stringent national MRV rules are indispensable, and the 
regulation of third-party emission trading service providers should also be 
strengthened so at to ensure high quality, truthfulness and consistency of emission 
data and information.  
 
Some have already expressed their concern about the over allocation of 
allowances.
609
This over-allocation problem is caused by the markets‘ over reliance on 
self-reported data from companies and industries.
610
 This creates ―perverse incentives‖ 
for firms to exaggerate data to ensure they get as many allowances as possible.
611
 
Over allocation will result in an artificially low allowance price and lead to no 
motivation for companies and industries to innovate or invest in more low-carbon 
technologies.
612One authority holds that, ―given allowances ascribed as financial 
assets, this is even crucial to ensure each unit of emissions reduction reliable and 
comparable among sectors and across pilots and regions,‖613also attributing the 
significant variations in consistency and reliability of the emissions data measured, 
reported and verified on the basis of their local MRV guidelines across the seven 
pilots to the lack of a national uniform MRV standard.
614
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A national uniform registry system should be established as a centralized platform to 
trade, surrender and cancel emission allowances or CERs credits.  
 
A mechanism to monitor, prevent and address carbon leakage should be provided, in 
order to ensure that emission reduction is truthful and effective, and the ETS will not 
cause unfair institutional consequences.  
 
Although the national carbon market under design likely does not connect to other 
international, national or regional carbon markets in the short run, the issue of  
 
 
market linkage with other nations and regions in the future should be taken into 
account.
615
 
 
Article 6 of the Paris Agreement provides a multilateral hook for carbon market 
cooperation between groups of countries by recognizing their ability to engage in 
international transfers of mitigation outcomes.
616
In light of article 6 of the Paris 
Agreement, a cooperative, voluntary approach, including the international transfer of 
mitigation measures to achieve independent national contributions is encouraged. 
Parties should not only promote sustainable development but also ensure 
environmental integrity and transparency, including governance. Prudent accounting 
methods should be used, in particular to ensure that double counting is avoided, 
consistent with guidance adopted by the Agreement of the Conference of the Parties 
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(COP).
617
 
 
The prospects for the linkage with other existing and future international carbon 
trading market remain unclear.
618
 However, China could participate in carbon market 
cooperation through a multilateral carbon market club. Eighteen countries led by New 
Zealand signed a ministerial declaration on carbon markets at COP 21.
619
These 
countries would likely form a multilateral carbon market club, and develop standards 
and norms for carbon markets in the future, so as to achieve their GHG reduction 
targets set in their NDCs respectively in light of the Paris Agreement. This club 
approach makes it easier to agree on provisions for accounting, offset use, and 
allowance transfers outside of the UNFCCC process rather than within it.
620
These 
provisions could then feed into the UNFCCC process on similar rules for international 
cooperation under article 6 of the Paris Agreement.
621
 
 
For the long run, China should explore forward trading of carbon allowances as it 
gains some experience from the uniform national carbon market.
622
 The seven pilots 
only probed spot trading for carbon allowances
623
 during the experimental period, 
and building a national market will allow spot trading at the early stage. Other carbon 
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https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=a0b77621-3b70-42d3-aa1a-2a95e65cb92d, Spot trading for 
carbon allowances refers to the transactions of allowances for immediate delivery, as opposed to at a set date. Spot 
trading for carbon allowances needs to deliver a certain amount of carbon allowances from a seller‘s account to a 
buyer‘s account within a certain period of time, for instance, one day, similar to the transaction of a stock market.   
175 
 
trading options, such as futures,
624
 forwards
625
 for carbon allowances, etc. are also 
important tools for robust liquidity and market stability.
626
 The more trading products 
available for the carbon market, the greater the liquidity is.
627
Given that carbon 
futures and forwards are necessary to determine the proper value of the carbon credits 
that are traded, and that corporations need forward price disclosure to make future 
investment decisions, a carbon market without forward price disclosure cannot be 
effective to timely trace market price trends and take preventative measures to avoid 
the risk from the market.
628
 
 
5.2. Integrate various carbon emission regulation instruments 
The choice of regulatory instruments for greenhouse gas emission reduction is always 
a hot issue for national governments, regulated sectors, the public and the academia. 
Countries will choose different regulatory instruments in accordance with national 
conditions. As policy and legislation practice across the world indicates, different 
countries, even though they have chosen the same regulatory instrument, are inclined 
to design their unique institutions.  
 
In recent years, the academic circle and regulators have begun to show an interest in 
integrating various regulatory instruments, and some countries have begun to 
introduce a variety of regulatory instruments to curb greenhouse gas emissions. For 
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instance, in Sweden and the Great Britain, in addition to a mix of carbon tax and 
emission trading, informational regulation is also attempted. While in the United 
States and some developing countries, in addition to command and control regulation, 
incentive-based regulatory instruments are available as well. But in China, regulators 
still take emission trading policy as a primary regulatory instrument to date, with little 
progress on a carbon tax, low-carbon product certification and other regulatory 
instruments. In light of synergies of various instruments and existing policy and 
legislation experience in various countries, this paper concludes that, the national 
emission trading market to be established in China will not be stand-alone, and 
instead, will work with and employ a mix of regulatory instruments. Specifically, such 
a mix of instruments may include the following: 
  
 
5. 2.1 Integrate incentive-based instruments with other regulatory tools 
With cost and benefit advantages over command and control regulation, 
incentive-based instruments have been the favorite choice for policy makers and 
academic circle in various countries.
629
 
 
However, such comparison might have three drawbacks: first, it fails to take into 
account the impact of political and diplomatic factors on emission reduction 
mechanisms and the uncertainty of different means of emission reduction; second, it 
overlooks specific social background, categories of pollutants, institutional and 
technical levels, all of which will have an impact on emission reduction; third, it does 
not account for the different impact on emission producers‘ environmental 
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awareness.
630
Therefore, it is suggested that economists might have exaggerated their 
differences, and carbon emission trading should be within the command and control 
framework.
631
 
 
According to some authorities, command and control regulation should be the 
institutional basis for incentive-based instruments: the latter decides its indicators on 
the basis of the former, such as subsidy caps and allowances, carbon tax rate, trading 
allowance caps, etc., while the former is an institutional safeguard for the latter‘s 
effective implementation. Take emission trading for example, its normal operation 
often requires using administrative means to ensure and supervise truthfulness and 
reliability of emission data provided by enterprises, or else there might arise the 
―effect of the lemon‘s market‖632 and ―bad money drives out good‖.  
 
To produce the proper level of carbon emission permits, it is necessary to use 
environmental impact assessment to ensure predictable decreases in emission 
caps.
633
Meanwhile, the development of informational regulation has brought new 
changes to greenhouse gas emission reduction regulation, and in particular, 
low-carbon product certification will help involve the public into greenhouse gas 
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emission reduction efforts. For instance, a lesson that could be learned from 
Shanghai‘s pilot program is its practice of including non-compliance in the credit 
record of non-complying entities and making it public to financial institutions and the 
general public.
634
While the penalty for non-complying entities in Shanghai‘s pilot 
program is not the strictest in comparison with other pilots, it achieved 100 percent 
compliance, due to this informational tool.  
 
From 2007, the Ministry of Environmental Protection has worked with the People‘s 
Bank of China on a new credit-evaluation system under which corporations‘ 
environmental compliance records are incorporated into the bank‘s credit-evaluation 
system.
635
 In the same year, the Ministry announced a ―green credit‖ policy jointly 
with the People‘s Bank of China and China Banking Regulation Commission under 
which offending corporations will be barred from receiving credits.
636
 Thus, this 
informational instrument would be another avenue to increase the rate of compliance 
in the undertaking national emission trading market.
637
In brief, China should develop 
and improve tools for informational regulation, while continuing to introduce other 
incentive-based tools. 
 
5.2.2. Integrate various incentive-based regulatory instruments 
 
China can integrate emission trading with energy efficiency subsidies; the purpose of 
the latter is to encourage emission producers to take diverse measures to accomplish 
energy efficiency and emission reduction targets assigned by the government.  
                                                             
634 Supra note 432, at 22.  
635 Id. 
636 Supra note 432, at 2.  
637 Id. 
179 
 
 
In addition, China may need to consider imposing carbon taxes to level the playing 
field.
638
Carbon taxes to level the playing ground between the sectors covered and 
those sectors not covered in the regions operating, and those without the operation of 
carbon emission trading.
639
As such, carbon taxes could integrate sectors and regions 
not covered by carbon emission trading systems.
640
 
 
The newly enacted Environmental Taxation Law of PRC 2016 does not provide 
carbon taxes, but article 43 of the revised Environmental Law of PRC 2014 has 
already provided a legal basis for carbon taxes.  
Conclusion 
From CDM-based carbon trading to transactions in Voluntary Emission Reduction of 
greenhouse gases to allowance-based emission trading piloted in seven provinces and 
municipalities, emission trading in China is in an evolution from single project-based 
trading to a dualistic mix of allowance-based and project-based patterns. In the 
post-Kyoto period, international negotiation on climate change has made 
breakthrough since the COP 21 Paris climate summit.  
 
In 2012 the NDRC promulgated the Interim Measures for the Administration of 
Transactions in Voluntary Emission Reduction of Greenhouse Gas for the purpose of 
promoting project-based emission trading; but without a compulsory emission 
reduction mechanism, and with inadequate provisions for internal motivation, its 
effect was very limited.  
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In 2013, China began to pilot carbon trading in seven places. China formally 
introduced an allowance-based trading system that provided a positive incentive for 
emission reductions. By June 2016, emission trading in China had maintained a fair 
momentum of growth, and provided valuable institutional experience for establishing 
a national carbon market, and effectively curbed the rise of greenhouse gas emissions. 
However, like the EU ETS, the pilot programs have revealed a number of institutional 
deficiencies in emission trading as mentioned above. 
 
Given these problems, regulators, the public, regulated sectors and the academic circle 
in China turned to reconsider the fitness and rationality of this emission trading 
system as an optimal instrument for greenhouse gas regulation. Based on their own 
interests, various parties have different policy viewpoints. For regulators, emission 
trading is still a primary instrument, and the focus in the short run is the establishment 
and improvement of a national carbon emission trading market starting immediately 
2017. However, it cannot be denied that, arguments and debates will help further 
clarify future policy development in connection with national carbon trading system.  
 
Among the most developed emission trading markets in the world, the EU ETS is the 
world‘s largest carbon market in terms of participating countries and trade volume, 
and so far has undergone three phases. The problems arising and revisions thus made 
at EU level may be a valuable reference for China to establish a national carbon 
trading system (CTS). Based on national circumstances in China and the evolution of 
the EU ETS, this paper has raised relevant recommendations to address problems 
identified in the course of the carbon trading pilots, proposing the development 
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direction of the future emission trading market in China. The recommendation is to 
consistently improve the legal system for emission trading market on the one hand, 
and actively integrate various regulatory instruments on the other hand, so as to 
systematically regulate greenhouse gas emission reduction.  
 
 
